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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers serve many masters. They are fiduciaries with respect to their
clients, but at the same time are called upon to serve as “officers of the
court.” They are charged with advancing their clients’ causes, regardless of
whether those aims are consonant with social justice, but they are also duty-
bound to avoid inflicting unjustified harm on third parties, a standard which
presupposes that lawyers must develop and respect some vision of the public
good. Some recent criticism, especially from feminist legal theorists, also
calls upon lawyers to recognize the impact of their activity on the network of
human relationships that makes meaningful social life possible, to avoid
disrupting settled relationships, and to promote the flourishing of
interpersonal connections. At the same time, respecting one party’s interest in
a dispute or transaction frequently requires devaluing the interests of others,
treating non-clients as less than full persons. Because these plural, conflicting
obligations derive from the social function of the lawyer, from “legal norms
and principles that form fundamental underlying precepts for our polity—
background norms that contribute to and result from the moral development
of our political community”1— legal ethics should be understood
functionally, as a question of how to channel lawyers’ behavior in socially
desirable ways.2
This article is aimed at understanding what happens when these
professional duties conflict. Many commentators on legal ethics start with
one value— loyalty to one’s client, social justice, fidelity to a set of legal
norms, or, most recently, interpersonal considerations such as care, mercy,
and connectedness— and seek to establish the primacy of that value in a
lawyer’s moral analysis. Arguments of this sort can be quite sophisticated.
For example, a frequently encountered contention is that social justice and
partiality to one’s client are not incompatible, because justice in the long run
requires lawyers who will represent their clients’ interests zealously. Of
course, opposing arguments can be constructed— maintaining, for example,
that a client is entitled only to a measure of loyalty that is compatible with
1. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1008 (1989).
2. See, e.g., JACK L. SAMMONS, JR., LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1988); Robert L. Nelson &
David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in
LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION
180-81 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992); William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the
Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565, 568 (1985);. The roots of the functional concept of
professional ethics can be found in Durkheim’s hypothesis that occupational groups filled the
normative void left by the breakdown of religious authority. See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS AND CIVIL MORALS (Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1958).
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social justice, and no more.3 What many of these arguments have in common
is evaluative monism: the belief that a single, impersonally justified value
can serve as a polestar for any moral agent’s deliberation about her ethical
responsibilities. Monism requires the analysis of apparently different values
in terms of some comparative value, or higher-order conceptual category that
permits the ranking of options in relation to one another in an impersonal
manner, i.e., without reference to the circumstances of a particular agent.4
Other seemingly diverse values may then be understood as instantiations of
the single relevant value, or the single master value can serve as a criterion
for ranking or ordering the lower-order values.
Monism has long been the dominant assumption of legal ethics, and the
organized bar’s statements on the professional responsibilities of lawyers
frequently follow this approach, strenuously resisting the notion that the
duties incumbent upon lawyers can actually come into irreconcilable conflict.
The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states:
A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of
the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus,
when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous
advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice
is being done.5
Courts and commentators also attempt to impose priority rules where they
perceive a conflict between professional values. For example, one federal
appellate court noted the obvious fact that a lawyer has a fiduciary obligation
to her client, but claimed nevertheless that “the lawyer’s duties to maintain
the confidences of a client and advocate vigorously are trumped ultimately
by a duty to guard against the corruption that justice will be dispensed on an
act of deceit.”6 In a similar vein, one scholar has extracted one “central”
principle from reported cases, disciplinary rules, and stories of the legal
profession: “[T]he lawyer’s obligation to the client is subordinate to the
lawyer’s primary obligation to the law.”7 If these statements have a utopian
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998).
4. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 117-40 (1993); James
Griffin, Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON 35, 36 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); J.B. Schneewind, Moral Knowledge and
Moral Principles, in REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 113 (Stanley
Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre eds., 1983).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. cmt.7 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
6. United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1993). In this case, the court’s
rhetoric was too neat. There was no actual conflict of professional values because the attorney was
simply asserting a spurious obligation of loyalty to avoid punishment for an obvious fraud.
7. Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 317
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ring, it is because of their implicit monism; as we will see, one of the
principal attractions of ethical monism is the promise of a decision procedure
that avoids the tragedy of inevitable wrongdoing.8
Monism belongs to the Platonic tradition of philosophy, in which ethics
can be viewed as a matter of measurement and calculation, much like the
natural sciences, mathematics, or formal logic. “Moral geometry,” as this
kind of reasoning has been called, depends on a particular kind of
relationship among the values that are at play in practical reasoning.9 It
requires that the values can be compared so that one of the items can be said
to be better than, worse than, or equal to the other in terms of whatever
comparison is relevant. Moreover, the comparison must be impersonal— that
is, carried out with respect to universal rational criteria, not the subjective
preferences or beliefs of the deliberating agent. If the discipline of
professional ethics is to possess this quasi-scientific character, some means
must be devised to make comparisons between obligations generated by the
lawyer’s role as an officer of the court, as an agent of the client, and as a
person required to make due allowance for the interests of third parties. Of
course, disciplinary rules and other legal norms determine a great many
practical questions in legal ethics, but there nevertheless remain many cases
in which the lawyer is more or less unconstrained by positive law, and must
refer to more general moral norms. But even in cases where the rules are
silent or underdeterminate, because the interpretation of legal texts is
influenced by the background of moral and political principles that justify
and undergird their authority, any lawyer concerned with correctly
interpreting and applying the governing legal rules must always be attentive
to the pull of competing moral values.10
My claim in this Article is that the foundational normative values of
lawyering are substantively plural and, in many cases, incommensurable. By
plural I mean that the ends served by the practice of lawyering are
fundamentally diverse, and are therefore valued in different ways.11 Lawyers
promote multiple worthwhile goals, including not only preserving individual
liberty, speaking truth to power, showing mercy, and resisting oppression,
but also enhancing order and stability in opposition to the “ill-considered
passions” of democracy, aligning individual action with the public good, and
(1990).
8. See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY (Henry Hardy ed., 1990).
9. See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF
MORAL REASONING 25-36 (1988); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 30 (1986);
see also JOSEPH DUNNE, BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND (1993).
10. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
11. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 1-16.
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shaping disputes for resolution by particular institutions such as courts and
agencies. These ends in turn generate a plurality of moral norms, which
frequently stand in opposition, and which sometimes cannot be compared or
ranked against one another. The incommensurability of moral values is a
position that has been considered extensively by philosophers,12 but it has
only recently been explored in connection with legal reasoning13 and has
been examined hardly at all with respect to legal ethics. The claim of
incommensurability should not be confused with the familiar argument that
in a multicultural, diverse society, the lawyer and client may disagree about
justice and the lawyer may face a choice between following her own moral
principles or those of her client.14 Instead, my argument is that the lawyer
seeking to act ethically must take account of different value claims that may
not be comparable with one another in an impersonally rational,
mathematical, or algorithmic manner.
This position does not entail skepticism about the possibility of making
ethical choices. Instead, it demands only that the model of ethical decision
making for lawyers accommodate the incommensurability of professional
values and make appropriate adjustments. Professional ethics need not look
like a branch of science or formal logic in order to provide a satisfying
account of how lawyers should resolve practical dilemmas. In particular,
virtue-centered and rhetorical modes of reasoning have always existed
alongside moral geometry and offered an alternative methodology for
practical ethics. In a previous paper, I offered two such models of reasoning:
(1) the revival of what has been variously termed prudence, professional
judgment, practical wisdom, or phronesis, and (2) the tradition of case ethics,
12. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 117-29; CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS, INNOCENCE
LOST: AN EXAMINATION OF INESCAPABLE MORAL WRONGDOING (1994); INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); NUSSBAUM, supra note 9, at
117-29; JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322-66 (1986); HENRY S. RICHARDSON,
PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS (1994); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING
VALUES (1990); David Wiggins, Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation
and Desire, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS 255 (Amelie O. Rorty ed., 1980).
13. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy:
Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990);
Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); Cass R.
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994); Symposium, Law
and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998); Richard Warner, Excluding Reasons:
Impossible Comparisons and the Law, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (1995).
14. It is apparent that in many cases the lawyer and the client may have divergent views about
the general good. Two legal ethicists even referred to these competing views as potentially
incommensurable. See Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist
Society, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 985 (1995). Morgan and Tuttle do not, however, consider the
effect of incommensurability on the practical deliberation of a single moral agent, the lawyer, who
must decide between two actions that are supported by incomparable reasons.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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or casuistry.15 These two traditions of practical reasoning solve the problem
of incommensurability by appealing to an interpretive community of decision
makers who have considered similar issues and resolved the conflict in
values. The community’s nomos— the justificatory narrative that locates,
constitutes, and gives meaning to the social institution of lawyering16— is
itself the criterion for ranking the competing professional values. In this
paper I explore the further question of what happens when the community is
internally divided over the proper course of action. In that case, no
intersubjective, community-based criterion exists for prioritizing conflicting
values across competing subcommunities.
A theory of legal ethics must confront the possibility that separate
subcommunities of lawyers are guided by fundamentally divergent ideals,
and that these incompatible models of the good lawyer result from equally
valid rankings of the constituent professional values. In practical terms, this
means that historical figures as different as John W. Davis and Clarence
Darrow both belong to our pluralistic professional tradition as exemplars of
lawyerly virtue, even though they could not be more different from one
another. Davis was the archetypal conservative lawyer, struggling steadfastly
to maintain the security of private property rights and the stability of
established institutions.17 Darrow, on the other hand, was a radical who
believed that government and corporations were thoroughly corrupt, and that
a lawyer’s highest calling was to struggle against these concatenations of
power.18 One’s reaction generally is to admire one or the other of these ideal
15. See W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 (1999); See generally ROBERT AUDI, MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACTER (1997);
JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 9; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT (1996).
16. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term— Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); see also RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND
RELATIVISM 73 (1983); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988). The
analysis in this paper is directed toward understanding the public morality of the legal profession in the
United States; lawyers in other countries have their own unique relationships with the state and with
professional associations, and have developed different moral justifications for their role in society.
Aspects of institutional roles such as the barrister, solicitor split in Britain and some Commonwealth
countries can affect the ethical analysis of the legal profession in ways not addressed here. For an
excellent comparative study of four professional groups in five countries, see ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE,
DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE
PRESENT (1996).
17. See generally WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS
(1973).
18. See GEOFFREY COWAN, THE PEOPLE V. CLARENCE DARROW: THE BRIBERY TRIAL OF
AMERICA’S GREATEST LAWYER (1995); ANTHONY J. LUKAS, BIG TROUBLE: A MURDER IN A SMALL
WESTERN TOWN SETS OFF A STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA (1998).
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lawyers, and to seek to understand the other lawyering paradigm as either
fitting within the preferred model of professionalism or as an inauthentic
expression of an ideal. Anthony Kronman, for example, argues that the
patrician lawyer-statesman, who works alternately in high government
positions and on behalf of commercial clients, represents the vital core of the
American lawyer’s role model and is in danger of being irretrievably lost.19
Other commentators from various jurisprudential perspectives identify the
central tradition of lawyering instead with representation of the outcasts, the
powerless, and the dissenters of society.20 They are suspicious of any form of
organized power, including the legal system. Because of this wariness, they
engage in a delicate balancing act, seeking to employ access to the judicial
process in the service of the powerless while not becoming corrupted by this
connection themselves.21
Because neither of these ideals can lay claim to being the central moral
tradition of the American legal profession, there are cases in which the
practices of the lawyer’s community do not determine what an agent ought to
do. What remains for guidance is the character and personal ethical identity
of the agent. People do not approach an ethical dilemma in a vacuum, as
some sort of decision making machine; they have a rich history of past
commitments, attachments, and allegiances. Fidelity to one’s past, a narrative
unity maintained over one’s lifetime, is itself a resource for making hard
choices.22 This is not a subjectivist position— an agent acting as a lawyer is
19. See KRONMAN, supra note 15. For critiques of Kronman that emphasize his one-sided
reconstruction of the professional ideal, see SIMON, supra note 3, at 23-24; Peter Margulies,
Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1139 (1995) (review essay); David B.
Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics,
108 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1994) (book review).
20. See, e.g., GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER
(1981). Milner Ball presents a radical version of Shaffer’s argument, relying on the theological vision
of William Stringfellow and the legal scholarship of Robert Cover. See MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD
AND THE LAW (1993); RADICAL CHRISTIAN AND EXEMPLARY LAWYER: HONORING WILLIAM
STRINGFELLOW (Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. ed., 1995); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). Ball argues that social institutions— including courts, legislatures, and
lawyers— offer only a form of death, and that law is in essence idolatry. See BALL, supra, at 75-82,
158-60, 207. In Ball’s view, fidelity to one’s higher calling demands that a lawyer not engage with
worldly institutions. Because one is a “lawyer” only by virtue of worldly institutions, it is hard to see
how it is possible to square this eschatological theology with one’s professional role.
21. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER 77, 123 (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills trans. and eds., 1946) (“[H]e who lets himself in for . . . power and force as means,
contracts with diabolical powers.”).
22. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY:
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION (1990); Edmund Pincoffs, Quandary Ethics, in
REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 92 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair
MacIntyre eds., 1983); Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
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free only to choose among authentic professional traditions, not to act in any
way she believes appropriate. Given the plurality of professional ideals, the
agent is liberated from the straitjacket of an incomplete ethical tradition. At
the same time, however, the agent is constrained by the commitments she has
made over her lifetime in the process of constructing herself as a unique
individual. As a result, she may encounter some options that would be
morally permissible for other lawyer-agents, but not permissible for her, in
light of her personal history and moral character. The character of individual
agents and the range of lawyering traditions therefore stand in a dialectical
relationship with one another, and no account of legal ethics is complete
without considering both.
To illustrate this argument, the following section begins by setting forth
some examples of professional dilemmas that an attorney might encounter in
ordinary practice. I have tried to avoid dramatic cases, many of which are
quite familiar in the legal ethics literature, where some sort of catastrophic
injury is threatened or a freakish combination of circumstances creates a
tragic choice between harms.23 Although these cases reveal something about
the outer limits of our moral intuitions, they obviously do not occur
frequently in the lives of most lawyers. The day-to-day lives of lawyers are
nevertheless fraught with ethical issues. While these examples might seem
prosaic, they do represent real conflicts between the constituent professional
values of lawyering. Subsequent sections of this paper will discuss the
incommensurability of the values implicated in these cases, the partial
resolution of the dilemmas provided by the traditions of legal practice, and
the remainder of cases in which the agent’s personal identity serves as the
lawyer’s moral compass.
II. PROBLEM CASES
The following examples all posit what appear to be relatively
straightforward conflicts between two moral values: the duty of loyalty to
one’s client and the obligation not to inflict unjustified harm on third parties.
After discussing the applicable law, I will suggest some of the complexities
that frequently go unmentioned in the neat hypotheticals one sometimes
encounters in philosophy or professional ethics discussions.
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 110 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Charles Taylor, Leading a
Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra, at 170.
23. Cf. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985).
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Problem #1— “Hardball” Litigation
Alice represents a large employer in an age-discrimination action; the
plaintiff’s lawyer, Bill, is inexperienced compared to Alice. Bill and Alice
receive a routine notice from the court clerk’s office stating that if they do not
file within 30 days a request to schedule the case for trial, the case will be
stricken from the docket. Bill calls Alice three days before the deadline and
requests that she stipulate to an extension of the 30-day period because his
mother is ill and he has to fly home to be with her. Alice knows (and
apparently Bill does not) that the 30-day time period is jurisdictional— the
parties cannot extend the time for filing the notice without seeking court
approval. It is clearly in Alice’s client’s interest to agree to the ineffective
stipulation because, in Alice’s judgment, Bill’s client has a potentially
meritorious claim. The client has instructed Alice to use “any means
necessary— or at least any means that won’t get the company in trouble” to
defeat the discrimination claim. Should she accept the stipulation?24
The professional codes tend to place a strong emphasis on following the
client’s instructions. One of the mandatory provisions of the Model Code
states: “A lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of
his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the
Disciplinary Rules.”25 This rule is qualified by an exception which allows the
lawyer to “exercise his professional judgment” to decline to assert a position
urged by the client.26 Similarly, the Model Rules require a lawyer to abide by
the client’s instructions regarding the objectives of the representation, and to
consult with the client on tactical matters.27 Again, the lawyer retains some
discretion to refuse to employ a particular means in pursuit of the client’s
24. This example is adapted from a problem in STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 84-85 (5th ed. 1998). Professor Gillers offered a similar example
from an actual case at the 1998 Hofstra Law School legal ethics conference: A new matrimonial
lawyer asks his vastly more experienced opposing counsel whether he will stipulate to a divorce order,
with the economic issues to be decided later by the court. Unbeknownst to the new lawyer, the divorce
order has the effect of divesting the court of jurisdiction over the marital property; thus, the economic
status quo will be preserved, favoring the client of the more experienced lawyer. Gillers asked whether
the experienced lawyer should inform the new lawyer of the jurisdictional requirement and, if so,
whether he could do so without securing his client’s permission. Stephen Gillers, Address at the
Hofstra University School of Law Conference, Legal Ethics: Access to Justice (Apr. 6, 1998). Lest
anyone think this example is exaggerated, and that no lawyer would be such a jerk, consider Williams
v. General Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D. 510 (M.D. Ga. 1993), in which counsel for the defense sought
sanctions against a plaintiff’s lawyer who was unexpectedly called away from a deposition to attend to
his seriously ill father.
25. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE].
26. MODEL CODE, supra note 25, DR 7-101(B)(1).
27. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.2(a).
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goal.28 Under the Model Rules and the Model Code, therefore, Alice
probably has discretion to exercise professional judgment to refuse the
defective stipulation. If the client insists that she play hardball, however,
there is no rule of professional discipline that specifically forbids Alice to
take advantage of Bill’s ignorance. The ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility admitted as much when faced with the similar
issue of whether a lawyer should be permitted to examine confidential
documents disclosed in error.29 In no way is Alice required, under the
organized bar’s prevailing norms, to exercise basic courtesy toward the
hapless Bill.
There is certainly precedent for the contrary position, at least in the
academic community. Consider this quotation from David Hoffman, one
(along with George Sharswood) of the canonical early jurists writing on
professional responsibility: “I will never plead the Statute of Limitations,
when based on the mere efflux of time; for if my client is conscious he owes
the debt; and has no other defence than the legal bar, he shall never make me
a partner in his knavery.”30
If Alice believes her client may be liable on the merits, it would be
“knavery” according to Hoffman, to agree to the ineffective stipulation.
Although scholars continue to quote Hoffman, this argument would probably
sound sanctimonious to a practicing litigator.31 Lawyers do recognize that
hardball tactics in litigation are not always appropriate, but they often
analyze the question not with reference to the intrinsic moral worth of the act,
nor in terms of its consequences to the opposing lawyer, but as a matter of
their own reputation in the community. A riveting, albeit fictional, analysis of
how a practitioner might reason through the problem is given by a federal
judge in Lawrence Joseph’s book Lawyerland:
28. See id., cmt. 1.
29. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992). See also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387 (1994) (stating that a lawyer has
no duty to inform opposing counsel in negotiations that statute of limitations has run on claim). Cf.
MODEL CODE, supra note 25, EC 7-38. This aspirational provision suggests that a lawyer accede to
reasonable requests regarding continuances, but only where the continuance would not prejudice the
rights of the client. A few bar association committees have reached the opposite conclusion. In
Oregon, for example, a lawyer is required to return an inadvertently disclosed privileged document.
See Oregon State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 1998-150 (1998). The Oregon committee
reasoned that reading an accidentally disclosed document would be conduct that “causes . . . harm . . .
to the procedural functioning of a judicial proceeding,” under DR 1-102(A)(4) of the Oregon Code of
Professional Responsibility. Id.
30. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 754 (Baltimore, Joseph Neal, 2d ed. 1836).
31. Cf. Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957).
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“The lying.” She sat down. “The deception. It’s not easy to talk about,
nor is it easy to explain. . . . It’s one thing to say, ‘That’s not what I
said’— which is going on a lot these days, everyone covering, pardon
my language, their proverbial asses. But it’s an altogether different
thing to say that a document never existed when, in fact, it did, and
you, or your client, destroyed it. That I don’t recommend. Double-talk,
triple-talk, saying you’re going to do something when you know
you’re not going to”— Day shrugged— “what can you do? But . . .
[s]aying that something didn’t happen when it did? This is a business
in which everyone relies on representations. This is a business in
which no one ever forgets, no one ever forgives— a business in which
no one ought ever to forget or forgive anyone who goes beyond those
extremely tolerable thresholds of deceit into one of those morally . . .”
Day stopped. . . . “[H]ere, if you ask me, is the mind-set— a lawyer
will get even. It’s how the system— is there a verb retribute? That’s
how the system retributes itself. It really does. How do they say it on
the street?— ‘what you do comes back on you.’ It may take a while,
but you make a material misrepresentation of fact to another lawyer,
you’d better be prepared to be hit, and I mean hit, and hit hard. The
equivalent of being, at the very least, blindsided with a crowbar.”32
An unappealing, perhaps even Hobbesian vision of lawyering? Perhaps.
But it certainly belies the hypothetical examples, which imply that
interactions with opposing counsel are a one-shot affair and that sleazy
behavior will go unpunished unless the courts or disciplinary agencies are
informed.33
32. LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND 74-75 (1997). Joseph is a law professor and a published
poet who wrote Lawyerland to provide a glimpse into the world of lawyers talking among themselves.
The identities of the parties are blurred (the character of Judge Day is supposedly based loosely on
U.S. District Judge Kimba Wood), and the dialogue is stylized to create the Mamet-like cadences of
the lawyers, but Joseph claims the conversations occurred substantially as he recalled them:
“Lawyerland is truthful rather than factual, but solidly based on facts.” Id., “A Note to the Reader.” I
quote this passage in a “truthful rather than factual” way, to illustrate the system of informal
reputational control among lawyers.
33. Judge Day’s argument also responds to lawyers who believe that hardball litigation presents a
prisoners’ dilemma— if they do not “go nasty” first, the opponent will, with the result that the client of
the courteous lawyer will be worse off. See Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on
Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1623 & n.13 (1996). Yablon agrees that there are benefits,
including reputational enhancement and gaining the trust of the court, to refraining from extreme
hardball tactics. See id. at 1623-24. Thus, litigation is not a one-shot game, but is iterative in nature.
This has been called the “Wally Cleaver Principle,” after the older brother in Leave It To Beaver: “You
know Beaver, there’s only so much junk you can get away with before you get creamed.” Marianne M.
Jennings, The Model Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility Have Absolutely Nothing to
Do With Ethics: The Wally Cleaver Proposition as an Alternative, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1223, 1227 n.19.
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One might object that, however compelling Judge Day’s words are, her
arguments do not pertain to ethics. A widely shared view among lawyers is
that acting ethically is importantly different from acting in one’s own best
interest.34 In philosophical terms, in order to be ethical, an action must be
motivated purely by moral concerns.35 Here, the word “moral” refers to
formal conditions, such as supremacy, concern for others, and
universalizability, that characterize a particular kind of judgment.36
Alternatively, ethics is said to be concerned with the character or disposition
of the actor. Merely performing a just act is not justice; the actor must also be
a just person.37 Traditionally, therefore, systems of ethics attempt to place
some restraint on self-interest, not to appeal to the actor’s prudential
motivations. The notable exception is ethical egoism, which advocates
For additional discussion of reputational constraints in the practice of law, see Florida Bar v. Went For
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 643 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]his problem is largely self-policing:
potential clients will not hire lawyers who offend them.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW § 8.3, at 281 (5th ed. 1998); Warren E. Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and
Defense Personnel: A Judge’s Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 12-13 (1966); Deborah L. Rhode,
Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 494-99 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Philip Shuchman, Relations Between Lawyers, in ROSCOE POUND, AMERICAN
TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, ETHICS AND ADVOCACY: FINAL REPORT: ANNUAL OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE OF ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 73, 97 (1978) (“[u]nless
we identify conformity with the [disciplinary rules] with good behavior, we may have taught prudence
but not morality.”); Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837 (1998). Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 151(3) (Tentative Draft No. 8, Mar. 21, 1997) (distinguishing between moral
and reputational interests).
35. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 25 (1993); ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 266 (1980) (actions performed in accordance with moral
restraints imposed by law may not have moral worth); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 3, 10, 19-20, 26 (James W. Ellington trans., 1981); W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT
AND THE GOOD 16 (1930) (“As soon as a man does an action because he thinks it will promote his
own interests thereby, he is acting not from a sense of its rightness but from self-interest.”); BERNARD
WILLIAMS, MORALITY 63-72 (1972). For a discussion of the historical antecedents of the Kantian
view, see J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY 92, 107-09, 163, 257 (1998). A variation
on this claim is voluntarism, the thesis that moral values are obligatory or normative only insofar as
they are backed by the command of God or a political sovereign. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE
SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 21-27 (1996). For one major moral philosopher who took the opposite
view, see JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 23 (Oskar Piest ed., 1957) (1861) (“[N]o system of
ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty ... motive has nothing to do
with the morality of the action.”).
36. This definition of moral propositions is from TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 18-21 (4th ed. 1994).
37. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch. 4, 1105a15-1105b15 (W.D. Ross & J.O.
Urmson trans.), in A NEW ARISTOTLE READER (J.L. Ackrill ed., 1987); see also AUDI, supra note 15,
at 288-91; Tom L. Beauchamp, Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J.
955, 967 (1994) (“Virtue requires properly motivated dispositions and desires when performing
actions, and therefore is not reducible to acting in accordance with or for the sake of principles of
obligation.”).
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“prudentialism as the whole story about the moral life.”38 Most philosophers,
for good reason, don’t take ethical egoism seriously as a theory of morality.
But the emptiness of ethical egoism does not mean we must ignore
psychological egoism, which is the undeniable fact that people find it easier
to do what is good for them than acts that require self-sacrifice.39 If Judge
Day’s monologue merely elaborates on lawyers’ motivation for doing the
right thing, without claiming that it tells the whole story of the moral life,
there is no reason for judging it out of bounds for ethical reasoning.
Suppose someone acts in a way that benefits society, but does it out of
purely selfish motives. In Bernard Williams’ example, a man gives money to
famine relief to enhance his standing in the Rotary Club or because he feels
rotten for eating steak dinners while millions of people starve. No one would
be inclined to praise this man in moral terms, but the fact remains that he has
done something good. Hunger has been averted because of his act, even
though he was only trying to make himself look like a philanthropist in the
eyes of his fellows or assuage his own feelings of guilt. As Williams puts it,
better that he give the money to famine relief than that he buy another
television set.40 In the same vein, suppose Alice tells Bill that the stipulation
would be ineffective, and that he should approach the court for relief.
Suppose in addition that she does this because she is afraid that when Bill
finds out he has been duped, he will swear revenge on Alice and retaliate at
some later time. We may not be inclined to ascribe moral approbation to
Alice’s actions or to call her an honest person, but legal practice nevertheless
benefits from her honesty. If she had not been candid, a potentially
meritorious case would have been dismissed on a procedural ground. Better
that Alice advise Bill of his mistake rather than seek to take advantage of it,
even if her motivation was not to do the right thing. (Of course, Alice may
value her reputation as a Rambo litigator, in which case reputational
considerations would actually militate against cooperating with Bill.41)
This problem has come full circle. We have concluded that Alice
probably should not take advantage of Bill’s ignorance, but only for
38. WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 18 (1963).
39. See id. at 19-20; see also Robert Audi, Moral Judgment and Reasons for Action, in MORAL
KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACTER 217, 217-42 (1997); IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
GOOD 51-54 (1970) (considering the significance of Freud for moral philosophy); Ronald Dworkin,
Darwin’s New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1725 (1998) (arguing that claims about the truth of
moral propositions should not be confused with claims about the difficulties encountered in persuading
people to respect moral norms).
40. WILLIAMS, supra note 35, at 66.
41. See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1321 (1998).
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pragmatic reasons. It remains to be established that there is an ethical— that
is, non-self-regarding— reason for advising Bill that the stipulation is
ineffective. The ethical ground for this judgment depends on Alice’s
character, disposition, or integrity, because the foundational normative values
of the practice of lawyering do not, by themselves, forbid Alice from
accepting the stipulation. These arguments will be developed in the next two
sections.
Problem #2— Ignore the Bad Facts and They’ll Go Away
Carlos is the outside lawyer for Dead Bugs, the manufacturer of a highly
profitable pesticide that a state environmental protection agency seeks to ban.
Under the prevailing regulatory scheme, the issue is whether the product is
“unreasonably dangerous to human health.” Although he is convinced that
the pesticide should be banned under that standard, Carlos has been unable to
convince the management of Dead Bugs of this. As proceedings progress, it
becomes clear that the inexperienced, overworked, and underprepared
agency lawyers will be unsuccessful at persuading the state trial judge that
the pesticide is dangerous. Agency attorneys have overlooked some highly
damaging data buried in one of the client’s expert’s reports and have failed to
point out severe methodological problems in the principal study on which
Dead Bugs relies. At several points during the trial, the judge makes
statements that reflect serious misunderstandings or assumptions contrary to
the facts in the record. Should Carlos draw the judge’s attention to
information adverse to his client’s interests?42
One might initially object that Carlos does not know that the pesticide is
dangerous, as there has been no definitive finding of that fact by the agency,
but this response has always struck me as fatuous. Lawyers become
intimately acquainted with the facts of cases, and through the process of
working with experts to prepare disclosures and reports, often become quite
familiar with the scientific and technical aspects of the dispute as well.
Monroe Freedman rightly insists that a lawyer who says he can never know
whether his client is factually liable is morally irresponsible.43 To be sure, the
42. This example is drawn from DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS
BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 441-42 (2d ed. 1998). Similar problems for discussion may be found in
an elaborate hypothetical, Food for Thought, in PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 216-34 (1988) and in THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS problem 18, at
239-40 (6th ed. 1995) (potential tort liability for defective product).
43. See MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS B-1 (1990). See also David
Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957 (1999). As Luban points out, however, the morally
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facts are ambiguous in many cases, but in others, the lawyer can claim to be
“uncertain” of his client’s liability only in the strong Cartesian sense of not
being certain of anything. Or, less philosophically, a lawyer may refuse to
learn aspects of his client’s case so that he cannot be charged with knowingly
perpetuating a falsehood.44 In this case, it is not unreasonable to assume that
Carlos has sufficient familiarity with documents and expert reports so as to
have achieved knowledge that the pesticide is dangerous.
The relevant disciplinary rules do not mandate any one course of action,
but merely set out signposts that point in different directions. The Model
Code forbids a lawyer to “[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which
he is required by law to reveal,”45 or to “[p]articipate in the creation or
preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is
false.”46 The lawyer is not actively developing false or misleading evidence,
but is instead standing passively by while the other side makes repeated
blunders in presenting its case. Thus, there is an ambiguity— is the lawyer
subject to sanctions for failing to act to prevent the establishment of a false or
misleading factual record? The more recently drafted Model Rules resolve
this ambiguity by clarifying the distinction between actively participating in
developing false evidence and merely acquiescing in an opposing lawyer’s
incompetence: “A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of
material fact or law to a tribunal;[or] offer evidence that the lawyer knows to
be false.”47 Here the emphasis is on the lawyer’s actions; the rule uses the
active verbs “make” and “offer.” The only prohibition on passively
permitting misleading evidence to be introduced is narrowly circumscribed:
“The lawyer shall not . . . fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the
client.”48 Where there is no fraud, courts and bar associations generally do
not impose upon lawyers a duty to correct an adversary’s misrepresentation
of facts or the tribunal’s misapprehension of the factual record.49 If the
dubious status of a lawyer’s profession of ignorance does not necessarily mean that the disciplinary
rules should be changed to impose liability on lawyers for maintaining an attitude of willful blindness
toward their clients’ activities. See id. at 976-78.
44. See FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 109-11.
45. MODEL CODE, supra note 25, DR 7-102(A)(3).
46. Id. DR 7-102(A)(6).
47. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.3(a).
48. Id. Rule 3.3(a)(2); see also United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that government lawyers violated this rule by failing to disclose a misrepresentation by
government expert made in the course of litigation).
49. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488 (Md. 1991); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-397 (1995) (“[A] lawyer has no general duty
to advise his adversary of useful facts or promising legal theories”).
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nondisclosure does not constitue fraud on the tribunal, the lawyer is
forbidden to disclose any information “relating to representation of the
client,” including information that Carlos has about the harmfulness of the
pesticide.50 Thus, the Model Rules broadly forbid disclosure, with narrowly
circumscribed exceptions— fraud on the tribunal or a prospective criminal act
likely to result in death or serious bodily injury.
It is frequently asserted that lawyers are justified by the adversary system
in favoring their client’s interests over the interests of third parties or the
public good. “[I]n an adversary adjudicatory proceeding, the effect of an
attempt to take advantage of an opponent’s incompetence ultimately may be
blunted by judicial intervention. Among other factors, the potential for such
intervention justifies the attorney’s conduct.”51 In this problem, however, the
lawyer knows there is no potential for judicial intervention; the opposing
government lawyer is incapable of mustering the resources to perform the
exhaustive pretrial discovery and preparation that the well-funded private
lawyers take for granted. It would be at best disingenuous, and at worst
extreme bad faith, to justify the introduction of misleading evidence solely on
the basis of the opposing party’s potential to rebut it. For this reason, more
sophisticated defenders of the adversary system appeal not to the short-run
considerations of whether a particular party had an opportunity to develop
rebuttal evidence, but to arguments which take a longer view of the
incentives that would result from a rule of professional morality that required
a lawyer to take steps to correct for institutional imbalances in information
and resources. One version of this argument maintains that the parties would
have little incentive to develop reliable and accurate information during the
pretrial process, because the fear of having to turn over inculpatory evidence
would deter a lawyer from digging too deep in her client’s files.52 A fair trial
would therefore be impossible, since the trier of fact would lack access to
crucial information and would be forced to make a decision on the basis of
partial or inaccurate factual submissions. This argument, too, is misleading,
because the discovery system already requires a party to turn over evidence,
whether harmful or helpful, to the adversary, subject only to narrow
exceptions for attorney work product and privileged matters.53 Granted,
many litigators bend over backwards to avoid this obligation, construing
50. See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1154-57 (1985).
51. John K. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Comments on
Ellmann’s Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781, 797-98 (1987).
52. See SIMON, supra note 3, at 64-65.
53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
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discovery requests narrowly and tendentiously,54 raising a welter of often ill-
founded privilege objections, burying relevant documents in a “boxcar” of
useless paper, and occasionally destroying or withholding discoverable
materials. But this pattern of noncompliance with clear legal norms does not
permit lawyers to make a straight-faced argument that an obligation to
disclose relevant facts to the adversary is a novel or unsound ethical duty.55
Nevertheless, most practicing lawyers tend to assume that keeping one’s
client’s confidences is their highest moral obligation. “The principle of
confidentiality is thought to be so important that the Model Rules, the
organized bar’s most recent pronouncement about the matter, barely
recognize the propriety of subordinating it to the value of human life.”56 The
Model Rules do permit disclosure in favor of preserving human life, but only
if the threat to life is the result of a criminal act by the client that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or serious bodily harm.57
Problem #3— Speaking Calumny to Power
Emma is a well known civil rights lawyer in a major city on the West
Coast. She has represented plaintiffs in numerous police-brutality lawsuits, in
several cases obtaining verdicts of a million dollars or more. She practices a
highly confrontational lawyering style, seeking not only to win cases by any
arguably legal means, but also to attract media attention to her clients’
causes.58 In a recent case, she suffered a momentary setback. The case was
assigned to Judge Frank, a notoriously conservative district court judge who,
according to courthouse lore, has never seen a civil rights case that didn’t
warrant early summary judgment for the defendant. Knowing that Judge
Frank is somewhat thin-skinned and has a hot temper, Emma goes on a
campaign of public vilification of the judge, hoping to cause him to recuse
himself from the case.59 She openly states that Judge Frank is frequently
“drunk on the bench,” and is “ignorant, dishonest, ill-tempered, and a
54. See, e.g., Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054
(Wash. 1993).
55. Lawyers are required to disclose some adverse legal authority to a tribunal. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.3(a)(3); MODEL CODE, supr note 25, DR 7-106(B)(1).
56. Subin, supra note 50, at 1159.
57. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
58. The character of Emma and the facts of this problem are based loosely on Standing Comm.
on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). See also In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483 (7th Cir.
1995); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1982).
59. See Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(per curiam opinion of three-judge panel) (quoting the lawyer: “Look, there are certain judges I want
to be in front of for my Civil Rights cases who are favorable to my view. And I’d like to recuse out the
ones who are extremely unfavorable.”).
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bully.”60 These comments are picked up by a reporter for the local lawyers’
newspaper where they are duly reprinted and noticed by the judge. In a fury,
the judge recuses himself from Emma’s case, which is reassigned to a liberal
judge. Has Emma acted properly?
Lawyers are required by the disciplinary rules to have a good faith basis
for factual and legal assertions they make in the course of a judicial
proceeding,61 but these rules do not apply to statements not made directly to
the tribunal. Many federal district courts have, by local rules, proscribed
conduct that “degrades or impugns the integrity of the court;”62 that is
“unbecoming an officer of the Court;”63 that is uncivil,64 or “provoking or
insulting.”65 A few states have passed legislation that attempts to require a
certain level of civility from attorneys, including this statute from California:
“It is the duty of an attorney to . . . abstain from all offensive personality . . .
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he or she is charged.”66
Many of these rules and statutes are arguably void for vagueness.67 Even if
they are constitutional, they exist in only a minority of jurisdictions. There is
no widely applicable professional disciplinary standard or rule of agency,
tort, or criminal law that prohibits attorneys from being obnoxious.
Many commentators have argued that courts must rein in uncivil behavior
by attorneys in order to protect the liberty of the litigants to obtain “the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”68 An excess of
zealous advocacy risks transmuting dispute resolution into litigation-as-total-
war, which destroys the effectiveness of the adversary process and renders
60. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 & n.4.
61. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.1; MODEL CODE, supra note 25, DR 7-102(A)(1).
62. See U.S. DIST. CT. R.E.D. CAL., CIV. L.R. 83-180(e); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 25,
EC 7-36.
63. See U.S. DIST. CT. R.E.D. KY., AND W.D. KY., JOINT L.R. 83.3(c); see also U.S. DIST. CT.
R. D.R.I., L.R. 4(e)(3); U.S. DIST. CT. R.E.D. TEX., L.R. AT-2(d)(1)(A); U.S. DIST. CT. R.N.D. TEX.,
LR 83.8(b)(1).
64. See U.S. DIST. CT. R.M.D. FLA., L.R. 2.04(g).
65. See U.S. DIST. CT. R.D. ALASKA, L.R. 39.5(d); cf. U.S. DIST. CT. R.N.D. OKLA., L.R.
83.2B(14) (admonishng lawyers to “[a]void disparaging personal remarks or acrimony toward
opposing counsel”); U.S. DIST. CT. R.W.D. TEX., L.R. AT-5(b)(17) (same).
66. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(f) (1990).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110 (1996) (holding that California statute
barring “offensive personality” is void for vagueness); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1565 (11th
Cir. 1990); but see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644-45 (1985) (stating that term “conduct unbecoming
a member of the bar” is not vague in light of the “lore of the profession”); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 666 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgement) (stating that attorneys may be disciplined for conduct that “all responsible attorneys would
recognize as improper for a member of the profession”); In re Beaver, 510 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1994).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Warren E. Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211
(1971) (civility in the conduct of litigation is necessary to protect the rights of individuals).
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lawyers powerless to protect their clients’ interests through the judicial
system. The freedom of lawyers to advocate their clients’ causes with vigor
must be checked by the recognition that unbounded advocacy destroys the
efficacy of the system that seeks to provide fair litigation outcomes.69
Therefore, litigation sanctions are available to the extent that Emma’s
assertions about Judge Frank’s drunkenness and ignorance were raised in
papers filed with the court. Consider, for example, In re Kelly,70 in which the
lawyer attempted to secure a judge’s recusal in an appeal of a discrimination
case brought against Marquette University. The lawyer’s theory was that the
judge would be biased in favor of the university, and offered as evidence
remarks the judge had purportedly made in opposition to abortion.71 A
Seventh Circuit motions panel ordered the lawyer to show cause why he
should not be sanctioned under Rule 11; the lawyer responded that sanctions
would violate his free speech rights.72 Judge Posner sensibly avoided the
First Amendment thicket, and simply asked whether the lawyer had a
reasonable basis for making the statement in his affidavit.73 Although the
court ultimately concluded that sanctions were not warranted, it strongly
admonished lawyers to consider the factual basis of allegations in their
pleadings.74
In this case, however, Emma does not risk Rule 11 sanctions because her
comments were not made in a “pleading, written motion, or other paper.”75
The question is, therefore, whether she can be criticized from the standpoint
of professional ethics for seeking to secure Judge Frank’s recusal by
subjecting him to a torrent of abuse.
* * *
The following portions of this paper set out a framework for analyzing
problems like these, in which professional norms seem to require taking two
“incompossible” actions.76 I hope to establish three propositions. First,
foundational professional values, which generate the applicable duties of
69. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1988).
70. 808 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1986).
71. See id. at 550.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 551.
74. See id. at 552. See also Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (leaving to
Rule 11 the task of redressing lawyer’s unfounded accusation that judge improperly participated in
proceeding from which he should have been recused); In re Belue, 766 P.2d 206, 207 (Mont. 1988)
(noting that a lawyer in federal district court proceeding was ordered to pay $5,601.97 under Rule 11
for filing unfounded ethical charges against adversary).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
76. Two duties are “compossible” if it is possible to perform them both. See Hillel Steiner, The
Structure of a Set of Compossible Rights, 74 J. PHIL. 767 (1977).
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legal ethics, are not reducible to a common scale of value, nor are they
susceptible of ordinal ranking in all cases, if the values are simply considered
in the abstract, apart from any reference to discrete social practices. Second,
in many cases the traditions of the legal profession, the practices of the
community of lawyers, and the social understanding of lawyers’ obligations
do provide a resource for ranking these values. Third, in a subset of cases, the
traditions and practices of lawyering are themselves plural and incomparable,
so that two or more incompossible actions are morally justifiable. In these
cases, an alternative form of practical reasoning— namely, attention to
personal integrity and the narrative unity of one’s life history— is the best
available method of making ethical decisions.
III. INCOMPARABLE VALUES
Historically, many philosophers have thought that practical reasoning
should strive to eliminate insoluble conflicts between values, so that only one
of the choices presented would represent the correct resolution of an ethical
problem. Indeed, some have gone so far as to describe as “the central
tradition of western political thought” the claim that there is, in principle,
only one correct answer to any question of ethics, which can be discovered
by the correct procedure and acted upon without violating any other demands
that reason makes simultaneously on the agent.77 This view dates at least
from the time of Socrates: “From the time of the Euthyphro onwards, a
dominant tradition in moral philosophy has agreed on one central point: these
cases of conflict display an inconsistency which is an offense to practical
logic and ought to be eliminated.”78 One strand of ancient thought equated
practical deliberation with a kind of measurement or algorithm: in any
serious ethical conflict, the agent merely had to calculate how much of the
Good was presented by each option, and choose the path which resulted in a
greater quantity.79 In the Protagoras, for example, Socrates argued for an
ethical science of measurement, in which the Good was hedonic pleasure.80
On this account, ethical deliberation is a species of technical reasoning, akin
to finding the eternal truths of astronomy or mathematics.81
77. See Isaiah Berlin, The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF
HUMANITY 20, 24-25 (Henry Hardy, ed., 1990). For a noteworthy exception to this tradition, see
ROSS, supra note 35.
78. NUSSBAUM, supra note 9, at 30.
79. See id. at 108-09.
80. See Plato, Protagoras (W.K.C. Guthrie trans.), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 308, 341-52
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds. 1961).
81. Cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN iv.12 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994).
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One modern exemplar of the Platonic tradition of moral geometry82 is
consequentialism, including utilitarianism, which seeks to reduce the
multiplicity of human goods to one overarching value— good outcomes,
however defined— which can be empirically measured and used as a
common metric to evaluate possible actions. For instance, Mill writes:
“[P]leasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends . . .
all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other
scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means
to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.”83 And Bentham’s
pithy comment about the sameness of pleasure in art and games is often
quoted to exemplify evaluative monism. “Prejudice apart, the game of
push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If
the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than
either.”84 In other words, the good for humans, or human interests, are
assimilated to the satisfaction of preferences.85 With the success of Henry
Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics, moral philosophy came to be accepted as a
theoretical field of inquiry in the academy, its methods blessed by the
association with scientific reasoning.86
Economics is one modern heir to the tradition of analyzing rational action
as a form of calculation, with one value being used as the metric. Individual
preferences are assumed to be arbitrarily given and the satisfaction of those
preferences is taken as good— as the Good.87 Preferences are revealed
82. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 9, at 25-36. Nussbaum uses the term “Protagorean
science” in the same sense, to refer to Plato’s account of practical reasoning in the Protagoras as a
kind of science— episteme or techne. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 9, at 89-121, 295.
83. MILL, supra note 35, at 10-11.
84. Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Reward, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 192, 253
(John Bowring ed.,  1843).
85. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 86 (1985).
86. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 9, at 280-81. Legal reasoning has displayed its own
obsession with monism, seeking to find a single foundational principle— a Grundnorm in Kelsen’s
terms— which justifies the legal order. See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in
American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601 (1993); cf. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW
(Max Knight trans., 1967) (2d ed., 1960). The emphasis on value-neutrality in legal reasoning has been
said to be a consequence of the emergence of natural science as the hallmark of rational inquiry and
the eclipse of institutions backed by religious authority. See James Boyd White, Rhetoric and Law:
The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF THE LAW 28 (1985).
87. The literature on law and economics is, of course, vast, and the analysis in this paragraph is
elementary enough to be found in just about any discussion of the subject. I was guided in these
paragraphs by various critical commentaries on the methodological and normative assumptions of law
and economics. See generally DAVID P. GAUTIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT ch. 2 (1986) (account of
rational choice theory); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 110, 114-50 (1987);
KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 225-40; Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors
Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980); Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations:
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through choices: If someone chooses A over B, she is assumed to have a
preference for A, and that person’s value structure can be revealed by
summing all her preferences into a master utility function. It does not matter
whether the goods A and B are similar, like apples and oranges, or
fundamentally different, like listening to the New York Philharmonic and
monomaniacally counting blades of grass (in Rawls’s example88); despite the
seeming diversity of human ends, they can all be compared in quantitative
terms, using the yardstick of wealth or utility, provided that the agent remain
consistent across her reported preference ordering. Because observation is
thought to be an evaluatively neutral method for determining individual
tastes, the preferences of agents can be aggregated and used to determine
social policy, which is keyed to the satisfaction of preferences alone. The
only acceptable government policy is maximization of wealth or utility, as
defined by the satisfaction of revealed preferences— the state may not put its
thumb on the scale, so to speak, and encourage the cultivation of a particular
set of preferences. Push-pin is truly as good as poetry, on the law and
economics analysis, and the state should not be in the business of subsidizing
poets if its citizens reveal an overall preference for push-pin. The diversity of
human goods is flattened out by economic analysis into one value, wealth or
utility, which can be used to guide practical decisions at the individual or
government level. One intuitively suspects that Bentham’s claim that the
values inherent in push-pin are the same as those present in poetry must be
incorrect, because we experience the pleasures of art and of mindless
diversions differently. To take a trivial example, suppose I must decide
whether to spend my day reading philosophy or lying on the beach. Lying on
the beach produces sensual pleasure that is not present in the reading of
philosophy, but reading produces intellectual satisfaction that is not to be
found on the beach.89 Pleasure is not the end for which we act by reading
philosophy, even if we do happen to experience pleasure from the activity.90
The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997);
Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
88. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 432-33 (1971).
89. See STOCKER, supra note 12, at 173.
90. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 9, at 295. To be fair to Mill, it should be noted that he
appreciated this problem, and strenuously opposed the Benthamite theory that all pleasures have the
same nature or quality. See MILL, supra note 35, at 11-15. Mill’s theory is still compatible with a
particular kind of evaluative monism, however, that is practically identical to contemporary economic
theory. Mill argues that pleasures should be compared and ranked in terms of tradeoffs (what
economists call indifference functions):
Of two pleasures ... that is the more desirable pleasure ... [i]f one of the two is, by those who are
competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though
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(This intuition helps explain why the claim of value incommensurability,
which will be discussed in the next section, seems so appealing.) Moreover,
we have all experienced instances in our own lives where merely having a
preference for something was not conclusive of whether we thought we
ought to pursue it. We rationally evaluate preferences with reference to some
criterion independent of desire or preference, concluding that some of our
desires are unhealthy or inconsistent with our life plan; seek out counseling
and therapy to attempt to better understand and control our desires; adopt
strategies to make some end more desirable (such as rewarding ourselves for
exercising or finishing a home-improvement project); bind ourselves in
advance so that attractive options are not available in the future (as in the
case of Ulysses and the sirens), and so on.91 These facts of human
psychology and behavior strongly suggest that a framework of practical
reasoning that takes desires simply as given, and equates the good with
satisfying those desires, will seriously fail to account for many of the
experiences in our ethical lives.
Utilitarianism promises to make moral reasoning as determinate as the
empirical social sciences by summing the pleasures of multiple actors (or the
avoidance of their pain, or the satisfaction of their preferences, depending on
the variety of utilitarianism employed) into one master quasi-mathematical
function and directing that the function be maximized. Utilitarianism has
been influential not only because of its promise to make morality
determinate, but also because it expresses the importance of impartiality,
altruism, and benevolence in moral deliberation. At the same time, however,
it suffers from a concomitant inability to explain values like commitment,
love, loyalty, and integrity.92 On a utilitarian account, a person’s moral
knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any
quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The standard of evaluation here is still monistic— it is utility, defined by
Mill as “an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments,” with
the proviso that some of these enjoyments may be preferred to others because of their nature. Id. at 16.
I am grateful to Kent Greenawalt for pointing out the distinction between Mill and Bentham in this
regard.
91. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 132-34; Wiggins, supra note 12; JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND
THE SIRENS (1979).
92. For a well-known statement of this criticism, see Bernard Williams, Consequentialism and
Integrity, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 20 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988). Elsewhere,
Williams acknowledges “indirect” utilitarian arguments that have been advanced for behaviors like
truth-telling, concern for one’s children, and loyalty to one’s friends— these patterns themselves have
utilitarian value in that they result in an increase in overall well being. See WILLIAMS, supra note 85,
at 107. But as he notes, these arguments would violate the transparency condition of rationality by
positing reasons for actions that are not the reasons given by agents; if utilitarianism were correct,
most people would be laboring in persistent false consciousness. Id. at 109.
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responsibility is to bring about the greatest possible happiness for humanity,
regardless of the effect of this imperative on the agent’s own life. If one must
drop a life-long project of great personal importance in order to bring about a
state of greater aggregate human happiness, utilitarianism commands that
one put aside the project and pursue the common good.93 Utilitarianism can
do nothing else, as it recognizes only one value— happiness, evaluated
impersonally— which may be weighed against other instances of happiness.
Other values, such as commitment and integrity, are treated only as instances
of happiness, to be respected only insofar as they contribute to the happiness
of the agent and others and subject to override by the potential of doing
greater good elsewhere. Utilitarians also must confront the problem of
illegitimate desires and pleasures, which requires theorists to develop non-
utilitarian standards for evaluating preferences. “Nobody really balances the
pleasure of the rapist against the agony of the victim to decide whether to
prohibit rape. Neither philosophy nor law can get along without some
standard for distinguishing ‘legitimate’ or ‘preferred’ desires from others.”94
Thus, a persistent challenge for utilitarians, related to the inability of
economists to explain the diversity of human ends, has been to explain
ethical phenomena like commitment and morally wrongful desires within the
framework of a single species of value.
Moral geometry is not limited to consequentialist theories like
utilitarianism or welfare economics. Some nonconsequentialist moral
systems are founded on the assumption that a limited set of general,
universally applicable principles of duty can be discovered, from which
practical guidance is derived logically, in deductive fashion.95 Kant’s
categorical imperative is the best-known example of a single ethical principle
that purports to resolve any practical problem facing an agent.96 A theory like
Kant’s is monistic not in the sense of recognizing one kind of good, but
because it specifies duties that can all be justified deductively starting with
one master principle— for Kant, the categorical imperative.97 Thus, Kant’s
93. See Williams, supra note 92, at 44-45.
94. Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 274
(1984).
95. See Schneewind, supra note 4. Schneewind identifies four characteristics of “classical first
principles” tht have been the object of the quest of modern ethics. For a discussion and critique of this
mode of reasoning in political philosophy, see AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY
AND DISAGREEMENT 52-63 (1996).
96. See KANT, supra note 35, at 30.
97. “Now if all imperatives of duty can be derived from this one imperative as their principle,
then there can at least be shown what is understood by the concept of duty and what it means.” Id. See
also IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 11 (Louis Infield trans., 1979) (“[A]s we all need a basis
for our moral judgments, a principle by which to judge with unanimity what is morally good and what
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moral philosophy may be referred to as comparabilist. Because duty is, in
principle, unyielding even in the face of overwhelming negative
consequences, strict deontological moralities operate in an all-or-nothing
fashion. Deliberately taking an innocent human life is not justified, even if
the killing would lead to a vast improvement in overall well-being, because
not killing is a duty derived from the categorical imperative, while improving
social welfare is not.98 The sanctity of human life is not merely one value that
is to be compared and weighed against others, it is the value, and respecting
it means not trading it off against other values such as the happiness of other
persons. Moreover, it is essential to strict deontological theories that duties
can never come into conflict. Kant writes:
[B]ecause two mutually opposing rules cannot be necessary at the
same time, then, if it is a duty to act according to one of them, it is not
only not a duty but contrary to duty to act according to the other. It
follows, therefore, that a collision of duties and obligations is
inconceivable.99
Thus, any conflict of obligations is only an apparent conflict. One alternative
must be done, for it is a duty, the other “duty” is spurious. Correlatively,
rights are thought to outweigh competing considerations, such as the increase
in social utility that could be realized by redistributing property from the
wealthy to the poor.100 “Rights express limits on what can be done to
individuals for the sake of the greater benefit to others; they impose limits on
the sacrifices that can be demanded from them as a contribution to the
general good.”101 The moral right to bodily integrity means that a small-town
sheriff cannot publicly hang a drifter as a horse thief in order to deter horse
thievery in his town. To note another well-known example, the legal right to
equal protection of the laws and the moral right of human dignity means that
the United States government cannot obtain vast goods, such as
environmental cleanliness, deficit reduction, and an endless supply of clean
energy by exchanging the entire population of African-Americans with a race
bad, we apprehend that there must exist a single principle having its source in our will.”) (emphasis
added). This latter passage from Kant underscores the theme identified by Berlin above, that
philosophy has long insisted on a single correct answer to moral questions.
98. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 9-13 (1978); James Griffin, Are There
Incommensurable Values?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 39, 56 (1977).
99. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 25 (John Ladd trans., 1965).
See also Schneewind, supra note 4, at 116.
100. In Hohfeld’s terminology, duties and claim-rights are correlative. See Wesley N. Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS 23, 91 (1923).
101. Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 203, 209 (1993).
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of space aliens.102 More controversially, the legally recognized rights to
privacy and bodily integrity arguably block the state from requiring a woman
to carry a pregnancy to term against her wishes, even though the fetus, as a
potential human life, has important interests (but not rights) of its own.103 A
right-holder is entitled to have her protected interest preferred to other
interests, even consequentialist considerations of great weight, as in the space
traders example. For this reason, some theorists have spoken of rights as
“trumps” that prevail even over significant social values or interests that do
not belong to the domain of rights.104 There is no room in such an absolutist
deontology for a gradation of evaluations, from best to worst, through
intermediate cases of “permissible” or “acceptable.”105 If rights are trumps,
an act is either permitted or blocked by a right— there is no uncertainty
arising from the weighing of disparate values. These concepts thus seem to
point to a way out of moral dilemmas resulting from value incomparability.
A practical problem with monistic deontological systems arises when one
encounters situations that seem to present a conflict of duties or rights. Just as
the unpalatable consequences of utilitarianism have spurred theorists to
devise a better system, proponents of deontological morality often find
themselves scrambling to soften seemingly draconian implications of their
theories. Absolute duties and the conception of rights-as-trumps, while
capturing our intuition that persons have inherent autonomy and dignity
which cannot be violated in pursuit of the common good, do not on their face
allow for tradeoffs between one kind of value (a right or a duty) and another
(utility) in cases where the gain in utility would be substantial and the right or
duty is weak or unimportant.
This is the point of having rights, of course; they block violations of
individual dignity in pursuit of the common good. However, at some point
our moral intuitions demand that rights be overridden to prevent harm.
Although persons generally have a right not to be told falsehoods, we would
permit a homeowner to lie to the Gestapo about the presence of Jewish
refugees in the house.106 This problem may be better understood not as a
conflict of duties with consequentialist considerations, but as a conflict of
102. See Derrick Bell, The Space Traders, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 158 (1992).
103. This is the point of the notorious “famous violinist” example. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A
Defense of Abortion, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION 3 passim (Marshall Cohen et al. eds.,
1974). For a sophisticated contemporary argument, see RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION (1993).
Dworkin’s argument is directed at the nature of the fetus’s interests.
104. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977) (“Individual rights are
political trumps held by individuals.”).
105. See Brian Barry, And Who is My Neighbor?, 88 YALE L.J. 629, 637 (1979) (book review).
106. See SISSELA BOK, LYING 43 (1978).
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duties with other duties. The agent has an obligation not to tell lies, but also
an obligation to protect innocent persons from harm. Some deontological
philosophers argue that duties must be thought to admit of exceptions, or to
be outweighed by other, stronger duties.107 On this account, duties do not
operate absolutely, but have prima facie effect: a duty must be done, all
things being equal, but if another moral obligation intervenes, the duty may
yield.108
But, of course, when two or more prima facie duties or rights come into
conflict, a theory must specify a method of ranking prima facie values.
Instead of a unified deontological system that eliminates conflicting ethical
obligations, a scheme of prima facie duties or rights multiplies the potential
for uncertainty by positing numerous defeasible values without specifying a
ranking procedure.
Some philosophers have proposed a ranking principle, variously known
as lexical priority or deontological side-constraints, in which certain
principles must be satisfied before moving on to others.109 According to
Robert Nozick, the non-violation of rights is a constraint upon acting so as to
maximize the common welfare. In Rawls’s political philosophy, individual
liberty is lexically prior to considerations of distributive justice: each person
has an equal right to “the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”110 Both Rawls and
Nozick seek to capture the Kantian intuition that a political system is unjust if
it allows persons to be used as means to the satisfaction of others. As
individuals, we are not merely fungible units of social satisfaction. “[N]o
moral balancing act can take place among us; there is no moral outweighing
of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall social good.”111
However, Rawls and Nozick famously disagree on the specification of the
side-constraints appropriate in a democratic political order, which shows that
107. See FRANKENA, supra note 38, at 23 (observing that no deontological system has been
devised that can make do without exceptions or conflicts between rules); Ruth Barcan Marcus, Moral
Dilemmas and Consistency, 77 J. PHIL. 121, 124 (1980).
108. See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 215-20 (1987); ROSS, supra
note 35, at 19-47 (1930); David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course
Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424, 432-33 (1990).
109. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 28-35 (1974); RAWLS, supra note 88,
at 40-45. Side constraints find wide application in the law, as in the example of the Delaney Clause, 21
U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994), which places the value of human life (through elimination of
carcinogens) lexically prior to the utility realizable from the use of food additives. A decision maker
unconstrained by the Clause might face an exceedingly difficult moral problem in ruling on whether to
allow the use of food additives (which represent a marginal increase in social utility) where an
actuarial probability of death by cancer can be shown to follow from their use.
110. RAWLS, supra note 88, at 250, 541-48.
111. NOZICK, supra note 109, at 33; see also DWORKIN, supra note 104, at 190-91.
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the ranking procedure depends for its usefulness on a presupposed theory of
the good for society. Specifying an ordering of values in the abstract,
detached from a fully developed political philosophy, is another matter
altogether. W.D. Ross admitted that “[f]or the estimation of the comparative
stringency of these prima facie obligations no general rules can, so far as I
can see, be laid down.”112 He appealed to the intuitions of the agent to sort
out the competing values. Despite the seeming vagueness of this decision
principle,113 intuitionism has continued to exert influence on moral
philosophy.114 It is highly implausible, however, that a thoroughgoing
intuitionist system with multiple, potentially conflicting prima facie duties
can remain monistic in the sense of having a master principle of duty that
resolves value conflicts impersonally. Taking a step down the road toward
Ross’s scheme of plural obligations is to commit oneself to a non-geometric
theory of practical reasoning.
Moral geometry, whether consequentialist or deontological, offers a
significant advantage for practical reasoning, which helps explain its wide
acceptance in various disciplines. This is the seductive possibility of moral
innocence: “the ideal of living one’s life in such a way as to fully,
comprehensively, and harmoniously understand and respond to the
requirements of morality” and through quasi-scientific measurement, study,
and calculation “thereby to entirely exclude all forms of wrongdoing.”115 If
Kant is right, we can never be faced with conflicting obligations if only we
think carefully about which obligation can be derived from the categorical
112. ROSS, supra note 35, at 41. Mill becomes equally fuzzy when addressing the possibility of
ethical conflicts, although of course he was working within a different evaluative framework. “There
exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation,” he
writes: “[t]hese are the real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics and in the
conscientious guidance of personal conduct. They are overcome practically, with greater or less
success, according to the intellect and virtue of the individual.” MILL, supra note 35, at 32-33.
113. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 69 (“[O]ne of the things that we ought to have learned
from the history of moral philosophy is that the introduction of the word ‘intuition’ by a moral
philosopher is always a signal that something has gone badly wrong with an argument.”).
114. For accounts of this influence, or for contemporary exponents, see ANDERSON, supra note 4,
ch. 5; BOK, supra note 106, at 56 n.9; KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 66; RAWLS, supra note 88, at 34;
Alan Donagan, Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems, 81 J. PHIL. 291 (1984); Schneewind, supra
note 4, at 117.
115. GOWANS, supra note 12, at 219. See also MURDOCH, supra note 39, at 56-57 (“That a belief
in the unity, and also in the hierarchical order, of the moral world has a psychological importance is
fairly evident. The notion that ‘it all somehow must make sense,’ or ‘there is a best decision here,’
preserves from despair: the difficulty is how to entertain this consoling notion in a way which is not
false.”). Murdoch tends to believe that a moral system will display increasing degrees of unity as it
increases in sophistication. Her objection is not to unity as such in moral theory, but to the imposition
of a spurious unity, through the overly enthusiastic use of sovereign concepts like freedom, autonomy,
or authenticity. See id. at 58.
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imperative. If law and economics theorists are right, we never do harm by
doing good, because overall wealth maximization is always justified,
provided that the distribution of resources is optimal, under either the Pareto
or Kaldor-Hicks test.116 Finally, in law, Langdell’s model of legal education
as scientific investigation offers a source of legitimacy for legal judgments.117
Like Plato’s moral geometry, Langdell’s legal geometry promised that
deductive logic and belief in unchanging, universally applicable legal
concepts could ground a pure system of law.118 The appeal of monistic
accounts of professional responsibility is therefore apparent. If it were
possible to demonstrate through logical reasoning that an agent would always
do right by ranking her obligations in a certain order, then the only possibility
for wrongdoing would be the agent’s incapacity or unwillingness to follow
this rationally prescribed hierarchy of values.
A. The Claim of Incomparability
Despite the theoretical neatness of moral geometry and the clarity it
brings to practical reasoning, it fails to account for other perceived features of
our moral life. The central tradition of evaluative monism has been
challenged by a considerable body of philosophy which maintains that
human values cannot be reduced to a single common unit of value, nor can
they be compared with one another in every case. These “incomparabilists”
116. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 509 (1980); Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 103
(1979). The close philosophical relative of law-and-economics, utilitarianism, has remained influential
in part because of its calculative nature. This approach seems much more precise than other systems of
moral philosophy, with their vague-sounding appeals to character and judgment. For utilitarians,
“[m]oral thought becomes empirical, and on questions of public policy, a matter of social science.”
WILLIAMS, supra note 35, at 85. Martha Nussbaum argues that nineteenth-century utilitarians were
motivated to recognize hedonic pleasure as the sole good for humankind in order to simplify what
would otherwise be messy deliberation problems. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 9, at 112.
117. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL 38, 51-64 (1983); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning:
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV.
923, 930-31 (1996).
118. See generally M.H. Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30
AM. J. LEG. HIST. 95 (1986). The claims of legal “science” were criticized as flim-flam by the legal
realists. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809 (1935). Since there is no observable fact of the matter about whether, say, a labor union is
a legal person, courts are free to utter scientific-sounding propositions without ever being forced to
back up their claims with empirical evidence. See id. at 814. Today, of course, no one believes that law
is a science, but the authority of empirical observation is a significant reason for the continuing appeal
of positivism as a jurisprudential approach. Classical positivists locate the authority of law in
phenomena such as the command of a sovereign, manifested as the words in a judicial opinion or the
voting behavior of legislators. The objectivity and authority of law, therefore, can be traced back to
observable facts about the world in a quasi-scientific manner.
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observe that diverse kinds of ethical claims are formally different from one
another, and this difference derives from the plurality of observational
standpoints that persons may adopt in relating to others, themselves, and to
the world:
The capacity to view the world simultaneously from the point of view
of one’s relations to others, from the point of view of one’s life
extended through time, from the point of view of everyone at once,
and finally from the detached viewpoint often described as the view
sub specie aeternitatis is one of the marks of humanity. This complex
capacity is an obstacle to simplification.119
Ethical reasons come in diverse forms because they supervene on
circumstances that have ethical significance, but differ in type from one
another.120 For example, consider the category of personal obligations; that
is, those duties that are specific to a particular agent. Some arise out of a
sense of connectedness and a common history between the obligor and the
obligee. These responsibilities may be involuntarily assumed, as in the case
of familial duties, or they may be more or less chosen, as in the case of
friendships. Other agent-relative obligations include the duty of keeping
one’s promise and the duty of reparation generated by a previous wrongful
act. They may be called duties of loyalty or fidelity. Finally, some
philosophers, notably Aristotle, Kant, and Ross, have contended that we owe
duties to ourselves, to improve our own lives to make them the best they can
be with respect to the standards of human excellence. Personal obligations
are different in kind, however, from universal moral proscriptions, such as
those generated by rights (the duty of non-maleficence), the diverse merits of
persons with respect to the distribution of some good (the duty of justice),
and those that rest on the fact that there are people whose lives we could
make better (the duty of beneficence). We feel the pull of these impersonal,
or non-agent-relative reasons because we are rational creatures, not because
some specific action in our past has created them.121 In these different
119. Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128, 134 (1979). See
also Alasdair MacIntyre, Moral Philosophy: What Next?, in REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 5 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre eds., 1983); Max Weber, Science
as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER 129, 147 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. and trans., 1946)
(“‘Scientific’ pleading is meaningless in principle because the various value spheres of the world stand
in irreconcilable conflict with each other.”).
120. Cf. the famous list of prima facie duties in ROSS, supra note 35, at 21-24. My presentation in
this section is considerably indebted to Ross’s formulation. See also Robert Audi, Intuitionism,
Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics, in MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACTER 32
(1997).
121. See generally KORSGAARD, supra note 35.
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spheres, the incomparabilists argue, we govern ourselves by moral norms
that are appropriate to each mode of social life, which are fundamentally
different in the values they express. Values may be said to be incomparable
in these pragmatic terms because a monistic theory fails to account for some
features of our evaluative practices, such as the use of different kinds of
normative standards, depending on the sphere of our life in which they are
deployed.122
Stated more precisely, the claim of value incomparability is that, of two
items, A and B, it is neither true that one is better than the other nor true that
they are of equal value.123 Incomparable values exhibit a failure of
transitivity. C may be better than A but not better than B.124 Moreover, A may
become better, on its own terms, without becoming better than B. Perhaps
some examples will make this definition clearer. Joseph Raz reports that he is
indifferent between sitting at home with a glass of scotch, reading a book,
and taking a walk in the park.125 He may prefer sitting at home with a glass
of port while reading a book to the first option with the scotch, but
nevertheless remain indifferent between staying home drinking something
and going for a walk in the park. Beethoven and Wittgenstein were both
individuals of exceptional genius, but which was more brilliant? They were
brilliant in different ways, and since it is impossible to say that either
profession— musician or philosopher— is superior to the other, it cannot be
said that either Beethoven or Wittgenstein was superior in general terms.126
Note that this example also shows the intransitivity of the comparison. If
Beethoven had been more brilliant, perhaps by painting pictures (as
Schoenberg did), he would have been a “better” Beethoven, but it would
nevertheless be incorrect to say he thereby would have become more brilliant
than Wittgenstein.
Technically speaking, values that cannot be translated into some standard
unit of measurement are said to be incommensurable; those that cannot be
ranked ordinally are incomparable.127 Incommensurability is the thesis that
there is no common yardstick, like money or utility, that can be used to make
comparisons between diverse values. Incomparability, by contrast, is the
stronger claim advanced here by Raz. This is an important distinction to
122. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 119.
123. See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 12, at 322.
124. See id. at 324.
125. See id. at 328; see also ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 132; MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 64.
126. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 55-56.
127. See GOWANS, supra note 12, at 52-53; STOCKER, supra note 12, at 176-77; Ruth Chang,
Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 1, 1-2 (Ruth
Chang ed., 1997).
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observe, because it is easy to fall into the trap of believing that
incommensurable values are automatically incomparable when, in fact, it
may be possible to compare values that cannot be converted to a numerical
scale. If we can form the judgment that A is better than B, it does not matter
whether we can assign the values of 100 utils to A and 50 to B.128 The
possibility of comparison is borne out by the way people actually reason:
some studies reveal broad agreement on subjects’ ranking of tort cases with
respect to their “outrageousness” or seriousness, while also showing utter
lack of agreement by the same subjects on the dollar value to be assigned to
the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims.129
Gowans introduces a third kind of failure of comparison, inconvertibility:
“choices are inconvertible when the better choice still results in a loss, when
there is something that the poorer choice would have provided that is not
provided by the better choice.”130 It is not clear how Gowans distinguishes
inconvertibility from incomparability. In his example, he would feel regret at
having to choose either a Kandinsky or a Degas painting for his living room.
(If only we all had such choices!) But this regret is a function of the
incomparability of Kandinsky and Degas with respect to the value of
aesthetic beauty. He says the choice of the Degas would result in the loss of
the unique value of something, call it Kandinsky-pleasure, which is not
present in the Degas, but that loss can be explained by the incomparability of
Degas-pleasure and Kandinsky-pleasure, rather than by the alleged
“inconvertibility” of the two kinds of pleasure. In this discussion, I will
primarily be concerned with incomparability— the claim that there is no
higher-order value in terms of which moral values, and therefore options for
action, may be compared impersonally in all cases.
Although some ethicists and economists regard incomparability as
something potentially deeply troubling for practical reasoning, it does
accurately capture many of the intuitions people have about certain kinds of
choices and evaluations. We think it highly inappropriate to offer a friend
$100 in exchange for missing a lunch appointment, even though social
etiquette commands that the inconsiderate friend do something to make up
for the slight. This is not to say that there isn’t an amount so high that she
would be bound to accept it. Rather, the point is that it is inappropriate to
128. See James Griffin, Are There Incommensurable Values?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 39, 43 (1977);
Wiggins, supra note 12, at 259 (aggregating preferences into indifference curves is a nonreductive
method of comparing values).
129. Cass R. Sunstein, Address at the Samuel Rubin Lecture, Rights and Money, Columbia Law
School (Apr. 22, 1998).
130. GOWANS, supra note 12, at 148.
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trade money for the hurt feelings of a friend. The exchange does violence to
the value of friendship by implying that it is something instrumental,
something that can be bought or sold like any other commodity. The film
Indecent Proposal, in which Robert Redford’s character offered to pay a
million dollars to sleep with a newlywed woman played by Demi Moore,
was jarring for the same reason. It is impossible to ask whether marital
infidelity is “worth” a million dollars because the two values belong to
different normative domains. We have different reasons for caring about
money and about the integrity of our marriage; thus, we naturally maintain
different evaluative attitudes toward those two goods.131 The attitude we have
toward our spouse would be fundamentally different from love, loyalty, or
even jealousy if we expressed it in monetary terms. Similarly, if we were
willing to consider selling our pets to laboratories for use in experiments, the
attitude we would experience toward our pets would not be recognizable as
the emotion of “affection” that we now claim to feel.132 This is not an
irrational decision to forego an opportunity to make money off our pets, but
an expression of a particular mode of valuation that is appropriate to the
animals we keep as pets. Money should be used to evaluate certain kinds of
human activities and not others because there are some evaluative stances
that cannot be captured by a market price. The strict segregation of money
into a separate normative sphere reflects the intrinsic value we place on
goods like love, friendship, and loyalty, and the different ways in which we
experience and express the value of these goods.
Along these lines, consider Amartya Sen’s critique of the expected utility
theory in economics.133 Sen argues that economic analysis, which assumes
pure self-interested behavior on the part of agents, has a hard time accounting
for social norms and rules of conduct that exist where economic incentives
are absent.134 The title of his article, Rational Fools, reveals his contempt for
the attempt by economists to represent the richness and complexity of human
goods as a factor in an invariant algorithm that can be applied consistently
throughout a person’s life:
A person thus described may be “rational” in the limited sense of
revealing no inconsistencies in his choice behavior, but if he has no
use for these distinctions between quite different concepts, he must be
131. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 4.
132. See id. at 208.
133. See Sen, supra note 87.
134. See id. at 332.
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a bit of a fool. The purely economic man is indeed close to being a
social moron.135
At the very least, a theory about human behavior needs to take into
account the difference between egoism and altruism, between prudence and
morality. Although defenders of utility maximization may be able to salvage
their theory by claiming that people have a preference for others’ interests
where they are connected by bonds of sympathy, so that someone else’s
pleasure becomes the agent’s pleasure, utility-maximization still cannot
account for commitment.136 Commitment is revealed when someone acts in a
way that does not maximize her personal welfare, but rather acts out of
loyalty to a group or an abstract principle. This kind of loyalty is difficult to
account for using a monistic theory of values, since it is either true that
loyalty is utility-maximizing or it is not, and an agent who took monism
seriously would choose only the option that maximizes utility in any choice
situation.137
Another problem with at least some forms of law and economic theory is
that it treats human goods as merely a matter of satisfying desires or
preferences. The assumption that values are merely things freely chosen for
purely subjective reasons is the first step in constructing indifference curves,
on which the range of plausible tradeoffs between preferences can be
arranged. It does not matter whether either push-pin or poetry is deeply
constitutive of human well-being or flourishing— that is, whether either is an
authentic human good. Instead, the only relevant question is how much
someone is willing to pay or trade off in order to have her preference for
either option satisfied.
This conception of human value has been criticized by natural law
theorists like Robert George,138 as well as philosophers from other
traditions.139 George, for his part, argues that a person may have a preference
for viewing pornography, but this bare fact does not mean that pornography
is a human good.140 Instead, goods are “intrinsic aspects of the well-being of
135. Id. at 336 (emphasis in original).
136. See id. at 326-27; ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 125.
137. This argument is reminiscent of Ross’s challenge to G.E. Moore’s theory of ideal utility. See
ROSS, supra note 35, at 16-20.
138. See GEORGE, supra note 35, at 98-102.
139. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 129-40; Robert Audi, Autonomy, Reason, and Desire,
in MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACTER 195 (1997); MACINTYRE, supra note 16;
RICHARDSON, supra note 12; ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Donald H.
Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995
(1989).
140. See GEORGE, supra note 35, at 97-100.
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human persons; as such they provide ultimate reasons for choice and
action.”141 Even if someone does not have a preference for one of these
human goods, she is better off if that good is realized, even though no
preference of hers has been satisfied; the value remains a human good and a
reason for action even though the actor does not fully appreciate it.142
Knowledge is a good, even for the most determined anti-intellectual, and
music and art are goods, even for philistines. Moreover, many activities are
pursued for the sake of excellence and their inherent values rather than for
pleasure. As Elizabeth Anderson points out: “Environmentalists endure long
hours of often boring, poorly compensated work to save remote ecosystems,
such as Antarctica, that few people will ever see and enjoy. . . . The baseball
pitcher who perfects his curveball takes pleasure in his superior athletic
achievement, in a good he recognizes to be distinct from pleasure.”143 Of
course, no mean amount of argument is necessary to establish that any
particular value is an intrinsic human good, but this is no less true of the law
and economics conception of value as preference-satisfaction. An argument
is required there, too, in order to show that goods and values inhere only in
the satisfaction of arbitrary and subjective preferences. Liberal philosophers
like Rawls, who attempt to construct a theoretical justification for a
conception of human good that consists in the satisfaction of wants, beg the
crucial question. Rawls’s apparatus of the original position and the veil of
ignorance assumes the conclusions it seeks to justify: that persons want only
to satisfy their preferences, not to live a genuinely good life, realizing only
true human goods.144
Incomparable values are frequently opposed in legal reasoning, often with
the result that a legal decision seems to devalue a particular conception of
human good. For example, a proposed environmental regulation may result
in a reduction of the risk of certain human diseases but also lead to increased
unemployment or decreased profit for corporate shareholders.145 Even
though the prevention of disease and these economic values are causally
linked, people do not view the two sides of the equation as expressing values
that can be measured against each other.146 Refusing to adopt the regulation
based on its cost appears to endorse tacitly the infliction of an increased
141. Id. at 105-06 (emphasis in original).
142. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 30-31 (noting that classical Greek thought clearly
recognized a difference between what seems good to us and what is, unqualifiedly, good for us).
143. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 125-26.
144. See id. at 136-39.
145. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 95, at 167-73 (discussing the Asarco case);
see also ANDERSON, supra note 4, ch. 9.
146. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 834-40.
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health risk on third parties so long as there is an offsetting economic benefit.
Similarly, if a workplace safety regulation costs X dollars and saves Y lives,
people are shocked to imagine that the life of a worker is “worth” X/Y
dollars, even though the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion would direct a
government decision maker not to issue the safety regulation if its cost
exceeds the monetary value of lives saved.147 The comparison is intuitively
unsettling because people do not ordinarily think of lives and dollars as being
susceptible to trade-offs, even though they realize that workplace safety has
an economic cost. The negligence standard in tort law may be the best known
instance of the law’s encounter with, and attempt to handle, incomparable
values. The court is directed to perform a deceptively simple mathematical
calculation: is the burden of taking a safety precaution less than the gravity of
the injury that might result from an accident caused by the untaken
precaution, discounted by the probability of its occurrence?148 Right away the
plural values become apparent in this formula. The burden on the defendant
is a dollar figure that must be paid by an actor to institute some kind of
precautionary measure; for example, stationing a crew member on board a
barge under tow, carrying radios on tug boats, or using only double-hulled oil
tankers in Prince William Sound. On the other side of the algebraic relation,
however, is the gravity of the potential injury, which is not obviously a
monetary value, particularly in cases where human life or health is taken by
the resulting accident. Of course, our civil damages scheme allows an injured
person to recover a monetized remedy for injuries wrongfully inflicted, but
this is a contingent feature of our legal system. There is no reason why, in
principle, the defendant could not be locked away in jail, subjected to lex
talionis penalties, or forced to walk around wearing a scarlet letter. If these
proposals seem silly, consider that we are all accustomed to thinking of
injuries in monetary terms only because this is the way our legal system has
chosen to accomplish various social goals like corrective justice and
deterrence of dangerous conduct. Most of the time, this somewhat artificial
comparison of human suffering and dollars-and-cents is not overly troubling.
In other cases, however, it produces outrage.
The problem of incomparable values in tort law was noticed long ago by
Judge Learned Hand— ironically also the architect of the B<PL formula— in
another negligence case, Conway v. O’Brien.149 That opinion reveals that
Hand was sensitive to the difficulties involved in reducing divergent spheres
147. See id. at 804.
148. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Richard
A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1972).
149. 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940).
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of value to a common metric. He cited numerous decisions in which courts
understood the issue in negligence cases not as a mathematical calculation,
but as a more broadly moral inquiry.150 Courts ask whether an actor is
“heedless,” “utter[ly] forgetful[] of legal obligations,” or in Hand’s summary,
“how loudly [the defendant’s] conduct cries for censure,”151 but they do not
purport to decide cases algorithmically. Indeed, Hand went so far as to say
that a mathematical approach to tort law would be “essentially self-
contradictory” because of the incomparable values involved.152 Despite the
sacrifice of theoretical neatness, Hand was willing to admit that many legal
questions are essentially based on practical judgments that cannot be reduced
to calculative rationality. In contemporary experience with the tort system,
the incomparability of human values like the preservation of life and
economic values like profit and efficiency may explain certain phenomena,
like the enormous punitive damages judgment in the Ford Pinto case.153 The
jury was appalled that Ford had conducted a cost-benefit analysis to
determine whether a redesign of the Pinto was warranted, even though it is
precisely this kind of calculation that seems to be required by the Carroll
Towing formula. But the punitive damages award, like Hand’s O’Brien case,
shows that the B<PL formula was never meant to be applied literally. It is a
rough heuristic, perhaps, but a defendant should be wary of assuming that its
moral obligations, which are enforced by juries in tort litigation, are
discharged merely by estimating the value of a human life in dollar terms and
designing safety features accordingly. Instead, Grimshaw and O’Brien show
that there are moral considerations at play in tort cases that cannot be
captured by a monistic scheme of values, and that juries are likely to punish
seriously a defendant that seems too willing to conduct its business as though
150. See id. at 612.
151. Id.
152. Id. For a contemporary example of the debate over incommensurable values in tort law,
consider the problem faced by courts that are required to determine in products liability cases whether
the plaintiff’s conduct could be compared with the strict liability of a manufacturer and used to reduce
the plaintiff’s damages. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 1979)
(noting the qualitative difference between the kinds of fault inherent in a defective product on the one
hand, and the plaintiff’s failure to exercise due care on the other). Courts, such as the Third Circuit in
Murray, have attempted to finesse this problem by claiming to compare the “causative contribution” of
both parties, which ostensibly does not raise incommensurability problems. A better solution was
adopted by the drafters of one of the new Restatements of torts, who explained that the jury should
assign shares of responsibility to the parties, rather than purporting to compare quantities that cannot
be reduced to a common scale. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 cmt.
a (Proposed Final Draft Mar. 31, 1998).
153. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). See also DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 206-13 (1988); Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case,
43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991).
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goods like human life and safety are merely equivalent to a dollar figure.154
Jurors seem intuitively to believe that there are higher and lower modes of
valuation, and that some goods must not be devalued in advance by market
actors. This popular understanding of the incomparability of values conflicts
with the monism of economics and cost-benefit analysis, even though these
monistic paradigms are perhaps a descriptively accurate account of how
engineers and economists actually reason through difficult decisions.155
In a similar vein, the incomparability of values is the starting point for
Margaret Radin’s attacks on the imperialism of the marketplace.156 Radin
criticizes the law and economics movement for its relentless monism, for its
claim that “[e]verything that is desired or valued is an object that can be
possessed, that can be thought of as equivalent to a sum of money.”157 At the
risk of oversimplifying a subtle argument, her claim can be described as
154. Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 209 (reporting on a study by economists who discovered that
citizens asked how much money they would require as compensation for loss of scenic vistas in the
Southwest perceive the payment as a bribe, not a fair expression of the value they place on the
environment, which cannot be represented in monetary terms).
155. It is one thing to talk about higher and lower modes of valuation in a philosophical analysis,
but quite another to advise a manufacturer about what it ought to do when assessing tradeoffs between
safety and cost. A vehicle might be built that would offer close to perfect protection to human life in a
crash, but this would be a tank, not a subcompact car. As long as we believe there is social utility in
small, affordable cars, hard choices will necessarily be made about what structural safety features to
forego in design. In the case of the Pinto, for example, placing the fuel tank behind the rear axle
created the risk that the tank would be split open in a collision, but an alternative location for the tank
would have increased other risks, such as the tank breaking into the passenger compartment in a crash.
See Schwartz, supra note 150, at 1026-32. Furthermore, subcompact cars generally are less safe in
collisions than larger, heavier cars or sport utility vehicles, but subcompacts offer countervailing
benefits such as better fuel economy, a cheaper purchase price, and enhanced maneuverability in city
traffic. Schwartz suggests that there is a “two cultures problem” at work here: public-policy analysis
suggests one way of thinking about values; ordinary citizens (notably in their role as jurors) use
another. See id. at 1041. The significant question for legal theory is which one of these cultures’
understandings ought to form the basis of tort law, as developed through judicial decisions and jury
instructions. Should juror outrage, founded on a belief about the incomparability of values, be a
permissible basis for an award of punitive damages against a manufacturer that employed cost-benefit
analysis, even though tort theory seems to require balancing the cost of safety precautions against the
gravity of harm? For reflections on this question, see generally Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand
Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of
Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1980); Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as
Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990);
Amelia J. Uelmen, The Supposed Death of the Consumer Expectation Test: A Study in Culture and
Caricature (19__) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). I am grateful to Adam Scales for
sharpening my thinking about these issues in numerous conversations about the basis for jury
decisions in negligence cases.
156. See Margaret Jane Radin, What, if Anything, is Wrong with Baby Selling?, 26 PAC. L.J. 135
(1995); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993);
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) [hereinafter Radin,
Market-Inalienability].
157. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 156, at 1861.
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essentially Kantian in its outlines.158 She argues that bodily integrity is not a
fungible object that can be traded for a sum of money, contrary to the
rhetoric of law and economics.159 The marketplace depersonalizes, by its
pervasive insistence that anything is permissible (that is, Kaldor-Hicks
efficient), as long as someone can be compensated for any loss he or she may
experience. People are nothing more than a collection of constituent
attributes, which in turn are merely goods to be bought and sold on the
market. Taken to extremes, the relentless monism of law and economics
justifies brutal results. Radin criticizes Judge Posner for analyzing rape in
terms of property rights, since Posner’s analysis does not allow for the
uniqueness of the rape victim’s injury.160 Rape does not represent merely a
loss of X units of satisfaction, which can be replaced by fining the rapist an
equivalent amount; rather, the crime is one of objectification, which is
actually exacerbated by the payment of damages in “compensation” for being
an act of depersonalization. Although Radin may not subscribe to this
description, this portion of her argument has a great deal in common with the
natural law theorists considered previously, who denied that human goods
can be represented as simply the satisfaction of preferences. Instead, Radin is
claiming that bodily integrity is a fundamental human good which cannot be
equated with or traded off against other values.
One of the most frequently cited examples of the imperialism of the
marketplace is the Baby M case.161 The parties agreed to an economic
exchange: for $10,000, Mary Beth Whitehead would carry another family’s
child and surrender it at birth.162 When she gave birth and wanted to keep the
child, a protracted custody battle ensued in which the New Jersey Supreme
158. Radin faults Kant for treating persons as interchangeable moral agents shorn of individuating
(“heteronomous” in Kantian terms) characteristics. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 153,
at 1897. Her argument that personal attributes may not be used for the pleasure of others, even if the
person is compensated for this invasion, however, is clearly indebted to the persons-as-ends
formulation of the categorical imperative. Cf. KANT, supra note 35, at 37. Moreover, there is nothing
in the Kantian theory of personhood that requires one to think of persons as lacking individuating
characteristics.
159. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 156, 1880-84; cf. Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1125-27 (1972).
160. See Radin, Market-Inalienabiity, supra note 156, at 1884-85. The uniqueness of the victim
may be represented in economic terms by maintaining that personal dignity has infinite value. See
Regan, supra note 139, at 1067. According to Regan, statements like “this friendship is of infinite
value” do not suggest that friends and money are incomparable, but that for some people, certain
relationships are worth more than any amount of money. Id.
161. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). See also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 95,
at 231-72 (extensive discussion of the Baby M case); ANDERSON, supra note 4, ch. 8.
162. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
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Court ultimately held that the surrogacy contract was invalid.163 The court
was primarily concerned with the contracting parties’ usurpation of the state
courts’ authority to determine custody based on the best interests of the
child.164 However, there was an undertone of shock at the exchange of
money for the custody of a child. “This is the sale of a child, or, at the very
least, the sale of a mother’s right to her child, the only mitigating factor being
that one of the purchasers is the father,” wrote the court.165 “The sale of a
child” carries tremendous emotional impact in that sentence— children are
not something that can be bought and sold. “There are, in a civilized society,
some things that money cannot buy.”166
The power of the Baby M example derives from the incomparability of
values. When the court stated that “[t]here are . . . some things that money
cannot buy,” it implied that even if money and babies are comparable in
some abstract sense, such that there is conceivably some sum that people
might agree to trade for a baby, the transaction is nevertheless so abhorrent to
human dignity that it cannot be permitted to stand in a civilized society. The
court thus appreciated the different ways in which familial relationships and
money are valued.
B. Covering Values
The possibility or impossibility of making comparisons is intelligible only
if there is some covering value in respect to which the intrinsic merit of two
items may be evaluated.167 People often refer to the impossibility of
comparing apples and oranges, or chalk and cheese, without explaining with
respect to what value they intend to compare the two items. The claim,
“chalk and cheese cannot be compared,” is spurious if there is a covering
value, say “suitability as a housewarming gift,” which makes cheese better
than chalk. If, on the other hand, no appropriate covering value exists, the
items are said to be noncomparable.
Noncomparability is a formal failure of comparison, formal in the sense
that “some condition necessary for both the possibility of comparability and
the possibility of incomparability fails to hold.”168 In one of Ruth Chang’s
163. See id. at 1236-40.
164. See id. at 1246-48.
165. Id. at 1248.
166. Id. at 1249.
167. See Chang, supra note 127, at 5, 27-33. Michael Stocker calls the covering value a “higher-
level synthesizing category.” See STOCKER, supra note 12, at 172. In this discussion, I will adopt
Chang’s term.
168. Chang, supra note 127, at 29.
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quirky examples, the items in the set {fried eggs, the number 9} are
noncomparable with respect to the covering value “aural beauty.”169 This
kind of noncomparability is no threat at all to practical reasoning, for it is
merely a failure to specify an appropriate comparability predicate. Practical
reason, that is, the kind of problems people actually worry about in their
lives, does not demand that we make comparisons between french toast and
the city of Chicago for breakfast.170 Noncomparability is therefore a non-
problem that may safely be ignored.
However, some philosophers who wish to deny the incomparability of
values have devoted sufficient attention to what I will refer to as the problem
of complex or indeterminate covering values. Chang, in contrast, assumes
that covering values can be specified with a minimum of controversy. In her
examples, it is relatively easy to see why certain predicates belong to the
covering value and others do not. For instance, she says that an appointments
committee might evaluate new philosophers on the basis of the covering
value “suitability as a faculty member,” which includes the components of
intelligence, insightfulness, and creativity, but not sartorial elegance.171 I
suppose this case is clear enough, but consider a different case, imagined by
Michael Stocker: I must decide whether to spend my day reading philosophy
or lying on the beach.172 Two possible covering values may be employed
here: one, “a well-spent day,” or another, “sensual pleasure.” Depending on
the covering value chosen, one of the options will seem superior, but there
seems to be no way to ascertain which covering value to apply in this choice
situation. The determination of which covering value to apply must be made
by some kind of meta-covering value. This second-order covering value
would be required to determine the proper mix of hedonic pleasure and
intellectual stimulation required to achieve the best life for an agent.173 If an
agent were considering a third option, such as volunteering as a literacy tutor
in a poor neighborhood, the second-order covering value would also be
called upon to allocate the agent’s time between self-regarding activities and
altruistic ones. Thus, what started out as a comparative choice between a
limited range of options would end with an attempt at resolving some of the
169. See id. at 28.
170. The example is again Chang’s. See id. at 29.
171. See id. at 7-8; cf. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 48-49.
172. See STOCKER, supra note 12, at 172.
173. In Robert Audi’s terms, an ethical theory exhibits second-order normative completeness if it
“accounts for the finality of any duty that prevails in a conflict of duties (and for the equal stringency
of two conflicting duties if they have equal stringency and one may therefore flip a coin).” AUDI,
supra note 15, at 280.
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knottiest problems in normative ethics.174 A meta-covering value would end
up being defined as something like G.E. Moore’s “good”175— adequate to
account theoretically for practical choices, but unable to guide the decisions
actually made by agents. This problem becomes more acute where an agent
is deliberating about competing forms of life, where the only potential
covering value is some kind of notion of the good for humankind. (Who was
more valuable as a contributor to human society, Beethoven or
Wittgenstein?)
To illustrate this objection, it may be helpful to consider an extended
example of the complexity of covering values and the incomparability of the
constituent values. Renowned writer John McPhee set out on a backpacking
trip through the Glacier Peak Wilderness in Washington’s Cascade range, in
the company of Sierra Club founder David Brower and mining geologist
Charles Park.176 The Kennecott Copper Corporation had patented a claim at
the foot of Glacier Peak and was permitted to work the copper deposit even
in the wilderness area.177 Brower, Park, and McPhee went to have a look at
the spectacular scenery before the mining began.
In every depression is a tarn, and we had passed a particularly
beautiful one a little earlier and, from the escarpment, were looking
back at it now. It was called Hart Lake and was fed by a stream that, in
turn, fell away from a high and deafening cataract. The stream was
interrupted by a series of beaver ponds. All around these free-form
pools were stands of alder, aspen, Engelmann’s spruce; and in the
surrounding mountains, just under the summits, were glaciers and
fields of snow. Brower, who is an aesthetician by trade and likes to
point to beautiful things, had nothing to say at that moment. Neither
did Park. I was remembering the words of a friend of mine in the
National Park Service, who had once said to me, “The Glacier Peak
Wilderness is probably the most beautiful piece of country we’ve got.
Mining copper there would be like hitting a pretty girl in the face with
a shovel. It would be like strip-mining the Garden of Eden.”178
174. Cf. Charles Taylor, Justice After Virtue, in AFTER MACINTYRE 16, 27-28 (John Horton &
Susan Mendus eds., 1994) (arguing that any ordering of this sort presupposes a theory of the good).
175. See G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA passim (1903); see also ANDERSON, supra note 4, at
119-23. Anderson’s critique of Moore shows that a non-naturalistic monism is inadequate because it
fails to account for the intersubjectivity of reason-giving.
176. See generally John McPhee, A Mountain, in ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID 3 (1971).
177. At the time, mining activities were permitted in national wilderness areas. See 16 U.S.C. §
1133(d)(2)-(3) (1994).
178. McPhee, supra note 176, at 10.
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* * *
Park said, “A hole in the ground will not materially hurt this scenery.”
Brower stood up. “None of the experts on scenic resources will
agree with you,” he said. “This is one of the few remaining great
wildernesses in the lower forty-eight. Copper is not a transcendent
value here.”
“Without copper, we’d be in a pretty sorry situation.”
“If that copper didn’t exist, we’d get by without it.”
“I would prefer the mountain as it is, but the copper is there.”
“If we’re down to where we have to take copper from places this
beautiful, we’re down pretty far.”
“Minerals are where you find them. The quantities are finite. It’s
criminal to waste minerals when the standard of living of your people
depends upon them. A mine cannot move. It is fixed by nature. So it
has to take precedence over any other use. If there were a copper
deposit in Yellowstone Park, I’d recommend mining it. Proper use of
minerals is essential. You have to go get them where they are. Our
standard of living is based on this.”179
* * *
A pluming waterfall, hundreds of feet high, fell from the east face
of Plummer Mountain, and, for lack of a more specific goal, we were
homing on it.
“This scenic climax is of international significance,” Brower said.
“That may be, but as long as you’ve got copper here, pressure to
mine is going to continue.”
“Well, I’ll give up when copper has to be used as a substitute for
gold. The kids will decide then. And I think they’ll decide not to mine
it.”
“A mine would remove the mining area from wilderness— anyone
in his right mind would admit that,” Park said. “You’re going to have
people, equipment, machinery. You’re going to blast. You’re going to
have a waste dump. You’re also going to get copper, which
179. Id. at 21.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p113 Wendel.doc 09/15/00   4:56 PM
156 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:113
contributes to the national wealth and, I think, well-being. And all that
can’t possibly affect Glacier Peak.”
“The mine will affect anybody in this whole area who looks at
Glacier Peak. One of the last great wildernesses in the United States
would have been punctured, like a worm penetrating an apple. There
would not only be the pit but also the dumps, the settling ponds, the
tailings, the mill, machine shops, powerhouses, hundred-ton trucks.
Good Lord! The mood would go. Wilderness defenders have to get
into abstract terms like mood and so forth, but that is what it is all
about. How are the people and equipment going to get in and out of
here? A road? A railroad?”
“I think cost would have to enter into that.”
“O.K. I put a price of ten billion dollars on the Glacier Peak
Wilderness. Actually, that is facetious. There is no price. The price of
beauty has never been evaluated. Look at that mountain! What would
it cost to build an equal one?”180
The debate between Park and Brower shows not only that values like
scenic beauty and inexpensive minerals cannot be compared on their own
terms, but that no simple covering value can be specified that makes the
comparison possible. The candidates for covering values in this debate, for
example, “What is the socially best use for this wilderness area” or “The best
mix of development and conservation”— are essentially contestable
concepts.181 There is simply no way to use one of those values as the basis
for making comparisons, because the values themselves depend on how the
values are ranked with respect to one another.182 And, there is not much point
in specifying the covering value as something like “social good,” because it
impossible to specify this value without begging the critical comparative
questions. Is the social good best served by economic development or
wilderness preservation? Since Park can only talk about the value of copper
as it contributes to the economic life of the country, Brower’s argument is
unanswerable in Park’s terms. Thus, the debate seems to become irrational,
since Park and Brower are left making claims in separate normative domains
180. Id. at 39-40.
181. See generally W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y
167 (1956).
182. Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1617-19 (1998)
(stating that incomparability results when an “integration condition” is too weak to specify how values
should be ranked).
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that do not encompass the other’s stated values. Herein lies the threat posed
by the incomparability of values to practical reasoning— if Brower is right
that it is genuinely impossible to compare the values of a mountain’s beauty
and the social benefits of minerals, his debate with Park was nothing more
than a clash of preferences, as though these two highly educated people had
spent several days on a camping trip arguing about whether vanilla or rum
raisin ice cream was the “better” flavor.183
One response is to characterize the objection as one based on epistemic
uncertainty, not incomparability of values. “In real-life ethical confrontations,
people entangle their moral claims with factual propositions about human
nature and the world. They deliberately open up the former to the latter,
sometimes holding themselves prepared to abandon or modify a moral
position if the facts turn out to be different.”184 Our inability to choose among
options may result from a lack of complete information.185 In addition to
good faith empirical disagreements, disputes often are made intractable
through the presence of ignorance, stupidity, bigotry, pig-headedness,
arrogance, or petty bureaucratic squabbling.186 For example, Ruth Chang
discusses one of Joseph Raz’s illustrations, in which a musically talented
college student is struggling with the choice between pursuing a career as a
clarinetist or going to law school to become a solicitor.187 She doubts that this
example shows incomparability of the two careers, although she takes pains
to argue that the reason the careers are incomparable does not depend on the
limitations of human agents to reason through the dilemma.188 Others,
however, have argued that incomparability in a case such as this one is a
function of the possibility of making erroneous judgments, although it is
conceptually possible for an omniscient agent to view simultaneously the two
183. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 92-95 (arguing that tastes, or objects of preferences, belong
to a social domain in which idiosyncracy is tolerated, but intrinsic goods are grounded in communities
of valuation that admit of objectivity).
184. Jeremy Waldron, On the Objectivity of Morals: Thoughts on Gilbert’s Democratic
Individuality, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1361, 1374 (1992).
185. See JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS 9-10 (1989); DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE
RULE OF LAW 33 (1984) (“The relevant facts can be much more controversial than the moral
judgments.”); Leo Katz, Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1465 (1998).
186. See RICHARDSON, supra note 12, at 260.
187. See RAZ, supra note 12, at 332.
188. See Chang, supra note 127, at 23-24; cf. BOK, supra note 106, at 77-78 n.* (1978) (“Moral
principles, just like length and weight, represent different dimensions by which we structure
experience and can therefore present conflicts in concrete cases but never in the abstract. It is for this
reason that the search for priority rules among moral principles in the abstract is doomed to fail; one
might as well search for such priority rules among pounds, yards, and hours in the abstract.”)
(emphasis added).
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alternative lives faced by the agent and help the would-be clarinetist or
lawyer make the right decision. If it were somehow possible to live life as a
clarinetist and then return to the starting point and experience a different life
as a lawyer, the perplexed young agent might find reason to favor one career
over the other.189 The best a single human can do, however, is to attempt to
view the alternative life choices imaginatively by putting him or herself in
the position of both the clarinetist and the lawyer and trying to understand
each life from an internal point of view.190 The choice only seems like one
between incomparable alternatives, because an agent with a God’s-eye view
could decide on the best course of action. From the human standpoint,
however, the options really are incomparable, since a God’s-eye perspective
is not available to us. Even if the conflict is only an apparent one, we have no
means of transcending this apparent conflict, so the choice situation as
experienced is one between incomparable options.191 Presumably, critics who
accept the epistemic objection would have a similar response to the debate
reported by McPhee, that if somehow everything were knowable, we as a
society would be able to make the allocative decision between mineral
production and scenic views. It is only the multiplicity of variables and
unknowns that makes the dispute between Park and Brower seem like one
between incomparable values.
The epistemological objection has some bite when applied to the
clarinetist versus lawyer example, where the options are richly detailed and
the effects of the choice long-lasting, or in Millgram’s example of choosing
between potential roommates. In the example of the Glacier Peak wilderness,
however, it is not difficult to conceptualize the values of pristine wilderness
and accessible minerals, but it does seem daunting to construct a covering
value that enables a decision maker to resolve contested social issues about
how best to balance development and conservation. One might argue that the
debate seems intractable only because of our imperfect knowledge: perhaps
189. See generally Regan, supra note 139; cf. Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical
Reasoning, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 151, 160-61
(Ruth Chang ed., 1997). In Millgram’s example, the agent is trying to choose between two prospective
roommates: one a slob but an interesting conversationalist, the other a somewhat dull neatnik. See id.
The agent has no idea how to compare the two roommates for suitability until several months have
passed; he has chosen one over the other and realizes that neatness was more important than good
conversation— the piled-up dishes in the sink are driving him to distraction, and so on. See id.
190. See KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 69-72. Kronman, like Raz, accepts the claim that the
alternative career paths are incomparable. See id. at 69.
191. Cf. KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 26-27 (1995);
Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 164 (1999)
(arguing that the debate over moral realism is beside the point for human affairs, because even if there
are objective values “out there” in the universe, the only thing that exists here on earth are beliefs
about what those values are, and people continue to disagree about these beliefs).
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if all the relevant facts were known, the government official would realize
that we have plenty of minerals but not nearly enough wilderness, or vice
versa. But suppose it were the case (as I think it is) that as a nation we do not
face grave shortages of either building materials or scenic vistas. Then the
decision turns on what kind of society we want to inhabit— one more
materially prosperous but less enriched with natural beauty, or the reverse.
The point of the example is that it seems impossible to specify a covering
value that takes into account the full range of moral and prudential
considerations at play in the policy dispute and tells us how they should be
ranked. Of course, if that political debate has been resolved at a higher level
of government, the covering value for the bureaucrat’s decision will be
readily apparent, but the policy debate itself, in any government institution,
can hardly be resolved without a means for comparing the values at stake,
which is precisely what makes the covering value indeterminate.
The difficulty of specifying a covering value in ethical reasoning is
apparent in cases of tragic conflict, where an agent is faced with two
incompatible courses of action, either of which will preserve some important
value but destroy another. The conflict is presented by the inability of the
agent to do both of two things she ought to do.192 Some familiar conundrums
of moral philosophy show that an agent can be faced with a choice in which
he cannot help doing wrong, because each of two incompatible actions is
supported by moral reasons that mandate the action, and that are not
overridden by other moral requirements.193 In a classic example imagined by
Sartre, a patriotic young Frenchman must choose whether to stay home to
care for his ailing mother or join the Resistance.194 If he cares for his mother,
which seems morally obligatory, he must forfeit the opportunity to fight for
his country, which also presents itself as something that must be done, for
good moral reasons. Both options retain their moral significance, regardless
of what the agent chooses to do, and the reasons for doing the unchosen
option are not overridden. These tragic choices produce what have been
192. See Bernard Williams, Ethical Consistency, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166, 171 (1973).
193. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 9, at 95; Philippa Foot, Moral Realism and Moral
Dilemma, 80 J. PHIL. 379, 380 (1983) (“In situations of moral conflict as thus understood one principle
enjoins one action and another another, and it is impossible that the agent should do both.”); Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas, 84 J. PHIL. 263 (1987). Gowans represents
this claim, which he calls the “dilemmas thesis,” in deontic logic: “There are moral conflicts in which
the correct resolution of moral deliberation includes both OA and OB.” GOWANS, supra note 12, at 49.
The dilemmas thesis is contrasted with what Gowans calls the “options thesis,” but which is also a
corollary of the essential claim of monism, that “for every moral conflict, the correct conclusion of
moral deliberation includes exactly one of the following: (1) OA; (2) OB; or (3) ~OA & ~OB & O(A v
B).” Id.
194. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism, in EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMAN EMOTIONS 24 (1957).
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called “moral remainders,” or the lingering sense that the agent has done
wrong, even though she chose her action based on good reasons.195 There
remains “a disvalue even within that justified, perhaps obligatory, whole— a
disvalue which is still there to be noted and regretted.”196
Similarly, politics is the arena for a particularly acute kind of moral
dilemma, known as the problem of dirty hands, in which it is asserted that a
public official must inevitably participate in wrongdoing.197 Consider two
well-known examples, slightly adapted from Michael Walzer: (1) A virtuous
politician who will bring about long-needed social justice in the city can get
elected only by entering into a cozy construction deal with a corrupt ward
boss, where the politician agrees to steer city construction contracts to the
boss’s family; (2) The CIA can learn the location of several bombs planted in
elementary schools around the country only by torturing a captured
terrorist.198 Torturing the prisoner or making the corrupt deal may, at the end
of the day, be justified. But justification of these choices does not eliminate
the sense of wrongfulness we feel about the politicians’ actions. There
remains some profound moral sense in which torture is wrong, even if
torturing the prisoner was the only way to protect the lives of dozens of
innocent persons.
Tragedy and dirty hands are different from the ordinary costs of actions,
which are imposed on us by the simple facts of scarcity and mortality. It is
important not to overstate this point, because not every choice is tragic.
“[N]early every choice and act requires a compromise between values, even
moral values. But again, unless one’s life is unfortunate beyond description,
not all such compromises are compromising.”199 On any given occasion, we
may have to choose between, say, watching a basketball game and working
on a forthcoming article. It would be a serious misdescription of this situation
to call it “tragic” merely because we cannot have it both ways. There is no
cause to feel ashamed of choosing to work or watch the game, even though
either choice necessarily means forgoing another use of one’s time. “[T]he
195. See GOWANS, supra note 12, at 91: “[T]here are moral conflicts in which, whatever the agent
does, he or she will do something which is morally wrong in the sense of transgressing some moral
value.” See also ROSS, supra note 35, at 28.
196. STOCKER, supra note 12, at 13.
197. See DENNIS THOMPSON, POLITICAL ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE 4, 11, 18-19, 22, 40, 67, 148
(1987); Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160
(1973); Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 55
(Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978).
198. Walzer, supra note 197, at 165-67.
199. STOCKER, supra note 12, at 14; see also ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 63 (“[A] choice
becomes tragic, as opposed to merely unfortunate or painful, only when it threatens the very coherence
of the chooser’s life.”).
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strong utilitarian does not think that people go into fits of paralysis whenever
they are required to compare goods that cross different domains of their
social lives. . . . Over the long haul, when we look at everyday life, the hard
question is not why most of these choices are so difficult to make, but why
they seem so easy to make.”200 We do not call these choices “tragic,” because
we recognize the possibility of specifying a covering value that readily
resolves the conflict. For example, if the covering value is, “what one ought
to do in order to gain tenure,” then it is clear that skipping the basketball
game to work on the article is mandated by the covering value. If, on the
other hand, the covering value is, “what one ought to do to maximize the
enjoyment of one’s life because, after all, we only go around once,” then
watching the game may be favored. Tragedy, for want of a better word,
results from the inability to specify a higher-order value that is capable of
guiding decision. Epstein is correct that people do not spend all day locked in
irreconcilable value conflicts, because for the vast majority of choices there
is a covering value that lends order to individuals’ lives.201 But this
observation does not carry over to all cases, like Sartre’s hypothetical, in
which the very specification of the covering value is contested, or where
second-order moral reasons are absent or stand in conflict. In such a case,
many philosophers have followed Sartre and advocated some form of
existentialist reasoning. Raz, for example, maintains that “once reason has
failed to adjudicate between a range of options, we normally choose one for
no further reason, simply because we want to.”202
Here is the rub of my argument: the purpose of the practice of lawyering
cannot be captured in a covering value that guides decision in all cases,
because any plausible covering value is to some extent indeterminate or
internally inconsistent. This is not to say that all ethical choices faced by
lawyers result in perplexity, tragedy, or dirty hands. Any conceivable
covering value for the practice of lawyering must reflect that a lawyer
possesses specialized knowledge, interprets and gives advice on various legal
texts, speaks and acts on behalf of another (a person, an entity, the state) in
judicial proceedings, is privy to sensitive information about the other’s
affairs, and so on. Otherwise, that covering value would not fit descriptively
200. Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 683, 691.
201. Alternatively, there may be a second-order moral norm, such as the principle of reciprocity
(the “Golden Rule”), which directs choice in cases where first-order values conflict. See Robert P.
George, Does the “Incommensurability Thesis” Imperil Common Sense Moral Judgments?, 37 AM. J.
JURIS. 185, 189-95 (1992).
202. Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON 110, 125 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
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with the extant social practice of lawyering.203 (Of course, alternative legal
systems exist that support lawyering practices which would be alien to
common-law trained jurists. The covering values that guide choices for those
professionals would naturally have different contours. I do not mean to
suggest that a different model of lawyering would not be normatively
justified in, say, Germany or Japan.)
The practice of lawyering in the present-day United States is justified
with respect to social functions that are frequently in conflict.204 Lawyers are
required to maintain order; permit challenges to the existing order; speak on
behalf of the political community personified; give a voice to those who may
not be heard by the majority; enhance efficiency so that powerful state and
private entities can get things done for the benefit of society; challenge
abuses of power when the little guys get trampled underfoot; protect private
ordering and individual expectations; and align private action with the social
good. Lawyers must secure such advantages for their clients as are attainable
within the legal system, but also not impede the truth-seeking roles of other
actors, such as courts, administrative agencies, and other lawyers. Lawyers
are expected to act as partisans, “champions,” “hired guns,” or “friends” to
their clients, yet must also avoid inflicting unjustified harm on third parties.
Lawyers must counsel their clients on compliance with legal norms, but are
also permitted to challenge the boundaries of existing law. Lawyers vindicate
the core value of political liberalism— namely, preservation of individual
autonomy— while also maintaining a civic republican respect for tradition
and the common good. Thus, appealing to the role or social function of
lawyers as a covering value for ethical choice situations merely replicates the
problem of incomparability.205 As I will explain in Section IV.B, the
traditions of legal practice in the United States embrace this pluralism of
professional ideals, permitting us to admire lawyers as profoundly different
from one another as Darrow and Davis. If professional ideals were somehow
203. Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 92; DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 67 (stating that an
interpretation of a practice must exhibit a sufficient degree of fit with the standing features of the
practice; otherwise, it is something more radical like a proposal for a completely new kind of practice).
204. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 320 (1994); Morris, supra note 51, at 790-
92. Raz criticizes Dworkin for assuming that a social practice can have only one purpose, which can
then be used as a criterion to identify when an account of that practice is made the best it can be by a
process of constructive interpretation. See RAZ, supra, at 320. For example, the law of criminal
procedure, including the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, has as its purpose both the preservation
of probative evidence and the deterrence of unjust police practices. An interpretive justification of this
body of law would have to refer to diverse purposes as elements in the justificatory argument.
205. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1731-32 (1976) (arguing that appealing to the justificatory purpose of rules does not cure
indeterminacy in the law, because the reasons behind the rules are themselves at cross purposes).
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forced into a single mold, so that only one of these lawyer-archetypes could
be found worthy of respect, then much of the richness of legal practice as a
moral ideal would be eliminated.
C. Must We Mean What We Say About Incomparability?
Claims about incomparability, setting aside for the moment whether they
are true, play a significant role in our thinking about moral values. Perhaps a
productive way to approach the debate over monism and pluralism is to ask
not whether incomparability is true as a matter of ontology, but whether
belief in the incomparability of values will have a positive impact on our
normative discourse. Frederick Schauer, for example, would ask of the Park-
Brower dispute whether Brower’s position— that the value of the mountain
cannot be compared with the value of copper— is likely to lead to more
productive conversation about conservation and natural resource
development.206 It could be the case that incomparability is false, but there
nevertheless may be good reasons for people to talk as though some values
are incomparable. Eric Posner postulates that people who use the discourse
of incomparability are trying to signal to potential cooperative partners that
they are reliable, principled people— “good types,” as he calls them— who
take their moral obligations quite seriously.207 His example of this kind of
communication is rather startling: When Posner tells his wife, “I value you
more than anything,” he doesn’t really believe that his wife cannot be valued
in some other terms. Instead, he is signaling to his wife that he is a
206. See Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215, 1216-17
(1998). Schauer insists that he does not necessarily accept a pragmatic theory of truth generally, only
that pragmatic evaluation is a useful way of thinking about incommensurability. See id. at 1223-24.
For Schauer’s earlier statement of this position, see Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its
Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785 (1994). For an opposing view, see Jeremy
Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 813 (1994).
Waldron argues that Schauer cannot have it both ways— if we have objective knowledge that
something is true, then we must act on it; practical knowledge has a “to be done” quality about it. See
id. at 814. It is, therefore, incoherent to hold a belief that values are comparable, yet act as though they
are not, or vice versa. See id. A possible response to Waldron’s argument can be found in Elizabeth
Anderson’s pragmatic theory of value, which maintains that any authentic evaluative distinction must
play some role in practical reasoning; thus, incomparability is true if and only if we have no need to
compare two goods in practice. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 47-55; Elizabeth Anderson, Practical
Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL
REASON 90 (Ruth Chang, ed., 1997). Interestingly, Waldron seems to have moved toward this position
in his recent writing. He argues that the truth of the claim of moral realism is irrelevant to political
deliberation because finite human agents can have only beliefs about ostensibly “objective” values;
there is no way to guarantee that we perceive objective values correctly. See WALDRON, supra note
191.
207. See Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the
Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1185, 1189-1200 (1998).
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trustworthy fellow, a “good type” in his jargon, and will not easily let other
things interfere with his relationship with her. The statement about the
incomparability of his wife and other values is nothing more than an
exaggeration, or a noble lie.
It is tempting to use this argument as an example of the morally
impoverished state of law-and-economics discourse,208 but Posner’s focus on
the communicative function of incomparability claims does help explain why
some actors may use arguments for the incomparability of values without
necessarily committing themselves to an ontological claim about values. For
example, applying the analysis of signaling behavior to the debate over the
Glacier Peak Wilderness, Brower’s position can be understood as an
expression of the strongest possible commitment to wilderness conservation.
Perhaps he phrases his arguments in incomparabilist terms to signal to Sierra
Club members that he will stand firm and resist any attempt to extract
minerals from the public lands. On the other hand, the signal could be
directed toward government decision makers, who may wish to consider the
strength of the opposition by environmental groups to mining in national
wilderness areas. Or, Brower’s words could be aimed at the Kennecott
Copper Corporation, as a veiled threat to obstruct the opening of the mine
through legal action.
Signaling conventions also help explain why certain choices are not taken
to reveal tradeoffs between incomparable values. For example, people
sacrifice intimate friendships to move to a different part of the country to
make more money.209 This choice appears to reveal a rational weighing of
preferences, and a decision that the additional money is worth more than the
friendships left behind. But, as Raz argues, what matters is the symbolic
significance imputed by social convention to the action.210 People do not
attach an economic value to spending a month with their loved ones, and
would be angry indeed if someone tried to offer them a sum of money to be
parted for a month. Nevertheless, people occasionally spend a month away
from home as part of their jobs— that is, to earn money. In those instances, in
light of the customs surrounding the trip away from home, it is clear that the
agent does not affirm an economic trade-off, spouse for money. Thus,
someone who relocates to pursue a new job does not symbolically affirm that
208. Cf. Brian Leiter, Incommensurability: Truth or Consequences?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1723,
1727 (1998) (“[T]he empirical inadequacy of rational choice theory strikes me as yesterday’s news”);
Nussbaum, supra note 87; Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103
YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
209. See RAZ, supra note 12, at 337-38.
210. Id. at 348-49; see also ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 59-64.
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he can be bought out of his friendships.
The signaling model may explain some apparent instances of
incomparable values. Perhaps some attorneys who use the language of
incommensurability are indeed trying to signal that they are “good types.”
For example, in the famous “buried bodies” case,211 a criminal defense
lawyer learned from his client, who had been charged with an unrelated
murder, that the client had killed several young women and hidden their
bodies in the wilderness. Based on his client’s directions the lawyer visited
the location of the graves, photographed the bodies, and said nothing in
public, even though he knew that the parents of the murdered women had
been pleading for information about their missing daughters. Revealing the
location of the bodies would have assuaged the parents’ despair, without
materially worsening the position of the client, who was sure to be convicted
of two other murders. The lawyer also realized, however, his obligation to
pay due respect to the potentially corrosive effects of lawyers divulging their
clients’ secrets. Not revealing the location of the bodies was mandated by the
duty of loyalty to the client, while disclosure seemed required by
considerations of care for the anguished parents. The lawyer reported having
felt this pull of opposing obligations, but he ultimately concluded that the
parents’ suffering “was not worth jeopardizing my sworn duty or my oath of
office or the Constitution.”212 Significantly, the lawyer acknowledged
publicly that his professional obligation to represent “a bastard” like his
client caused pain to the relatives of the murder victims: “I caused them pain
. . . . What do you say? Nothing I could say would justify it in their minds.
You couldn’t justify it to me.”213 He seemed to be saying, “I’m not a
monster, I’m a conscientious professional. I’m the kind of lawyer you want
in your small town, not someone you should run out of town on a rail.”
Because the lawyer did live and practice in a small community, this public
show of contrition may have been essential to the lawyer’s retaining his
livelihood.214
211. See People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975), aff’d mem., N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1975), order aff’d, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976). David Luban analyzes this case in his book
Lawyers and Justice, and the case forms the core of the debate with one of his critics. See LUBAN,
supra note 152, at 53-54; Luban, supra note 108; David Wasserman, Should a Good Lawyer Do the
Right Thing? David Luban on the Morality of Adversary Representation, 49 MD. L. REV. 392 (1990).
212. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 900 (1996) (quoting Frank Armani, one of the lawyer-defendants in the Belge
case).
213. Id. at 903 (quoting Frank Armani).
214. This kind of signalling behavior can also lead an agent to avoid saying something that would
suggest the comparability of disparate values, like human life and money. One political scientist
imagines a conversation that can never occur, because of the messages it would send about the
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The lawyer in the buried bodies case might merely have been trying to
salvage his public reputation by frankly admitting that he was pulled in two
directions by values that seemed irreconcilable. Posner may be correct that
this case does not show us anything about whether the values of loyalty and
avoiding harm to third parties are, in fact, incomparable. The signaling
explanation does not suffice to account for other cases of ethical conflict in
legal practice, however, in which the incomparability of values is a central
feature of the agent’s choice, not merely a post hoc label attached to the
choice by the agent as a justification. In the problem cases in Section II of
this Article, there is no communicative explanation for the incomparability of
values. Indeed, in the first two problems, no one is communicating anything
to another person; they are simply going about their business, trying to
decide whether to act or not, but they are not making a public statement
about their beliefs or values. The third problem does involve communication,
but the lawyer is not asserting the incomparability of values. Her
communication, instead, is a defamatory utterance about the judge assigned
to her case, which is made for the purpose of angering the judge and causing
his recusal. In all of these cases, the moral values are incumbent upon agents
as a result of the relationships between the agent and other parties, which are
in turn created by the social practice of lawyering. They cannot be explained
as simply signaling conventions, where signaling is not a feature of the
dilemma.
D. Incommensurability of Worldviews, Paradigms, or Forms of Life
As a cautionary note, it is possible to overstate the thesis about the
incomparability of values as a broad claim of conceptual
incommensurability, usually associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn and
Paul Feyerabend.215 Kuhn argues that scientific knowledge proceeds in fits
and starts. Competing theoretical frameworks are offered to explain observed
data, and scientific revolutions occur when the adherents of one framework
convert the scientific community to their new system of explanation. (These
speaker: “Mrs. Jones, I share your grief about the plight of your husband, but we simply cannot afford
to spend $30,000 per year to keep him alive when people are dying elsewhere who could be saved for
much less.” Steven E. Rhoads, How Much Should We Spend to Save a Life?, in VALUING LIFE (Steven
E. Rhoades ed., 1980). This example also highlights the incomparability of individuals, which is a
separate, and very significant, moral consideration.
215. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); PAUL
FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 255 (rev’d ed., 1988) (“The (cultural) measuring instruments that
separate ‘reality’ from ‘appearance’ change and must change when we move from one culture to
another and from one historical stage to the next.”).
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frameworks are similar to what Wittgenstein calls “forms of life,” that is,
what has to be taken as given in order for rational inquiry and, indeed, human
life, to proceed.216) A crucial premise in Kuhn’s argument is that these
frameworks, or paradigms, as he calls them, are incommensurable; that is, an
explanation of observed phenomenon within New Paradigm cannot be
translated into terms that are intelligible in Old Paradigm, because New
Paradigm employs numerous concepts and categories that simply do not exist
in Old Paradigm.
Lavoisier, we said, saw oxygen where Priestly had seen
dephlogisticated air and where others had seen nothing at all. . . . And
in the absence of some recourse to that hypothetical fixed nature that
he “saw differently,” the principle of economy will urge us to say that
after discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked in a different world.217
Where Kuhn speaks of a “hypothetical fixed nature” that the disputants
could appeal to, he refers to a standpoint outside the competing paradigms,
from which the claims of Old Paradigm (phlogiston) and New Paradigm
(oxygen) could be assessed.218 The naive realist view, at least as caricatured
by Kuhn, is that the-world-as-it-is-in-itself contains either oxygen or
phlogiston, so either Lavoisier’s theory or Priestly’s must be the correct
description of nature. Kuhn’s radical claim is that there is no theory-
independent criterion of truth in science, so one cannot say that Priestly was
wrong, only that Lavoisier’s claims have achieved general acceptance in the
scientific community. Science does not give us access to the-world-as-it-is-
in-itself, so we cannot use the world as a touchstone to prove or disprove
theories that posit the existence of oxygen or phlogiston. We cannot ask
whether scientific claims are true simpliciter, only whether they are valid
under the scientific paradigm currently in vogue.219
216. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, pt. II, at 226e (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).
217. KUHN, supra note 215, at 118.
218. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 166.
When two rival large-scale intellectual traditions confront one another, a central feature of the
problem of deciding between their claims is characteristically that there is no neutral way of
characterizing either the subject matter about which they give rival accounts or the standards by
which their claims are to be evaluated.
Id.
219. Some legal theorists invoke Kuhn in support of their critique of law as radically
indeterminate. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional
Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990). To the extent Kuhn’s claims fail on their own terms, as I argue
below, the radical legal indeterminists do not gain by invoking the supposed crisis in empirical science
as a symbol for the instability of legal propositions.
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Kuhn’s critics argue that broad conceptual incommensurability is literally
an unintelligible notion. His arguments about paradigms only make sense if
there is some common theoretical framework within which to describe the
rival scientific traditions.220 Kuhn’s examples of radical paradigm shifts “are
not so extreme but that the changes and the contrasts can be explained and
described using the equipment of a single language. . . . Kuhn is brilliant at
saying what things were like before the revolution using— what else?— our
post-revolutionary idiom.”221 Kuhn is able to talk about the transition from
the theoretical construct of phlogiston to the now-accepted explanation of the
role of oxygen in combustion while remaining intelligible to his readers. We
have the same access to the word “phlogiston” that the believers in
phlogiston did, even though we don’t believe such a thing exists. Only
because our language is rich enough to describe the beliefs of Priestly and
Lavoisier and to explain the grounds for the disagreement between the rivals
is it possible for us to understand Kuhn’s claim that the two theories are
incommensurable. Since the very notion of incommensurable paradigms or
conceptual schemes depends on the existence of a language in which both
paradigms can be represented, the strong argument for the existence of
mutually unintelligible conceptual frameworks vitiates itself.
In other words, it is important not to overstate the amount of agreement
that is necessary between two frameworks in order for members of these
diverse communities to have productive arguments with one another about
the truth of competing claims. “As Peirce, Quine and Sellars, and
Wittgenstein show us (in very different ways), there is no need to presuppose
that there is some ultimate foundation or ultimate standards that must be
presupposed to make [scientific debate across rival paradigms]
intelligible.”222 We do manage to represent the history of science effectively
in our present-day language, and virtually all observers, even radicals like
Feyerabend, agree that science made progress through the work of Galileo,
Einstein, and the quantum physicists in the early twentieth century. The
lasting insight of Kuhn and his followers is that debates between members of
rival communities cannot be neatly theorized as deductive logic; instead, we
must understand scientific argument, especially at “revolutionary” moments,
as involving rhetoric, persuasion, and above all, practical judgment.223
Although there may not be an externally given, theory-independent set of
220. See Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH
AND INTERPRETATION 182 (1984).
221. Id. at 184.
222. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 73.
223. Id. at 74.
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criteria to which scientific disputants can appeal directly, the disagreements
described by Kuhn are not wholly irrational.224 Instead, the rationality of the
debates must be redescribed.225 The distance between conceptual frameworks
emphatically does not mean that anything goes, or that there is no such thing
as truth and falsity in science.226 Rather, it merely entails a style of debate
that requires imagination, sympathy for arguments based on rival
presuppositions, and an openness to the explanatory power of the rival
framework. When we approach a rival culture, whether in the natural
sciences or in social disciplines like anthropology, we may not be able to
translate alien concepts directly into terms with which we are familiar, but it
is nevertheless quite possible for us to reach a sufficiently rich understanding
of the other culture’s practices to compare them with similar practices in our
culture.227 Again, as Clifford Geertz has recognized, this comparison does
not proceed through cross-cultural universals, nor does it entail cultural
relativism.228 Instead, members of the rival communities use the claims of the
rival community to test the acceptability and plausibility of claims within
their own preexisting conceptual framework that they take to be true.229
In the realm of ethics, it is important to observe the extent to which
members of rival communities (perhaps constituted along geographic lines,
or otherwise associated with a particular cultural, religious, or ethnic group)
are not making normative claims that purport to hold only for members of
that community.230 A normative framework is the response to a history of
grappling with central questions about how people ought to live their lives
and structure their families, governments, and social institutions.
[W]hen a person talks about his identity as a Maori, or a Sunni
Muslim, or a Jew, or a Scot, he is relating himself not just to a set of
dances, costumes, recipes and incantations, but to a distinct set of
224. Id. at 92.
225. Id. at 92-93.
226. This extreme conclusion could not be true, because, if it were, the scientific enterprise would
simply grind to a halt, as opposing camps of scientists with no way to commensurate their claims
rationally fell into a game of power politics or pointless squabbling. Cf. John Finnis, Commensuration
and Public Reason, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 215, 217
(Ruth Chang ed., 1997) (“If worldviews are incommensurable, we have no reason to accept a scheme
of social decision making, a constitution, a Rule of Law. For each person, then, the challenge is simply
to become and remain one of those who are in charge.”) (emphasis in original).
227. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 103.
228. Id. at 105-06 (citing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (1973)).
229. Id. at 138.
230. This discussion draws from Jeremy Waldron, Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility, in
CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman eds., 1999) [hereinafter
Waldron, Cultural Identity]. See also Jeremy Waldron, Particular Values and Critical Morality, in
LIBERAL RIGHTS 168 (1993).
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practices in which his people . . . have historically addressed and
settled upon solutions to the serious problems of human life in
society.231
As Waldron emphasizes, these practices have developed historically
within the context of a particular culture, but no one within that culture thinks
they are true, insightful, or useful only for members of the culture and
optional for everyone else.232 The story told about a given norm is not,
“Because I am a member of such-and-such a community, I value X.” Instead,
it is, “X is a good thing to do.” For example, conservative Christians in the
United States do not claim that single-sex marriages are wrong for
themselves, but acceptable (or a matter of indifference) for others outside
their framework. Rather, they believe quite vehemently that their insistence
on the limitation of the institution of marriage to a man and a woman is
warranted for people generally. Many secular liberals, on the other hand,
believe that extending the institution of marriage to encompass same-sex
unions ought to be accomplished, not only within the distinct community of
secular liberals, but in society as a whole.233 Notice two things about the
interaction between these communities. First, neither community believes
that its claims about right and wrong are valid only for its members. If a
religious conservative were asked why marriage ought to be reserved for
opposite-sex couples, he or she would presumably respond by telling a story
about the importance of different gender roles within a family, or the
biological necessity of procreation, or about Adam and Eve.234 These reasons
may not be persuasive to someone else, but they are certainly meant to be a
better account of why the form of life lived by the religious conservative is
morally preferable to the alternatives.235 Members of both communities
would claim that their understanding of the institution of marriage and its
alternatives is true, while the other community’s account is beset with bias,
one-sidedness, and partiality.236 Second, the claims made by these rival
communities are not so different that they cannot be understood by others.
They begin from dramatically different metaphysical, theological, and
empirical presuppositions, to be sure, but they are not mutually
231. Waldron, Cultural Identity, supra note 230.
232. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Moral Relativism, Truth, and Justification, in THE MACINTYRE
READER 202 (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998).
233. This belief is shared by some liberal Christian communities, such as the Riverside Church in
New York City, but it is a minority view, even among relatively progressive Protestant denominations.
234. Cf. Mark 10:2-9; Matthew 19:3-6.
235. See Waldron, Cultural Identity, supra note 230, at 20-21.
236. See MacIntyre, supra note 232, at 208.
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incomprehensible.237 One community’s standards may become widely
adopted in society, and another’s rejected, but this is not for lack of
understanding; rather, the claims of both are widely enough understood that
they can be compared and ranked. Indeed, contemporary political debates
that touch on the values of particular cultures reveal a high level of
understanding of the rival claims. I can state the case for both the pro-choice
and pro-life positions in the abortion debate, or both sides of the issue of
same-sex marriages, even though ultimately I believe one position is better
justified than the other.238
Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that two people may occupy separate
normative spheres— cultures, political orders, or religious traditions— that
differ so sharply from one another that mutual understanding of ethical
claims is made extremely difficult.239 However, it is important not to
exaggerate the extent to which members of a pluralistic society cannot talk to
one another. Perhaps the occupants of rival ethical traditions can, with effort,
understand the terminology and concepts used by the others. Jeffrey Stout,
criticizing MacIntyre, asks his reader to imagine the case of a modern liberal
academic trying to understand and reason with the Corleone family from the
Godfather movies.240 The academic hears the word “respect” frequently in
Corleone discourse, but has difficulty translating it into her own vocabulary.
For her, respect has Kantian overtones: agents are self-governing,
autonomous beings, and they should be treated as ends in themselves, not
means. But the Corleones clearly don’t use respect in this way. For them, it
237. These presuppositions are “basic” in the sense that “no objections others bring to it count
against it from [the agent’s] perspective, that is, given her set of beliefs, the norms of rational
argument she accepts and those beliefs and norms she must accept on pain of unintelligibility.”
Andrew Mason, MacIntyre on Liberalism and Its Critics: Tradition, Incommensurability and
Disagreement, in AFTER MACINTYRE 225, 230-31 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1994)
238. The academic debate over legalizing same-sex marriages shows that both sides are perfectly
capable of understanding and representing the claims of rival normative communities, even though the
debate shows no signs of ending. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on
Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty
and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Democracy, Kulturkampf, and the Apartheid of the Closet, 50 VAND. L. REV. 419 (1997); Chai R.
Feldblum, A Progressive Moral Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 485
(1998); Robert P. George & Gerald V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J.
301 (1995).
239. See MACINTYRE, supra note 16; MACINTYRE, supra note 15. One reviewer faults MacIntyre
for slipping between two claims: a weak claim of “historical understanding,” which is merely the
thesis that to understand an argument requires an appreciation for the historical context in which it was
advanced, and a stronger claim of “essential location,” which holds that an argument depends on its
historical setting for its defining features. See Julia Annas, MacIntyre on Traditions, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 388 (1989).
240. See JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL (1987).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p113 Wendel.doc 09/15/00   4:56 PM
172 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:113
connotes a complex judgment about social status and the rituals with which
status is acknowledged. It would be pointless for the academic to try to
understand Corleone practices using the modern Kantian translation of
respect. If she wanted to have a dialogue with the Corleones about justice,
she would have to immerse herself in Corleone tradition and practice, so that
she could make use of the Corleone term, respect.
Stout’s point is that imaginative translation is possible, even between
conceptual schemes or cultural frameworks that appear at first glance to be
mutually unintelligible, and that an immersion in the discourse of another
normative scheme can provide sufficient background for translation.241 The
distance between these alternative forms of life is not as great as it seems, at
least not for lives lived by real people in the world today.242 For this reason,
lawyers can have conversations about justice even with clients who share
vastly different normative presuppositions, as long as both participants are
willing to make the effort to see things from the other’s point of view. In
Joseph Raz’s example of such a “detached” normative statement, a Christian
could say to his Orthodox Jewish friend, “you shouldn’t eat that— it contains
pork,” although the advice would be received differently from the same
advice given by another Jew.243 It is possible for a non-Jew to give his friend
advice on Jewish dietary laws because the two friends can imagine what it
would be like to share the same values.244
MacIntyre would respond that the attempts to translate from one
conceptual scheme to another do not succeed in completely bridging the
gaps, because the translated concept— say, “respect”— becomes a mere
variant of the concept that exists in the rival framework, not a true rendering
of the concept of respect in its home discourse.245 But this move encounters
its own difficulties, because the committed genealogist who insists on the
untranslatability of a community’s utterances must explain how he can
imagine addressing an audience that belongs to a different tradition.
241. See also RICHARDSON, supra note 12, §§ 39-40.
242. See WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 161-63. Even assuming that some people may hold such
extreme views that rational arguments made by moderates cannot reach them, when the extremists
participate in the public sphere, they address their arguments to the uncommitted. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 451-52 (1995). Unless a community is so committed to its separate
nomos that it is willing to withdraw entirely from political life, its members must be prepared to cast
their moral claims in terms that outsiders can understand. See also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 94.
243. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 175-77 (1975).
244. See also Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 33, 66
(1996) (noting that the task of ethics is partially that of uncovering common values through a process
of dialogue).
245. See MACINTYRE, supra note 22, at 43.
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The problem then for the genealogist is how to combine the fixity of
particular stances, exhibited in the use of standard genres of speech
and writing, with the mobility of transition from stance to stance, how
to assume the contours of a given mask and then to discard it for
another, without ever assenting to the metaphysical fiction of a face
that has its own finally true and undiscardable representation, whether
by Rembrandt or in a shaving-mirror.246
MacIntyre identifies Nietzsche and Foucault as two moral genealogists
who have struggled to avoid slipping back into the academic mode, in which
the success of the genealogical project can be described in terms that
transcend the author’s own interpretive community.247 “[I]t seems to be the
case that the intelligibility of genealogy requires beliefs and allegiances of a
kind precluded by the genealogical stance.”248 MacIntyre seems to have
conceded much of the force of the line of objection advanced by Stout, and to
have retreated from his prior insistence that divergent cultural frameworks
stand as an impediment to dialogue about ethics.249 Thus, claims about the
incomparability of rival forms of life should not be taken to entail paralysis in
public debate, or the impossibility of moving beyond competing conceptions
of the ethically responsible life.
IV. COMMUNITY NORMS AND TRADITIONS AS A RESOLUTION OF
INCOMPARABILITY PROBLEMS
A. The Role of Social Practices in Ethical Reasoning
Elsewhere, I have developed at length the argument that the norms of a
defined community serve as a constraint on members’ behavior, so that the
community’s accepted solution to a given ethical dilemma strongly
influences how similarly-situated agents resolve analogous problems.250 To
briefly recapitulate, values are embodied in the practices of social
communities and are given shape through application in particular cases.
While it may be an interesting exercise for analytic philosophers to attempt to
discern the “true” or essential meaning of words like “loyalty,” “justice,” or
“care,” the values represented by those signifiers are brought to life in human
activity through a process of description and elaboration in which the values
246. See id. at 47.
247. See id. at 49-53.
248. Id. at 55.
249. See MacIntyre, supra note 232, at 219-20. See also Mason, supra note 237.
250. See Wendel, supra note 15, at 17-26.
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are introduced in a process of explanation and justification for the behavior
of moral agents in actual cases.251 What is taken to be true are traditional
understandings, developed through arguments with those inside and outside
the tradition, as described by MacIntyre:
A tradition is an argument extended through time in which certain
fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two
kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the
tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental
agreements, and those internal, interpretive debates through which the
meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be
expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.252
This model of practical reasoning emphasizes precedent and the guidance
of tradition— phronesis— rather than pure abstract reasoning.253 Because
practical reasoning functions within tradition, values that might appear to be
incommensurable in an abstract sense may be unproblematically compared if
the criteria of comparison are supplied by the traditions of a particular
community.254 The community’s practices and traditions provide the
covering value for making evaluative comparisons, as discussed in Section
III.B. Just as some legal arguments may be logically plausible but would fail
to pass the “laugh test” for presentation to a judge, some arguments in legal
ethics might be defective not as a matter of formal logic, but because they fail
to fit with and account for a community’s settled judgments.
There is no point in asking the question “what ought I to do?” except in
unusual cases where there is a good reason for doing something out of the
ordinary.255 Most of the time people just muddle through, following a
routine, living according to the “structures of normality” that give life its
shape.256 While this description may sound dreary, it is actually the only
alternative to an intolerable burden of constantly justifying oneself anew;
unless we are living in some kind of hellishly repressive society, we
understand “the ways things are” to be mostly morally acceptable and
251. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 97-112; BERNSTEIN, supra note 16; STANLEY FISH, IS
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980).
252. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 12.
253. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 38-40, 57-58.
254. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 219 (“Judgment is communal and
intersubjective; it always implicitly appeals to and requires testing against the opinions of other
judging persons.”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 69-74; see also DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH
169-79 (1996); Finnis, supra note 226, at 228-32.
255. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 24, 54.
256. Cf. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, ch. 6 (1995) (describing “the
Background”).
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accordingly pattern our activities around the routine established by our
culture. Of course, our understanding of the given order of things also
includes an appreciation for some of the inherent problems of the culture.257
We recognize that “the ways things are” is not always a sufficient
justification for a particular social practice. But again, we do not recognize
those deficiencies in justification a priori in every case; they have been
marked off as problems through the give-and-take of the culture’s self-
understanding.
These central cultural norms seldom take the form of rules. Maxims and
rough rules of thumb, perhaps, and certainly stories that are meant to
illustrate some aspect of the culture’s self-understanding, but not rules in the
formalized sense familiar to lawyers.258 Even where rules exist, the
application of those rules requires nuanced judgment that cannot be reduced
to a rule-governed decision procedure. The resistance of traditional
normative understandings to embodiment in rules is one reason for the
disconnect between ethics codes for lawyers and other sources of
professional values. Lawyers are, in many cases, more likely to be influenced
by professional lore or war stories— precatory tales told by more experienced
practitioners— than by reading rules, disciplinary cases, or bar association
opinions. What is significant for the purposes of my argument is that these
stories and the narrative account of the culture of which they are a part serve
to integrate the incomparable values that bear upon the professional role. As
MacIntyre shows, the Greeks, who were concerned with understanding how
various goods ought to be apportioned among different classes of citizens,
appreciated this insight: “How are the goods of honor and those of the
external rewards of excellence to be apportioned among different kinds of
achievement? How is the desert of the good soldier to be compared to that of
the good farmer or the good poet?”259 The form of community life answered
257. See MacIntyre, Moral Relativism, supra note 232, at 218.
258. Rawls and others refer to these tentative, pretheoretical judgments as intuitions. See RAWLS,
supra note 88, at 20, 48-50; WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 97-99. Cf. AUDI, supra note 15, at 292
(noting that moral standards may be more or less explicit, and they may be internalized habits learned
through education). Audi would allow much more room for moral theory in the formation of these
intuitions, however. (This sense of the word does not imply any metaphysical thesis about the nature
of moral values or how they are apprehended by the agent, unlike the claim of early twentieth-century
ethical intuitionists.) Searle is getting at something different with his concept of Background, although
it plays a similar role. For Searle, the Background is not just a set of raw data awaiting theoretical
confirmation or refutation, but is a precondition of any social life. See SEARLE, supra note 246, at 127-
47. Professional traditions and norms have a status somewhere between intuitions and Searle’s
Background: they are more open to questioning and criticism than the Background, but more centrally
constitutive of the reality of participants in the social practices we know as lawyering than Rawlsian
intuitions could be.
259. MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 33.
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that question, not only by providing a rank ordering of human goods in many
cases, but also by delineating a space for each good within the patterns of
normal life, “so that there would be in some cities at least a time of the year
when tragic poetry received its due and a time when comedy did so.”260 The
analogy between Athenian political philosophy and the theory of legal ethics
is not as strained as it may seem; for just as there was a form of life in the
Greek city-states that distributed rationally incommensurable goods
according to a higher-order conception of the good for the city-state, there are
contemporary traditions of the legal profession which specify the ranking of
incomparable professional values.
Practical reasoning in one’s personal moral life requires an understanding
of the final good for humans, “the complete ethical rectitude of a lifetime.”261
This is obviously a daunting task given the complexity and diversity of
human activities. Fortunately, a similar model of practical reasoning for
professionals may be constructed with reference to a more limited vision of
the good for that particular occupational group. Social practices generate
evaluative criteria.262 We might agree that a good doctor is someone who
applies the methods of science to heal and prevent illness. A good accountant
is someone who ensures accuracy and honesty in financial recordkeeping. A
good architect appreciates the aesthetic and technical aspects of a building
project, and so on. Note the chain of reasoning here: the conception of the
260. Id. at 34.
261. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 147; see also MACINTYRE, AV, supra note 15, at 203
(“[T]here is a telos which transcends the limited goods of practices by constituting the good of a whole
human life, the good of a human life conceived as a unity.”).
262. The emerging customs regulating use of the Internet provide an apt illustration of how
normative standards evolve that are tailored to the ends of particular social practices. Even relatively
rule-bound practices like judging can make use of these custom-based criteria, as shown by a recent
Canadian court judgment. See 1267623 Ontario, Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., [1999] 89 A.C.W.S.3d 135
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) available in 1999 ACWSJ Lexis 16867. In Ontario, Inc., an Internet service provider
(ISP) canceled a customer’s account for a violation of “Netiquette,” the unwritten customs of
neighborly Internet usage. See id at ¶ 14. The ISP alleged that its customer had breached Netiquette,
and therefore its contract, by sending “Spam”— unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail. See id.
Significantly, the contract between the customer and the ISP obligated the customer to “follow
generally accepted ‘Netiquette’” without further defining that term, or without specifically mentioning
Spam. See id. The Ontario Superior Court nevertheless held that Netiquette had a sufficiently
determinate meaning in the community of Internet users, and that the ISP was contractually justified in
shutting down its customer’s account for sending Spam. See id. at ¶ 26. At the risk of reading too
much into this case, I should note that the practice of communication on the Internet has a plurality of
ends: (1) freedom of expression for a broad community of users, relatively unencumbered by
government regulation or cost, on the one hand, and (2) efficiency of communication, including
sharing of relatively limited bandwidth and server capacity. Spam presents a conflict between these
two ends, but the consensus of the community of Internet users, embodied in unwritten Netiquette, is
that the Spammer’s interest in promoting his or her products online must yield to the interest in
maintaining open channels of communication.
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good for a professional is derived from the social role that person fills, or the
profession’s telos; the moral evaluation of that person depends in turn on
normative standards generated by that end or conception of the good. An
accountant who failed to report that her client was cooking the books would
be criticized in moral terms because nondisclosure would be inconsistent
with the social reason for creating the practice of accountancy in the first
place. Similarly, models of medical ethics depend on the social function of
physicians, and derive principles of professional conduct from that
understanding.263 What is necessary in beginning to elaborate a theory of
professional ethics, therefore, is an understanding of what functions the
profession performs in a particular society.264
This account at first blush appears to be unduly conservative, since it
gives substantial normative weight to precedent and tradition. “Prudence is
today an unfashionable virtue; to many, its invocation will seem a mask for
reactionary interests and the illiberal privileges of the status quo.”265 But, as
Bernstein’s illuminating study of Gadamer, MacIntyre, and the American
pragmatists shows, there is no such thing as living outside a tradition.
Tradition and reason are not opposed, because we can only conceive of
ourselves, understand the external world, and make arguments to others from
within a tradition.266 Reasoning and understanding are essentially
intersubjective, because they are by their nature linguistic processes.267 In
other words, meaning does not just exist “out there” in the universe, waiting
to be discovered; it is created through human engagement with the world,
through people trying to relate to, interpret, and exercise some control over
their surroundings and one another. “[W]e are essentially beings constituted
by and engaged in interpretative understanding.”268 This form of life creates a
store of traditional understandings, which Gadamer calls “enabling
prejudices.”269 Gadamer (and Bernstein and others) are quick to point out that
263. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS,  supra note 36.
264. Cf. David Miller, Virtues, Practices and Justice, in AFTER MACINTYRE 245, 250-51 (John
Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1994) (stating that a “purposive practice” is one which exists to serve
some social end beyond itself, and its standards of excellence should be reviewed in the light of the
purpose the practice is meant to serve). Our understanding of a practice may be informed by ideals,
even though the practice in reality fails to measure up to the ideals it sets for itself. See ANDERSON,
supra note 4, at 107. As I have been arguing, however, the evaluation of a practitioner is complicated
when the practice professes a plurality of incompatible ideals.
265. Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1571
(1985).
266. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 77.
267. Id. at 126-27; see also HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 201-03
(1972).
268. BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 137.
269. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 249 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
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these prejudices are not immune from rational criticism. Indeed, it is one of
the principal tasks of an interpreter to ascertain which prejudices are worthy
of retention and which represent mere superstition or false belief. This
critical self-interpretation can take many forms. A tradition is constituted in
part by its ideals, which provide a resource for internal self-criticism, a
method for discovering which beliefs are based on cultural bias, superstition,
or self-deceptive motivations; traditions also can be tested for internal
coherence and theoretical plausibility (in terms of compatibility with
empirical science and formal logic).270 Traditional practices may lose their
social utility, and even fall into crisis, as the conditions that allowed the
practice to flourish cease to exist.271 Previously accepted traditions “may
cease to provide a useful map of the practical landscape.”272 Tradition-bound
reasoners may seek out alien traditions that represent different, and often
more appealing, ways of thinking about the same problems, and triangulate
from these disparate cultural practices in an attempt to identify those beliefs
that blind them to the meaning of what they are trying to understand.273 But
despite all these critical strategies, it is impossible for persons to achieve an
Archimedean standpoint outside of all traditions.274 Thus, reasoning from
within a tradition is not conservative, nor is it progressive. It simply is.
The common law is an example of how tradition-based reasoning need
not be conservative and in fact can undergird revolutions. Tradition provides
the intellectual resources for challenging the status quo. Although detailed
consideration of the history of the civil rights movement is well beyond the
scope of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the legal victories of the
NAACP were based in part on changing societal attitudes (possibly including
whites recognizing that their own interests would be promoted by granting
Marshall trans., 2d rev’d ed. 1990) (1960).
270. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 106-08.
271. See generally supra note 16, at 361-69 (discussing “epistemological crises”). The internal
ferment that periodically precipitates crises within traditions shows that a tradition-based account of
ethical norms does not presume that communities are big happy families or ‘60s style communes, in
which all participants get along in a perpetual state of peace and harmony. Cf. Don Herzog, As Many
as Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CAL. L. REV. 609, 617-19 (1987).
272. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 109.
273. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 138-39; see also James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral
Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 518-21 (1999). According
to Boyle, one of the central insights of postmodern philosophy is that competing traditions provide
breathing space for moral agents in which to rebel against the stultifying conformity of the dominant
worldview. See id. at 527.
274. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 112 (“Although any particular intuition or thick concept can
be intelligibly criticized, it makes no sense to criticize the whole lot at once, for the only way we can
frame an intelligible criticism is in terms of some intuitions and thick concepts whose authenticity
must provisionally be presupposed.”); cf. Davidson, supra note 221.
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civil rights to blacks275), but also on the existence of inchoate
antidiscrimination norms in the American legal tradition. Mark Tushnet
explains how the early civil rights litigation pursued by the NAACP relied on
cases such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,276 which held an invidiously
discriminatory licensing scheme unconstitutional, and even Plessy v.
Ferguson,277 which at least stressed formal equality, albeit while
simultaneously endorsing segregation.278 The NAACP lawyers used those
precedents as leverage to argue for a broader understanding of the norm of
equality, but they certainly did not seek to undermine the rule of law. Quite
the contrary— they showed that the regime of law already contained the
principle of substantive racial equality in an embryonic form.279 Tradition
enabled change by legitimating it in the minds of observers who recognized
elements of the new order in the status quo.280 At the same time, popular
perception that the law was not being administered in a just manner provided
leverage for those within the legal tradition to move the law in a new, more
inclusive, direction. There is thus an interplay between the internal
perspective of practitioners and the external, critical standpoint by which a
tradition can be judged.281
B. Plural Practices
The problem with the application of this general pattern of justification to
legal ethics is that lawyers’ social roles are multifaceted and the various
aspects of the public function of lawyers are not always harmonious.282 The
275. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
276. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
277. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
278. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1920-1950, at 36 (1987); see generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
279. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960); cf. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 104.
280. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4,
44 (1998) (“[E]ven . . . paradigm-shifting cases may be seen more accurately in gradualist terms. . . .
In general, the great common law opinions such as Cardozo’s in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, or
Hand’s in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., are known for their elegant synthesis of existing
precedent, rather than for doctrinal innovation.”) (internal citations omitted).
281. Cf. Miller, supra note 264, at 256 (“It is precisely because we are able to reflect on the ends
that politics should serve, and therefore on what it means genuinely to excel in this field, that [critical
arguments] are able to get a grip.”).
282. Rob Atkinson argues that many lawyers and academics wrongly assume that there is One
True Way of lawyering, while there are, in fact, several ethically defensible models for conscientious
lawyers to follow. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74
TEX. L. REV. 259, 317 (1995). See also ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 7 (“There is a great diversity of
worthwhile ideals, not all of which can be combined in a single life.”).
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telos of the practice of lawyering— the covering value for making
comparisons among professional values— is internally inconsistent in ways
that make ethical decisions indeterminate in some hard cases of value
conflict.283 The organized bar’s statements on professional responsibility
sometimes admit as much, although they provide little guidance for resolving
these value conflicts: “[t]he duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal
does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration
all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of
needless harm.”284 Or, consider the “Professionalism Creed” drafted by the
American Inns of Court, an organization dedicated to ethical reform of the
legal profession.285 This set of aspirational principles seeks to provide ethical
guidance for lawyers, but it must grapple with the plurality of foundational
normative principles of the profession. Inns of Court members pledge
simultaneously to: “serve as an officer of the court [and] work to make the
legal system more accessible, responsive, and effective,” and “represent the
interests of my client with vigor.”286
Of course, in many cases it is possible to advocate vigorously on behalf of
one’s client while nevertheless promoting the efficiency and responsiveness
of the judicial system, and it is certainly a worthy aspiration to attempt to do
both, but in many cases, such as the problems set out in Section II, these two
goals pull in opposite directions. If Alice allows Bill to make a mistake that
would result in dismissal of his client’s case, for example, she would be
advancing the interests of her client but denying access to the court system to
Bill’s client. Similarly, Carlos’s inaction while the state agency bungles its
case is hardly defensible as enhancing the efficiency and responsiveness of
courts.
Again, I do not claim that the social role of the lawyer generates a
radically indeterminate covering value in every case. An argument that
purported to show that a lawyer had a duty to inform law enforcement
authorities of confidential communications received from her client relating
solely to her client’s past crimes would be rejected immediately on the basis
of the traditions and norms of American legal practice, even in the absence of
a positive legal duty not to disclose the information. In some cases, there is
283. To be more precise, the covering value is underdeterminate. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987).
284. MODEL CODE, supra note 25, EC 7-10.
285. See American Inns of Court, Professional Creed (visited Mar. 2, 2000)
<http://www.innsofcourt.org/aboutframe.htm>. The curious prevalence of religious imagery in
professional responsibility discourse, like the use of the word “creed” in this document, was noticed
and criticized by Atkinson. See Atkinson, supra note 282, at 260-70.
286. See id.
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only one acceptable solution to an ethical problem in light of the law of
lawyering and the background moral principles of the profession, although
conscientious objection may remain an option. For example, I am fairly
confident that no community of practicing lawyers in the United States
would criticize Carlos for not salvaging the agency’s case against his client,
absent some kind of statutory duty to disclose adverse information to
regulators. This is so even though the values of loyalty and social justice
may, in the abstract, be incomparable. But consider a closer case, such as
Problem #3, above. In that case, the lawyer reasonably believes that her
client will not receive a fair hearing before Judge Frank, and that a motion to
recuse the judge probably will not be successful. She is obligated by the duty
of loyalty to her client to use any lawful means to advance her client’s cause.
At the same time, she is required to respect the procedural system put into
place for the resolution of disputes, and not to undermine the rule of law.
What should she do?
First, to condemn Emma for using “unlawful” means to secure Judge
Frank’s recusal would be simplistic, because the word “lawful” itself requires
elaboration. Is an action taken by a lawyer in litigation lawful provided that it
does not warrant the imposition of judicial sanctions? This legal realist
position appears to be endorsed by the Model Rules. “[I]n determining the
proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law’s ambiguities
and potential for change.”287 What law exists in this area is nothing if not
ambiguous; indeed, many civility codes have been held unconstitutionally
vague.288 The mandatory portion of the Model Code, for its part, prohibits a
lawyer from taking any action on behalf of a client “when it is obvious that
such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.”289 In
this case, the action is not motivated solely by spite or malice, but is intended
as part of a judge-shopping strategy. As Ronald Dworkin continually
reminds us, ascertaining the boundaries of the law without reference to the
scheme of principles that underlies the regime of rules is a vain enterprise; an
interpretation of the law requires the interpreter to make the law the best it
can be by unifying its disparate strands into one communal voice that says,
“In this society, this is what we, collectively, stand for.” The problem here,
however, and a problem with Dworkin’s argument generally, is that the
287. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.1 cmt. 1 (emphasis added). The phrasing of this rule has
always called to my mind the repeated demand of Linda Loman in Death of a Salesman: “Attention
must be paid!” In other words, the rule has a precatory nature, not merely a permissive one— lawyers
should employ the law as a tool for change and be unwilling to accept that injustice is sanctioned by
existing law.
288. See supra note 67.
289. MODEL CODE, supra note 25, DR 7-102(A)(1).
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justificatory principles underpinning the law point in two directions, and the
community’s stance on the norms of the practice of lawyering is Janus-faced.
Dworkin struggles gamely to respond to challenges like this, but the only
resolution he achieves is to grant both of two competing principles a place in
the justificatory scheme of political values. Speaking in the voice of his
superhuman alter ego, Hercules, Dworkin says:
The constraints of fit require me to find a place in any general
interpretation of our legal practice for both of the more abstract
principles . . . . No general interpretation that denied either one would
be plausible; integrity could not be served if either were wholly
disavowed. But integrity demands some resolution of their competing
impact . . . a choice that our practice has not made but that must flow,
as a postinterpretive judgment, from my analysis. Integrity demands
this because it demands that I continue the overall story, in which the
two principles have a definite place, in the best way, all things
considered.290
So Hercules picks one value as the winner in the case at hand and
continues the story, with the “loser” value continuing to play a role in the
overall scheme of principles. The two values live together, in occasional
tension, with one occasionally coming to the fore in a particular case.291
This is a descriptively accurate account of the practice of judging and,
more importantly for the purposes of this paper, of the practice of lawyer
self-regulation. There is simply no way to suppress one of two competing
values, such as loyalty or avoidance of harm to third parties, without
producing a caricature of the social practice. But recognizing this tension
entails a certain sacrifice in theoretical elegance. The highest-order covering
value that guides ethical choices by lawyers— the telos of professional life—
turns out to be ambiguous and underdeterminate in some interesting cases. In
Problem #1, for example, the practices of the relevant community may vary.
In some communities, particularly smaller towns where lawyers encounter
one another repeatedly over the course of their careers, allowing a rookie
attorney to submit an ineffective stipulated continuance without telling him
of his mistake would be universally condemned in the strongest ethical
290. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 270.
291. Boyle oversimplifies Dworkin’s position somewhat when he says that, in contrast with
postmodern legal theories that see opposing normative understandings as providing the motive force of
legal creativity, for Dworkin, “conceptual tension is simply a close call with a right answer.” Boyle,
Integrity, supra note 273, at 509 (emphasis omitted). As the above passage from Dworkin/Hercules
shows, however, a judicial decision does not suppress the second-place value entirely, but relegates it
to a temporarily subordinate position in the justificatory scheme of principles.
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terms. In larger cities, especially in certain subcommunities like the personal-
injury bar, with its rough-and-tumble ethos, Alice’s actions would hardly
warrant a raised eyebrow. The bar’s response to situations like Problem #2 is
somewhat more uniform— every practicing litigator I have talked to about a
variation of this problem has adamantly denied that Carlos has any duty to
point out flaws in the agency’s case. Problem #3, on the other hand, reveals
the same kind of variation among subcommunities as the first problem.
Lawyers for outsider groups, who represent clients with very little social
status or power, are more likely to approve in ethical terms of Emma’s
conduct than are lawyers who work on behalf of powerful interests.292
Surely one of these communities must have the ethical balance right, and
the other be mistaken, right? I think the answer is a qualified “no.” In some
communities the seemingly callous behavior of practitioners may be the
result of being excluded from higher-status subcommunities in which
“gentlemen’s agreements” are enforceable. For example, the plaintiff’s
personal-injury bar has historically been composed of immigrants and
lawyers from other lower-status groups who were not welcomed in large
commercial law firms, where more “gentlemanly” practices were alleged to
have been the norm.293 The bar is markedly stratified by social prestige, with
lawyers who serve business clients at one end, and lawyers who serve
individuals at the other.294 Interestingly, some of the practice specialties in
the lower-status range are rated by survey respondents as having a higher
incidence of “sharp practice” or unethical behavior,295 but this finding is
susceptible of two quite different interpretations. Are some lawyers social
292. Even lawyers who belong to a tightly circumscribed subcommunity may differ on the correct
balance of competing ethical obligations. Tax counselors, for example, differ on whether their role is
to minimize the client’s tax exposure by any means that is not likely to get the client or the lawyer in
trouble, or to align the taxation of the client’s proposed transaction with the purposes of the tax laws.
See Rostain, supra note 41, at 1328-31.
293. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 60-84 (1994). During the first
third of this century, the organized bar vigorously resisted admitting non-WASP immigrants, often
employing spurious character and fitness evaluations as the basis for exclusion. See RICHARD L. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); Patrick L. Baude, An Essay on the Regulation of the Legal Profession
and the Future of Lawyers’ Characters, 68 IND. L.J. 647, 649 (1993); Rhode, supra note 33, at 499-
502.
294. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (rev. ed. 1994); KRAUSE, supra note 16, at 50-51.
295. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 294, at 69-71; see also Mark C. Suchman, supra note
34, at 848 (reporting comment by a large-firm associate that lawyers in smaller firms “are typically
quite hardworking, but they do tend to be people who . . . are more uncivil than they ought to be”). The
ABA study described by Suchman revealed that lower-status lawyers, such as the plaintiffs’ personal-
injury bar, were concerned that corporate lawyers at large firms were able to “turn the process into a
hypercivilized game of manners, at the expense of more substantive ideals such as truth, justice, and
efficiency.” Id. at 848 n.21; see also id. at 865 n.46.
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pariahs because they are unethical, or is the “sharp practice” epithet assigned
by higher-status lawyers to those without power? It might be argued that
personal-injury and criminal defense lawyers are, indeed, less ethical than
others and are therefore shunned by their respectable peers. On the other
hand, one might question the neutrality of the evaluation. If these lawyers
represent individuals against powerful institutions like the government and
large business enterprises, and the clients themselves are already derogated in
the social hierarchy, then the very act of working in one of these fields will
carry a reputation for antisocial, unethical behavior. One clue that the latter
interpretation may be the correct one is found in the differential prestige
rankings of lawyers on opposite sides of the same cases. In six fields—
antitrust, labor, environmental, personal injury, criminal, and consumer
law— the lawyers representing challengers to the establishment (unions,
injured consumers, criminal defendants, and so on) are ranked lower in
prestige than those working on behalf of powerful interests.296 In short, “the
primary determinant of the social structure of the profession is the interests
and demands of the lawyers’ clients.”297 Further support for this claim is
provided by studies that show disciplinary actions against lawyers are
disproportionately brought against lower-status professionals, such as
criminal defense and divorce lawyers.298 Again, it could be that these lawyers
are more frequently guilty of unethical behavior, but the more likely
explanation is that large institutional law firms do not often run afoul of the
kinds of rules codified by state bar associations, or that the elite lawyers who
control bar associations do not tend to investigate their own with much
enthusiasm.299 Rules against solicitation of clients, for example, prohibit
passing out business cards at hospital emergency rooms, but not meeting
potential clients at the golf course.300 This suggests that the evaluation of
unethical behavior has been subtly skewed toward approving of conduct by
lawyers for powerful clients and disapproving of the behavior of lawyers for
the powerless, or lawyers who must compete for business using methods that
elite lawyers find unsavory.301
296. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 294, at 85.
297. Id. at 151.
298. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 4-7 (1976); JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK
CITY BAR 176-82 (1966).
299. See ABEL, supra note 293, at 147-50; HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 294, at 159; KRAUSE,
supra note 16, at 54.
300. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 294, at 159
301. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the sanctioning behavior of federal courts,
which disproportionately impose sanctions on particular classes of litigants, such as plaintiffs in civil
rights suits. See, e.g., Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading
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If the bar is stratified into subcommunities that correspond to the interests
and social prestige of clients, it seems only reasonable that these
subcommunities would evolve different normative understandings of what it
means to be an ethical lawyer. In Aristotelian terms, because of the
fragmented nature of the professional telos, it is only to be expected that
these diverse communities would emphasize different aspects of the lawyer’s
function. Some groups would take as their rallying cry the traditional
lawyer’s mission to resist oppression and tyranny; others of a Burkean stripe
would not see their role as custodians of valuable social traditions that risk
damage from ill-considered passions.302 It is difficult to combine these two
functions into one unified vision of professional practice, even in multi-
lawyer firms, as revealed by the reluctance of many large law firms to
engage in certain kinds of pro bono work for fear of offending their
important, establishment clients. “The defining characteristics of the
friendless and despised are, after all, that they lack important friends and that
many persons find them distasteful, and the difficulty with reformist causes is
that they may well be controversial.”303 Thus, even though professional
discourse acknowledges that the function of the lawyer is both to promote
order and to permit challenges to power, lawyers in their practice tend to take
one or the other of those ends as the central guiding principle of their
activities, promoting it to the detriment of the other constituent function. The
remainder of this section discusses these competing traditions of legal
practice critically and argues that neither tradition can claim to be the
exclusive function of American lawyers.
1. The Rebellious Lawyer304
Although there is some debate over the extent to which the organized bar
is committed to this ideal, there is no question that at least one strain of
professional ideology in the United States emphasizes the moral neutrality of
the lawyer, who is expected to provide technical competence to a client who
sets the political or moral agenda of the representation. The rebellious lawyer
emphatically rejects the norm of neutrality. For the rebellious lawyer, it is
Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935 (1990); Robert L. Carter, The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2191-95
(1989); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 493-95 (1989).
302. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Conor
Cruise O’Brien ed., rev. ed. 1969) (1790).
303. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 294, at 164.
304. This term is borrowed from Gerald López’s study, although my analysis does not agree with
López’s in all particulars. See López, supra note 20.
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essential that the representation advance a particular vision of social justice,
generally through the representation of clients who share the same vision, but
sometimes— and far more controversially— by strategies of persuasion,
resistance, or even coercion within a professional relationship in which the
lawyer and client disagree about the client’s ends.
Rebelliousness is not necessarily limited to the espousal of politics
through one’s work as a lawyer. Many lawyers use the machinery provided
by the legal system, such as public law remedies, class-action lawsuits,
impact litigation, and the like, to improve the welfare of disempowered
individuals. This kind of progressive lawyering “involves working within
accepted professional understandings of skilled and zealous client
representation.”305 A rebellious lawyer, on the other hand, may also be
committed to transgressing existing legal norms when necessary to vindicate
a political agenda.306 The very legal norms that a lawyer is ordinarily bound
to uphold are the root cause of the injustice suffered by the client. Often,
rebellious lawyers speak in terms of systematic oppression, patterns of
thought, structural injustice, or institutional wrongs. “[I]f justice can be
obtained for the not-poor through an adversary system of law, it is because
they are involved with the law on a case-by-case basis. But a case-by-case
injustice is not what poor people face; they confront a host of unjust
institutions, acting for and within an unjust society.”307 Rebelliousness means
recognizing that the legal system itself in many cases legitimizes oppression,
and that meaningful social change cannot always be accomplished within the
framework of existing legal norms. “As Martin Luther King and many of our
moral heroes have taught us, moral values are more important than legal
values.”308 This means that legal rules should be cast aside whenever they
interfere with the realization of an important extralegal moral value. This
vision of lawyering is profoundly radical— “sufficiently at odds with
established political, professional, and career structures to entangle radical
cause lawyers in a variety of destabilizing conflicts and contradiction.”309
305. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional
Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING 3, 7 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
306. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?
(1996) [hereinafter UNGER, LEGAL ANALYSIS]; William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363
(1984); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 592
(1983) (arguing for a theory of law that “would provide constant occasions to disrupt any fixed
structure of power and coordination in social life”).
307. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1059 (1970).
308. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 58 (1994).
309. Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 305, at 7. Duncan Kennedy made waves in 1981 by
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Emma, the lawyer in Problem #3, and Steven Yagman, upon whom she
was based, are archetypal rebellious lawyers. The motivation for Emma’s
behavior is to ensure that her client will obtain a fair hearing before an
impartial tribunal, because she is certain that Judge Frank would be biased
against her client’s claim. Instead of filing a request that Judge Frank recuse
himself, however, Emma sought a more effective and reliable method of
removing the judge from her case. By heaping public scorn on the judge,
Emma angered him sufficiently that he was forced to reassign the case, not
because he could not impartially judge Emma’s client’s case, but because he
was biased against Emma personally. Notice that Emma did not take
advantage of available legal procedures for securing recusal, such as filing a
motion as provided by statute.310 Thus, her conduct flouted the legal norm
that disputes are handled only through prescribed means, such as seeking
relief by submitting motions or appealing a judge’s ruling. Emma, of course,
would respond that those procedures are inherently oppressive to powerless
clients, who either cannot afford the lengthy legal maneuvering necessary to
secure their rights, or who confront hostility from powerful government
officials. Since legal rules and procedures are worthy of respect only to the
extent that they lead to just outcomes, she would argue, a lawyer has no
obligation to conform to them if injustice would result.
There are several aspects of the rebellious lawyer paradigm that should
give us pause. First, the lawyer who justifies her activities by reference to a
political agenda must take special care to ensure that she is not projecting her
own ideals onto her client. Rebellious lawyering can lose its focus on the
client’s interests, so that “clients often become stalking horses for law reform
efforts.”311 In some “rebellious” contexts, the interests of the lawyer and
those of the client may diverge at the outset of the representation, or may
begin to drift apart over time, as the clients grow weary of the conflict and
publishing a brief article in which he encouraged law students to become saboteurs, insinuating
themselves into corporate law firms and subverting them from within. See Duncan Kennedy, Rebels
from Principle: Changing the Corporate Law Firm from Within, HARV. L. SCH. BULL. Fall 1981, at
36, excerpts reprinted in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
1023 (2d ed. 1994); see also RHODE, supra note 42, at 86-88. You can work for the big, bad law firm
and be faithful to your progressive politics, he purred seductively, as long as you practice “sly,
collective tactics within the institution where you work, to confront, outflank, sabotage or manipulate
the bad guys.” As Kennedy’s critics were quick to point out, it is not terribly morally demanding of
lawyers to salve their consciences by occasionally committing covert acts of rebelliousness while
continuing to draw fat paychecks from The Man. “One should not barter one’s soul to practice law,
and one does not have to. . . . But you can’t expect to be a habitual conscientious objector and still plan
to be a general.” Id. at 88 (quoting John G. Kester, Correspondence, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Spring
1982, at 82).
310. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1994).
311. Margulies, supra note 19, at 1160.
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seek rapproachment with the opponents in the lawyer’s struggle.312 Bell
discusses several cases in which local NAACP lawyers, along with black
school board officials and parents, sought federal court approval for
compromise desegregation plans that did not achieve anything approaching
full integration. National NAACP lawyers were shocked at these
compromises and intervened in the litigation to press for greater integration
against the wishes of the ostensible clients, the affected parents, who were
more concerned with seeking an excellent education for their children than
with achieving the more abstract ideal of integration.313
Another serious problem with the rebellious lawyer paradigm is that there
seems to be no logical stopping point. Rebelliousness, in the sense of freely
transgressing legal norms, risks eliminating the distinctiveness of the social
role of lawyer, as compared with elected officials, non-lawyer activists, or
interested citizens.314 Consider the response to two recent incidents of
egregious abuse of government power: the shooting of Amadou Diallo, an
unarmed West African immigrant, by New York City police officers, and the
brutal jailhouse sexual assault of Abner Louima, by other NYPD officers.
Although outrage at these violations was practically universal, there was an
essential difference between the modes of response available to non-lawyer
protesters, such as the prominent black political officials and religious leaders
who staged daily public arrests at City Hall after the Diallo shooting, and the
civil rights lawyers who almost immediately intervened in both cases. The
civil rights lawyers and the protesters sought the same reforms— increased
hiring of people of color onto the police force, the establishment of a more
effective civilian oversight board, racial-sensitivity training for officers, a
requirement that police officers live in the communities in which they work,
decreased use of random stop-and-frisks to search for weapons, and so on.
The lawyers, however, sought to accomplish these reforms by appealing to
values intrinsic to, and dependent upon, the legal system. Without a federal
statute establishing a cause of action against state officials for violations of
Diallo’s and Louima’s civil rights (and, indeed, a constitution declaring those
312. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). But cf. Wexler, supra note 307, at 1053
(“Poor people have few individual legal problems in the traditional sense; their problems are the
product of poverty, and are common to all poor people.”).
313. For an overview of the disagreement within the civil rights community concerning the value
of integration, see Bradley W. Joondeph, A Second Redemption?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 169, 188-
89 (1999) (book review); cf. Hugh LaFollette, The Truth in Ethical Relativism, __ J. SOCIAL PHIL. 146
(1991) (recounting disagreements within the civil rights community over what tactics— such as violent
revolution, passive resistance, education, and persuasion— ought to be employed).
314. See Richard Wasserstrom, Postscript: Lawyers and Revolution, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 125,
128-33 (1968).
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rights), or state law tort remedies against the officers, the victims’ families
would have no opportunity to seek legal redress against the government
actors who abused their power. If all of these remedies, which depend on a
functioning legal system, were repealed overnight, the protesters could
continue to march in front of City Hall, but the lawyers could do nothing but
close up shop and join the rest of the demonstrators on the sidewalk. Thus, to
the extent that legal strategies are effective in checking government power,
civil rights lawyers have an incentive to maintain the institutions of the law
over the long term.
To turn the argument around, if rebellious lawyers justify their activity by
pointing to the inherent injustice of the legal system, to what extent are they
not unacceptably co-opted by their very participation in that system as
lawyers?315 The lawyer’s job is to secure the greatest possible advantage for
her client within the system of ordered liberty protected by the rule of law.316
Can a rebellious person have it both ways by working as a lawyer while
decrying the systemic oppressiveness of the legal regime? After all,
conscientious objectors don’t join the army and hope to reform it from
within; they are excused from service. Max Weber clearly recognized the
inevitable “tragedy” of political institutions in a powerful passage from his
essay, Politics as a Vocation:
[H]e who lets himself in for politics, that is, for power and force as
means, contracts with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true
that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that
often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a
political infant.317
While politicians and lawyers undoubtedly need to feel passionately
about the “goodness” of their causes, this passion must be tempered by a
“cool sense of proportion” that recognizes the “ethical irrationality of the
world,” including the need to engage with potentially unjust institutions.318 In
other words, co-optation by imperfect, even corrupt institutions may be the
price that a lawyer must pay in order that good ultimately may be done in the
world. If one believes adamantly that her soul will be corrupted by
complicity in a system of injustice, then she has good ethical grounds for
315. See David Luban, Getting the Word, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1247, 1262-63 (1993) (reviewing
MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993)).
316. See Wasserstrom, supra note 314, at 128-33.
317. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER 77, 123 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright
Mills trans. & ed., 1946).
318. Id. at 115, 122.
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refusing to work as a lawyer; however, she cannot then be surprised at her
lack of access to the levers of power that is provided by a license to practice
law. Again, Weber puts the choice forcefully:
[F]or the politician the reverse proposition holds, “thou shalt resist evil
by force,” or else you are responsible for evil winning out. . . . No
ethics in the world can dodge the fact that in numerous instances the
attainment of “good” ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing
to pay the price of using morally dubious means or at least dangerous
ones.319
It sounds as though, by quoting this passage from Weber, I am taking
back what I have said in the rest of this Article. For if being a lawyer
involves a Faustian bargain with the ways of evil, in order that greater good
may come, then what ethical restraint exists on any of our hypothetical
lawyers? Why should Emma not wantonly slander a judge that will visit
injustice upon her client? Why should Alice be at all hesitant to trick Bill into
filing an ineffectual document? Why would Carlos even think twice about
watching the state agency blunder its way through the trial? These are the
questions with which every politician and lawyer in the Machiavellian
tradition must grapple. Weber is perfectly clear that working in politics
“endangers the salvation of the soul,”320 but I think the key word here is
“endangers.” Politics, and lawyering as a political activity, amounts to
tickling the dragon’s tail. One is playing around with the instrumentalities of
one’s own corruption, but these same means are necessary in order for any
good to come through the rule of law administered by lawyers. The response
to the injustice of the legal order can only be, as Weber says, to be
clearheaded, virtuous, and resolute: “what is decisive is the trained
relentlessness in viewing the realities of life, and the ability to face such
realities and measure up to them inwardly.”321 Since Machiavelli, political
philosophers have recognized that, because politics may require doing evil so
that good may come, the only guarantee against abuse of this power is the
moral character of the politician.322 Similarly, lawyering is a matter of
character, and any lawyer, progressive or not, must be attentive to the danger
that her participation in an unjust system may allow her to do good or evil,
both in the external world and in her own soul. There is a balance to be
319. Id. at 119-21.
320. Id. at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted).
321. Id. at 126-27.
322. See DENNIS THOMPSON, POLITICAL ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE (1987); Bernard Williams,
Politics and Moral Character, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 55 (Stuart Hampshire, ed., 1978).
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struck here, and whenever talk turns to balancing, Aristotelian ideas cannot
be far behind. The virtue of the lawyer is, ultimately, the only guarantee that
the language of power can be used to challenge the exercise of power.
2. The Establishment Lawyer
Geoffrey Hazard has argued that a different strand of the traditional ideal
of legal practice has been lost in recent times. “Legal practice primarily
involves the protection of property, specifically business property,” he
claims.323 Hazard draws from Tocqueville’s famous description of lawyers as
American aristocrats who preserve order and stability in the face of the “ill-
considered passions of democracy.”324 Stability runs both ways, from
lawyers to the state and from the state to lawyers; law as an institution
depends on the state for its existence and so has a strong tendency toward
conservativism.325 Establishment lawyers need not work for large
corporations or law firms. A public defender may be animated by an abstract
commitment to the adversary system of justice and a sincere belief that
someone must be the one to do the necessary work on behalf of criminal
defendants in order to preserve the rule of law.326 This is an “establishment”
justification for one’s professional life, even though one’s clients are outside
the circle of power-holders in society. In a slight variation, a prosecutor may
be animated by law-and-order ideals, perhaps as the result of having a
relative who was victimized by a criminal act.327
323. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1266 (1991). See
also KRAUSE, supra note 16, at 57 (“Lawyers as a profession help to preserve the present U.S. system
of overwhelming capitalist domination over state policy.”). Compare the populist sentiments of Louis
Brandeis, who argued that the role of lawyers is to curb “the excesses of capital” or “[t]here will come
a revolt of the people against the capitalists.” See Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law,
Address Before the Harvard Ethical Society (May 4, 1905), reprinted in THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 5, 8 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 3d ed.
1994).
324. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 263-70 (George Lawrence trans. & J.P.
Mayer ed., 1969).
325. See Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 305, at 8.
326. See Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 69, 97 (Philip B. Heymann & Lance Liebman eds., 1988) (“I became a
public defender because I believe passionately in our system of justice, in the adversary system.
Without a lawyer fighting with all of his strength to advocate for his client, without a lawyer as
competent and able as the prosecutor, the system simply is not legitimate.”). For a Jewish perspective
that argues the defense lawyer’s obligation is to remove evil from society, but only by means that are
themselves just, see Michael J. Broyde, Practicing Criminal Law: A Jewish Law Analysis of Being a
Prosecutor or Defense Attorney, 66 FORD. L. REV. 1141 (1998).
327. The eponymous lawyer in Notes of a Public Defender relates several experiences that caused
him to question his commitment to representing criminal defendants, including trying a rape and
robbery case on the day after a close family friend was robbed and raped. See Bellows, supra note 326,
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The American Founders shook off many British feudal institutions with
the Declaration of Independence, but they were shrewd enough to recognize
that something comparable to the English aristocracy would be necessary to
guarantee stability in this post-revolutionary society; thus, they adopted state
constitutions that contemplated a significant role for the law and the legal
profession.328 Some early American legal theorists attempted to equate
lawyers with ministers of order, who were responsible for minimizing
factionalism and chaos.329 But it is probably not necessary to browbeat
lawyers into maintaining order, because the law itself is frequently felt as a
stabilizing force. “Men who have made a special study of the laws and have
derived therefrom habits of order, something of a taste for formalities, and an
instinctive love for a regular concatenation of ideas are naturally strongly
opposed to the revolutionary spirit.”330 (This approving observation by
Tocqueville has been deconstructed by some critical legal theorists, who
have vehemently attacked legal education for its supposed tendencies to
inculcate conservative dispositions in students.331)
It is inevitable, however, in a system founded on the authority of
precedent and on respect for the past, that lawyers will tend toward
gradualism and incremental change. The foundational assumption of the
common law system is that something ought to be done in a certain way
because it has been done that way in the past; in other words, past decisions
are necessary to confer legitimacy on present actions.332 Present actions in a
tradition-based framework are not the product of all-things-considered
rational deliberation, but are constrained to some degree by what decision
makers have done before in relevantly similar cases. Of course, the authority
of precedent can be defended on instrumental grounds— for example,
because it makes deliberation more efficient by saving decision makers from
constantly reinventing the wheel, and makes decisions more uniform and
at 78. Bellows recounts another case where he had to seek reassignment— the defendant had allegedly
robbed a pregnant woman and threatened to kick her in the stomach if she did not hand over the
money; at the time, Bellows’s wife was six months pregnant. See id. at 80. If these experiences could
shake the ideals of a committed public defender, they could just as readily motivate a lawyer to
become a prosecutor.
328. See Paul D. Carrington, A Tale of Two Lawyers, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 615 (1997).
329. See id. at 621, citing FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, republished
in 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1883 (1995).
330. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 324, at 264.
331. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 38 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990); Robert V. Stover, Making It
and Breaking It: The Fate of Public Interest Commitment in Law School, reprinted in LAWYERS: A
CRITICAL READER 75 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1997).
332. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
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therefore predictable.333 Lawyers, however, are taught to respect the past not
only pragmatically, but morally, because it deserves to be respected for its
own sake as an articulation of an ideal moral vision to which we aspire.334
The decisions and traditions of the past represent the people’s attempt to
come to grips with conflicting moral demands and values, and thus to make
sense of the complexities of moral life. And because, as I have been arguing,
moral values cannot always be compared impersonally, without reference to
a particular community of reasoners, the past is a critical resource for making
ethical decisions in the present. There is no way to compare incomparable
values other than by reference to what has been done in similar cases.335 By
helping to conserve this social self-understanding and pass it along through
decisions that look to the past for their justification, lawyers perform an
exceedingly valuable public function, which cannot be replaced by a
rebellious group that considers itself to be fundamentally agents of radical
change.
Establishment lawyering is animated by the rule-of-law ideal so
eloquently captured in Robert Bolt’s play about Sir Thomas More. More’s
future son-in-law, Will Roper, argues that legal rules should be cast aside if
justice so requires.
ROPER: So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law!
MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to
get after the Devil?
ROPER: I’d cut down every law in England to do that!
MORE: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you— where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?
This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast— man’s
laws, not God’s— and if you cut them down— and you’re just the man
to do it— [do] you really think you could stand upright in the winds
that would blow then? Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my
own safety’s sake.336
333. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 63 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
334. Kronman, supra note 332, at 1039; Kronman, supra note 265, at 1569. But see UNGER,
LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 306, at 115 (“To be tolerable within a democracy a common law cannot
represent the cumulative discovery and refinement of a natural and stable world of custom by a group
of legal wise men.”).
335. See generally JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 9.
336. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 65-66 (Vintage Books 1990) (1960). A Westlaw
search for this passage in the database of journals and law reviews turned up well over 150 hits,
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If we could be sure the devil would not turn on us, there would be some
justification for cutting down all the trees. The problem with any model of
lawyering that permits lawyers to disregard legal norms is that there is no
guarantee that a transgression for the sake of justice will not be used to relax
the protection of legal rules in the future for an unjust purpose. Furthermore,
by repudiating norms that powerful actors claim to respect, lawyers like
Roper seem to invite a powerful backlash and will be unable to cling to the
norms they trashed previously when that backlash comes.
Just as the rebellious-lawyer paradigm misses some salient features of
legal practice, so does the aristocratic model of the establishment lawyer.
One should be cautious not to assume too quickly that legal norms are
invariant facts about the world or that preserving the system of laws in its
present form is the ethically mandated course of action for lawyers. These are
related, but distinct lines of criticism. The first critique is suggested by the
legal realist understanding of the law: sometimes the devil is not hiding in the
forest, but is the trees themselves. The vivid metaphor in More’s response to
Roper suggests that laws, and ethical restraints on the behavior of lawyers,
are empirical facts “out there” in the physical universe, like rocks and
streams and trees, that any competent observer can acknowledge to exist.337
Laws, like trees, should not be cut down. But what if this metaphor is
misleading? What if the devil is not hiding behind trees, but behind smoke
and mirrors, or behind illusions of trees the devil has conjured up? Roper
would surely be justified in pointing out that what seems like a forest is
merely an image, and once the deception is unmasked, we can see the devil
exposed for the fraud he is. Some legal realists claimed that the law was
nothing more than the product of decisions made by political actors.338
“[T]he existence of rules of law, as anything outside of the books, is an
illusion.”339 More recently, it has become commonplace for left-leaning legal
scholars to point out that what seem to be neutral, objective rules are often
nothing more than the entrenchment of results favorable to powerful
actors.340 Law and economics scholars point to the theory of interest groups,
indicating that Bolt’s defense of the rule of law has struck a chord with jurists.
337. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Cohen, supra note 118.
338. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH (1930).
339. Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1931)
(summarizing, and qualifiedly endorsing, this realist position).
340. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977); Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Mark Kelman, The
Deification of Process, in A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Richard Davies Parker, The
Past of Constitutional Theory— And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Mark V. Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 781 (1983). Even critics of Critical Legal Studies rehearse this argument, if only to demonstrate
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which states that participants in the political process compete for legislation
or regulations that favor their own interests over those of others.341 Applied
to More’s image, these critiques suggest that we do not know where the trees
are until we have managed to identify the devil.
The second critique emphasizes the role of lawyers in speaking truth to
power and in resisting concentration of power in the hands of the state or
corporations. The result of the emphasis on lawyers as aristocrats or
guardians of tradition has been, as Paul Carrington argues, two centuries of
relatively stable democratic government. But the price of this stability has
been the relentless demand that lawyers understand themselves as public
professionals capable of perceiving and acting on the common good.342 It is
just this demand that throws rebellious lawyers into a rage, for their clients
have manifestly not benefitted from whatever general good is enjoyed
elsewhere in society. If the principal argument of this paper is correct, in
many cases there is no uniquely proper priority of moral values that holds
necessarily for all moral agents. Thus, there may be two equally permissible
options in a dilemma situation— neither choice would represent “unethical”
conduct. If, however, a powerful group were able to influence discourse
about ethics, it might succeed in labeling permissible behavior as unethical.
There is not necessarily anything sinister about the process of achieving
social consensus about contested ethical judgments— this is what
communities do in cases where values stand in conflict. The danger is not
from rhetoric and persuasion as such, but with dominance and the breakdown
of discourse.343 If all interested members of a community are given a voice
that is heard and respected, then a community’s normative judgments are
entitled to respect, but if those in power are permitted to suppress the
positions of dissenters by coercion, then a genuine moral consensus does not
exist.
The locus of power is, of course, often the government, and the model of
establishment lawyering is always in danger of fetishizing the state.344
that it is not all that original. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 96, at 266-80. Jefferson Powell offers the
argument from the intriguingly different standpoint of theology. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE
MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1993).
341. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
342. Carrington, supra note 328, at 633.
343. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas
McCarthytrans., 1984). Ely’s constitutional theory is, I think, related to Habermas’s project of
establishing the legitimacy of norms in discursive rationality. See generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
344. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Book Review, 41 LOY. L. REV. 387 (1995) (reviewing
KRONMAN, supra note 15).
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Establishment lawyers locate the source of justice and stability in institutions
that have withstood the test of time and have proven their worth as
repositories of moral understanding for generations. A thoughtful
conservative theory of lawyering would include in the set of relevant
institutions such private “mediating associations” as families, churches,
neighborhoods, unions, clubs, and civic organizations.345 These associations
have a great deal to teach us about what is morally valuable in social life and,
by contrast, the government may have very little to say on the subject of what
makes a good person. As I have emphasized previously, however, a theory of
lawyering cannot confine itself to sources of normativity that are not
accessible to the majority of citizens in society.346 Political institutions, such
as courts and legislatures, and including lawyers, must take responsibility for
offering moral truth— claims to the community as a whole, taking due
account of the normative claims of the constituent subcommunities. What
binds us together as a polity are deeper value commitments shared by
members of these mediating institutions, and the task of governing in a
pluralistic society is that of discovering a coherent scheme of principles to
which everyone can assent, regardless of his or her particular allegiances.347
Mediating institutions are, to be sure, an essential part of the process by
which fundamental normative commitments are elucidated, but a role
nevertheless remains for political entities to harmonize conflicting value
claims into a coherent scheme of principles. This is an ideal theory of the role
of state institutions, but it is by no means equivalent to the view that the role
of lawyers and judges is simply to execute the will of the elected branches of
government. Rights remain as “trumps” against the will of the majority
where the majority’s action is inconsistent with fundamental principles of our
political order (again, which can be developed and preserved by mediating
institutions). One of the basic roles of lawyers in our society is therefore to
safeguard these rights, by resisting state power if necessary.
Finally, the problem noted earlier of the plurality of traditions within the
legal profession can be observed, writ large, in society. Asking lawyers to
guard and preserve tradition merely moves the inquiry back one level. Which
tradition, or whose tradition, ought to be preserved? (This argument is the
345. See id at 397; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Towering Figures, Enigmas, and Responsive
Communities in American Legal Ethics, 51 MAINE L. REV. 229 (1999) (forthcoming); cf. DWORKIN,
supra note 10, at 196-99; WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989);
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1989).
346. See Wendel, supra note 15.
347. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 225 (“[I]ntegrity instructs judges to identify legal rights and
duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single author— the
community personified— expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness.”).
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mirror image of the concern, noted above, that rebellious lawyers ought to
make sure that the position they urge is in fact held by their clients.) Surely
divergent principles of political morality may be located in American
political history and in contemporary discourse.348 We are a society that
emerged from a revolution, adopted chattel slavery, pushed westward
through the conquest of native people, fought a bloody war for preservation
of the union, became a colonial power, grew to be an economic and political
colossus after fighting two world wars, and gradually embraced the ideals of
racial and gender equality starting in the middle this century. Our history
reveals strands of socialist agitation and radicalism as well as unfettered
capitalism; progressivism and Jacksonian populism; imperialism,
isolationism, and internationalism; secularism and religious piety; racism and
liberation. In contemporary society, political discourse is a curious amalgam
of libertarianism, civic republicanism, New Deal statism, and natural law
theory. As Cynthia Fuchs Epstein observes:
Americans believe in equal justice for all, but they do not value
funding of the institutional supports to achieve it. They believe in
justice for the poor, but not in government support for legal services;
they believe that morality is essential, but pragmatic necessities may
dictate skirting it; they believe discrimination in employment is not
right, but employers should have the right to employ anyone they
wish; they believe that all people are created equal but that
individuals’ abilities vary according to ethnicity, race, and gender. . . .
Americans believe women should participate in public life and have
full professional careers, but women must take primary responsibility
for children, and the state should not provide or subsidize childcare.349
These contradictions surface in legal disputes, as in tort law, where each
doctrinal development recapitulates old battles between notions of individual
responsibility and collective risk-spreading, or in contract law, where
“freedom of contract” and protection of powerless parties perenially clash.
Each of these strands of our public self-understanding is rooted in genuine
political traditions, and cannot easily be ruled out as a valid basis for policy
decisions. As it is impossible to pinpoint only one of these historical currents
as the authentic expression of what we stand for as a polity, establishment
348. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 67-68
(1988); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801
(1993); Johnson, supra note 340, at 268-70; Glen O. Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269
(1997).
349. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Knowledge for What?, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41, 41 (1999).
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lawyers seem destined to bicker endlessly over the precise contours of the
tradition they seek to preserve.
V. NARRATIVE UNITY
A. A Limited Role for Personal Values in Legal Ethics
In the majority of cases, the choice between incomparable values is
governed by professional traditions that favor one value over the others. In
other situations, however, the customs and practices of a community of
lawyers is underdeterminate with respect to the decision faced by the agent
because, as we have seen, the practice of lawyering generates multiple
communities with divergent ethical norms.
Where professional traditions permit two or more incompatible solutions
to an ethical dilemma, an alternative guiding principle for lawyers making
choices between incomparable alternatives is the concept of narrative
unity.350 Personal history is “an enacted dramatic narrative in which the
characters are the authors.”351 In other words, persons constitute themselves
by their own actions. Ethical agents are not decision makers that approach
each choice anew, bound to decide on a course of action based solely on the
facts as they present themselves in that case. Instead, they approach ethical
choices as persons who have lived lives shaped in particular ways by past
decisions and commitments. Think of a government official who has
maintained a commitment to protecting and conserving natural resources
over the course of her political career.352 That official might ultimately
become intellectually convinced that permitting mining in pristine wilderness
land is, on balance, ethically permissible (but not mandatory) for reasons of
social policy. She may personally be unable to order that action, however,
because of her lifelong commitment to wilderness preservation. Her
reluctance is not due to the impersonal calculus of values, which we have
350. See MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 214-25; MACINTYRE, supra note 22, at 196-215;
CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1992). Dworkin seems to accept a similar account
of moral decision-making for individuals. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 166. See also Kupfer, supra
note 244, at 71 (noting that the value of “authenticity” represents being true to one’s inner core of
values, allowing one’s choices to develop these values over time, while simultaneously being
constrained by prior decisions); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas, 84
J. PHIL. 263, 271-72 (1987) (moral antirealists can explain choices between incomparable alternatives
by factoring in the agent’s commitments and way of life as truth conditions for moral judgments).
351. MACINTYRE, supra note 22, at 215.
352. Charles Taylor offers a similar example in his thoughtful article on narrative unity. See
Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL
REASON 170, 176-77 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
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assumed comes out as permitting exploitation. Rather, it owes to how the
choice between conservation and development interacts with her own value
structure; she has decided, at some point in the past, that environmental
protection is a cause she will take seriously, even at significant cost. Taking
this value seriously means she gives environmental conservation greater
weight in her own scheme of values than the value has in the calculus of
social harms and benefits. Expressing this commitment, she might even
choose to resign her government position rather than approve of mining in
the wilderness. This commitment is a criterion for choice, even among
incomparable values. “Choosing in harmony with one’s past reasonable
commitments, and, thus, establishing or maintaining one’s personal integrity
(in the non-moral as well as the moral sense), constitutes an important reason
which often guides our choices between rationally grounded options.”353
Personal identity and narrative unity often enter professional ethics
discussions in connection with one of the most morally problematic
occupations in our society: working as a public defender, representing clients
who are almost certainly guilty, knowing that if one does one’s job well,
some extremely dangerous individuals will be permitted back on the
streets.354 A lawyer with Marxist commitments, for example, may have an
understanding of the moral worth of her work that arises out of her ideology,
which would tend to view defense of accused criminals as part of a class
struggle. Alternatively, a lawyer may be motivated by a powerful sense of
compassion for the oppressed and may be committed above all else to
ministering to the despised of society.355 Another lawyer may have a more
abstract commitment to the adversary system of justice and a sincere belief
that she must be the one to do the necessary work on behalf of criminal
defendants in order to preserve the rule of law.356 Finally, lawyers may
choose this career for egoistic reasons, such as the achievement of trial skills
that will be marketable to private firms. A lawyer who is just biding her time
353. George, supra note 201, at 189; see also ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 59-64; Edmund
Pincoffs, Quandary Ethics, in REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 92
(Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre, eds., 1983).
354. See generally Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993).
355. Thomas Shaffer has offered a theological justification for lawyering that draws heavily from
New Testament stories of Jesus among the outcasts. See SHAFFER, supra note 20, at 71-79 (1981).
According to Shaffer, a lawyer’s commitment to defending accused criminals may be grounded
powerfully by a religious faith that teaches the inherent dignity of human beings; one’s clients “are
children of God, infinitely valuable, more valuable than any government or all governments.” Id. at
100.
356. See Bellows, supra note 326, at 97; see also Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty,
32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 177-78 (1983).
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as a public defender, waiting to become an accomplished trial lawyer, will
have a very different reaction to defending society’s outcasts than a
committed Marxist or Christian lawyer. Of course, none of these reasons for
working as a public defender may apply to a given individual; perhaps there
is no reason why a particular lawyer would want that job, given the kind of
person she is. That is all right. It may be morally permissible for a generically
described moral agent to do X, yet not permissible for me in light of my
commitments, personal history, and moral character.357 Counterintuitive
though this may seem, it is an important, and often overlooked dimension of
ethical reasoning. The choices we make should not be evaluated
impersonally, as though we were automatons or value-computers reasoning
in a vacuum, but should be measured against the background of the lives we
have chosen to lead.
One’s life history is not merely a collection of weights assigned to and
balances struck between various goods. It is also a particular scheme in
which goods are fitted together to form a coherent whole, to construct a
unique individual.358 The creation of a background narrative is essential to a
scheme of normative evaluation: “any set of moral admonitions . . . rests on a
culture and a story.”359 Compare Ronald Dworkin’s familiar analogy of the
law to a chain novel, written by a succession of authors, each of whom must
be concerned with creating a coherent whole out of the contributions of
predecessors.360 Depending on what has gone before, an author maybe use
the character of Scrooge in A Christmas Carol to embody the inherent evil in
humankind, or to illustrate how an essentially good person may be corrupted
by capitalism. If only a few chapters have been written, the author may take
either direction, but if a considerable amount of character development has
occurred and some of the key events of the novel have taken place, the
author’s choices are much more narrowly circumscribed. In either case, the
novel must display the virtues of unity and coherence— there would be
something deeply wrong with a version of Romeo and Juliet that suddenly
became a do-it-yourself manual for suicides.361 Similarly a human agent that
357. See Pincoffs, supra note 353, at 101.
358. See Babcock, supra note 356, at 179; Boyle, supra note 273, at 495 n.2; Finnis, supra note
226, at 220-22.
359. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 66 (1991).
360. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 228-38.
361. I owe this example to James Boyle. See James D.A. Boyle, Legal Fiction, 38 HAST. L.J.
1013, 1016 (1987) (book review). Of course, as Boyle points out in reviewing Law’s Empire,
Dworkin’s analogy only works if the hypothetical author assumes certain conventions about novelistic
aesthetics. If the author wishes instead to produce a “postmodern” novel, with many abrupt shifts in
viewpoint, unresolved contradictions, and a marked lack of unity, then the previous chapters of the
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did not display integrity and unity throughout her lifetime would be thought
somewhat eccentric at best, mad at worst.
The ability of persons to rank goods differently, assign different weights
to competing values, and form a commitment to one goal to the exclusion of
others is what makes us humans as opposed to utility-machines.362 For
Joseph Raz, the essence of being human is the capacity to live a different, but
equally valuable form of life from one’s fellows. “[A] person cannot
normally lead the life both of action and of contemplation . . . nor can one
person possess all the virtues of a nun and of a mother.”363 If there are forms
of life that exemplify virtues that cannot be realized in other, equally morally
worthy forms of life, then the ideal of a single perfect form of life is a
chimera. This vision of persons as expressions of plural values suggests a
model of professional ethics in which lawyers’ decisions are imperfectly
constrained by values that they have adopted and made central to their moral
identities. Just as neither a nun nor a mother can be criticized for failing to
realize the virtues particular to the other, so is it possible that two or more
types of lawyers may exist, each of which exemplifies competing but
incompatible virtues. Different lawyers may therefore resolve dilemmas of
choice between incomparable values differently, depending on their prior
commitments. The lawyer’s life history provides a resource for working
through the problem of weighing values and balancing them against one
another. Incomparable values are what give our lives shape, and our lives in
turn become a rich resource for helping us make choices between
incomparable values.364
What this means, however, is that ethical decisions can never become
completely theorized and predictable. We are often tempted to think that
ethics is analogous to a set of rules of the road, with general prescriptions,
exceptions, and priority rules: wait at a red light until it turns green, unless
you are making a right, and then only go if there is no approaching traffic on
the intersecting road, and then only if you are not driving in New York City,
novel would provide comparatively little constraint. Postmodern critics like Boyle probably would be
delighted to find Romeo and Juliet turn into Final Exit, or Around the World in Eighty Days into a
holiday brochure. But even Boyle might be alarmed to find a postmodern work abruptly abandoning
its own aesthetic presuppositions, as if Joyce suddenly began writing like Melville in the middle of
Finnegan’s Wake. It is only the assumption that the novelist is playing around with, or appropriating,
someone else’s convention that gives postmodern fiction its coherence.
362. Cf. Brian Bix, Dealing with Incommensurability for Dessert and Desert: Comments on
Chapman and Katz, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1652-53 (1998) (the incommensurability of values
makes choice— in the sense of judgment or will— possible, because an automaton could choose $500
over $100, but only a human could choose a way of life over an incomparable alternative).
363. RAZ, supra note 12, at 395.
364. See Pincoffs, supra note 353, at 100-03; Taylor, supra note 352, at 182-83.
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and so on.365 No matter how complex these systems become, they may
always be evaluated impersonally; two different drivers would resolve a
rules-of-the-road dilemma the same way, provided that the situation were
described with sufficient particularity. Many philosophers believe that the
same is true for ethics. They hold that you may describe a conflict— between,
say, a promise made to one’s friend and an unexpected opportunity to save a
life— and formulate generally applicable rules and meta-rules of ranking that
determine the right resolution of the dilemma for all similarly-situated agents.
But this description of the problem leaves out the character of the
deliberating agent, without which, in many cases, there is insufficient
information to solve the problem. Perhaps there are two or more sets of
authentic human value commitments, both of which are morally worthy, but
which would lead the agent to resolve the dilemma differently. In that case,
there would be a plurality of right answers, none of which is impersonally
better. It is only by virtue of the agent’s value structure that a ranking
procedure may be specified.
Philosophers who invoke plural moral values and personal character often
draw an analogy with aesthetics. Why should we think that morality leads to
only one rational solution to a problem any more than we think the standard
of “beauty” ought always to pick out one artistic work as better than another?
This is not to suggest that aesthetic ideals have no content— every competent
observer would agree that Schubert is a better composer than elevator-music
maestro John Tesh, for example, in terms of musical values like logical
structure, harmonic inventiveness, thematic beauty, mastery of the
vocabulary of prior artists, and so on. But who is a better composer, Brahms
or Thelonious Monk? Here the comparison invokes shared values, but
straddles divergent ideals, neither of which may be deemed intrinsically
superior to the other. Each ideal emphasizes different virtues as central— for
Brahms it is musical logic and the fusion of classical and romantic styles, for
Monk it is startling originality and interpretive daring— although neither
ideal excludes the other virtues, which remain as complementary elements in
each composer’s work. Just as these composers balanced aesthetic values
differently, music lovers may be attracted to one or the other, depending on
what elements in music move them. Similarly, in the domain of morality, a
person may cultivate, for example, an ideal that is highly responsive to
human suffering, or one that is as honest as Abraham Lincoln, in which one
virtue is judged to be the cardinal organizing principle of the individual’s
365. This example, and the deeper point about the false analogy between ethics and rule-based
decision making, is from Pincoffs, supra note 353, at 98-99.
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ethical life.366 Both ideals are socially acceptable; neither can be ruled out as
a pattern for human life on the basis of our shared traditions and
understandings. By the same token, neither can be held superior to the other
in our ethical tradition. In some cases of ethical conflict, one ideal may
demand one course of action, the other ideal, another. As long as both ideals
are indeed expressions of strands that we consider valuable and worthy of
respect within our ethical tradition, either course of action must be regarded
as permissible, and neither agent may be criticized in moral terms. Just as we
can cultivate tastes for classicism or romanticism, modernism or post-
modernism within the domain of beauty, in the realm of ethics we can
approve of diverse ideals that agents may adopt as guides for leading their
lives.
B. Objections
The account of professional ethics as narrative unity is open to several
criticisms, which show some of the limits of personal character as a criterion
of moral choice.
1. Integrity Does Not Guarantee Goodness
Agents can display a high degree of integrity but nevertheless be
monstrously evil. Consider one of the great villains from literature, the
renegade of Avignon, whose story is retold by Rameau’s nephew in
Diderot’s dialogue of the same name.367 This man became intimate friends
with a Jew in Avignon, lived in his house, and eventually won his complete
confidence. One day, however, the man and his Jewish friend were reported
to agents of the Inquisition. Terrified, the Jew asked his friend what should
be done. “Be seen going about your business, affect the greatest unconcern,
carry on as usual,”368 the man replied. “This tribunal acts in secret, but
slowly. We must take advantage of these delays and sell everything. I will go
and charter a ship . . . . In it we will deposit your fortune, for that is mainly
what they are after, and then you and I will sail away to another clime.”369 As
Rameau’s nephew is telling the story, his interlocutor anticipates the
predictable result— the man steals his friends possessions and escapes on the
ship. But, as Rameau’s nephew eagerly announces, the man is far worse than
366. See id. at 108.
367. See Denis Diderot, Rameau’s Nephew, in RAMEAU’S NEPHEW/D’ALEMBERT’S DREAM 33,
93-96 (L.W. Tancock trans., Penguin Books 1966).
368. Id. at 95.
369. Id.
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that, and “the sublimity of his wickedness” is the result of the totality of his
integration of character, for he has none of the scruples of “a respectable
citizen.” Because of his supremely unified character, the man commits an act
of incomprehensible evil: he turns in his Jewish friend to the Inquisition, who
is promptly led to the bonfire. The younger Rameau claims to admire this
man precisely because of his peerless integration: “If it is important to be
sublime in anything, it is especially so in evil. You spit on a petty thief, but
you can’t withhold a sort of respect from a great criminal. . . . What you
value in everything is consistency of character.”370
The story told by the younger Rameau shows that narrative unity cannot
serve as the sole criterion of good character or of good actions. The lawyer
may not be in as good a position to determine the right course of action as
others who have confronted a similar situation in the past. The merit of
tradition-based methods of practical reasoning is respect for the wise
decisions of those who have gone before. The narrative unity account, by
contrast, does not explicitly constrain the agent’s judgment either to the
accumulated wisdom of the past, or to the virtue of the truly wise decision
maker. “Agents may be as conscientious as you please, but their opinions
will have value only if they are informed and experienced as well.”371 Thus, a
proponent of narrative unity should ideally construct a theory of judgment
that integrates an intersubjective component, so that the agent’s deliberation
will be influenced by public norms and by the opinions of other ethically
conscientious people who have confronted similar dilemmas. This condition
may partly be fulfilled by requiring that agents offer as reasons only those
principles that are general enough to apply to others who are similarly
situated.372 Although narrative unity focuses on the agent, subjective
370. Id. at 93. For another example of a writer who has explored the possibility of integration in
evil, consider Arthur Miller’s play Incident at Vichy, discussed by James Boyle. See Boyle, supra note
273, at 512. In the play, a roomful of detainees are trying to convince themselves that whatever the
Nazis have in mind for them, it cannot possibly be extermination. After all, they reason, it is wartime
and the Nazis would presumably prefer to use captives as forced labor. But one of the prisoners finally
sees the situation with clarity— evil is not constrained by ordinary self-interested rationality: “If you
despise Jews the most honest thing is to burn them up. And the fact that it costs money, and uses up
trucks and personnel— this only guarantees the integrity, the purity, the existence of their feelings.”
ARTHUR MILLER, INCIDENT AT VICHY 40 (1965). The story is a great reductio ad absurdem argument
against admiring people for their unity of character alone. See also the description of Charles-Henri
Sanson, the executioner of Paris, in ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE
MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 15-42 (1999).
371. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 9, at 313.
372. See AUDI, supra note 15, at 279-86 (arguing for a “Kantian intuitionism” in which
universalizability in the form of the Categorical Imperative operates as a constraint on the prudent
agent’s balancing of prima facie obligations); Kupfer, supra note 244, at 88-89 (citing several works
by Jürgen Habermas, who argues that valid norms must be justified by reasons which could be
accepted by all other participants in the ideal speech situation).
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principles will be valid justificatory reasons for practical judgments only
where they are capable of being accepted by others as a grounds for action,
lest ethical decisions be merely solipsistic. In addition to this intersubjective
component, universalizability (in the Kantian sense) still plays a role in
ethical decision making. A decision must conform to an ideal that we could,
in principle, accept as an ideal for others to follow, even though we may not
choose to adopt that ideal ourselves. Universalizability may establish a range
of acceptable choices while ruling others out as inconsistent with
authentically valuable ideals.373 Put another way, genuine integration is not
possible around wicked moral principles.374
It is worth emphasizing that narrative unity is intended to function as a
criterion for ethical choice only in that limited subset of cases in which the
norms and practices of the relevant interpretive community are ambiguous.
In such cases, there will probably be a narrow range in which agents may
resolve dilemmas differently, but there naturally will be many other possible
solutions that are out of bounds for the community.
2. Compartmentalization
Second, narrative unity may function as a theory of professional ethics
only if the actor’s professional self and personal self are conceived of as
unitary. Not all who have written about public morality have thought that
professional actions are governed by the same norms applicable to personal
moral decisions. One of the most famous statements of this separation is
from Montaigne: “The mayor and Montaigne have always been two people,
clearly separated.”375 Complete role-differentiation, as envisioned by
Montaigne, requires not only that the agent’s public and private actions be
clearly segregated, but also that the dispositions and character relevant to
each role be similarly separable. Many Americans, for example, are willing
to forgive Bill Clinton for his marital infidelities, reasoning that these
infractions relate to his private self rather than to an aspect of his character
that relates to his performance as President. The public seems able to draw
the line envisioned by Montaigne between the President’s private and public
lives. Moreover, Clinton himself appears to value the bifurcation of his
personal and professional selves, accepting praise for being the morally good
person who advances his public-policy initiatives while insisting on the
373. See Pincoffs, supra note 353, at 111.
374. See GEORGE, supra note 35, at 79; cf. Mark Tushnet, Flourishing and the Problem of Evil, 63
TUL. L. REV. 1631, 1642-43 (1989).
375. Quoted in Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 20 (1951).
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irrelevance of his darker, private side.376
This separation frequently proves tenuous and unstable. Eventually, in the
example of Bill Clinton, the suspicion grows that if he would break his
marriage vows and lie to his wife, then he very well also might lie to the
public about, say, his motives for attacking terrorist installations overseas.
This evaluation is based on the intuition that, unlike the case of Montaigne,
“William Jefferson Clinton” and “the President” are not always clearly
separated. The dispositions that Clinton cultivates in his private life must
inevitably spill over into the character he brings to his performance of public
duties. Alternatively, a public figure who adheres to a strict public-private
separation becomes an unattractive character in terms of both his personal
and official selves. There is something inhuman about a person who “refuses
to be seen except in pieces,”377 and who insists that all his character traits be
seen in isolation from one another, as though they were manifestations of a
split personality.378 Finally, even within the realm of public acts, we should
not regard radical compartmentalization as normatively desirable. A
government official who can easily separate his role as a spouse from the
relationship of trust he maintains with the public may be so morally
fragmented that he is unable to appreciate the relevance of one government
policy to another arena of public activity.
In what remains as one of the best philosophical accounts of professional
morality, Gerald Postema argues that the strategy of separating one’s public
or occupational self from one’s personal self incurs intolerable social and
psychological costs.379 In the context of lawyering, the process of giving
legal advice to clients cannot proceed in a moral vacuum. Advocacy,
judging, and indeed, even the most fundamental process of reading and
interpreting legal texts, take place in a rich normative context. If a lawyer has
created a hermetic separation between her role-self and her personal-self, the
376. For a wry observation about Clinton’s 1999 State of the Union address as the apotheosis of
this split personality, see Maureen Dowd, Sex and Balances, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at A31.
377. Id.
378. One of the most disturbing aspects of Monica Lewinksy’s interview with Barbara Walters
was Lewinsky’s continuing effort to conceive of Clinton as having two personalities: the “person she
knew,” who seemed to care about her, and Clinton the “pure politician,” who would cast aside loyal
friends and deny his affection for Lewinsky to keep himself out of trouble. See Francis X. Clines &
Frank Bruni, In Interview and Book, Lewinsky Seizes Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at A22.
This split apparently makes Lewinsky feel less like a dupe— she fell in love with the good Clinton and
was hurt unexpectedly by the bad Clinton— but it seems an inauthentic description of human nature.
One watches this story unfold with a sense of longing to know which personality, good or bad, is the
real Bill Clinton. The possibility that both personalities could be the real Clinton is very difficult to
accept.
379. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63,
78-81 (1980).
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experience of day-to-day private life becomes unavailable as a source of
moral understanding. This problem may become manifest in the lawyer’s
inability to sympathize with the client and see the dispute through the eyes of
another. This moral myopia may lead to lack of empathy for non-parties who
are affected by ethical judgments. Alternatively, if the lawyer degenerates too
far into a Jekyll-and-Hyde role-differentiated personality, she may lose the
ability to draw from the principles of public morality that play such an
important role in the interpretation of legal texts. Finally, if practical
deliberation is not a purely deductive mode of reasoning, then it is incumbent
upon a lawyer to develop faculties that enable alternative modes of ethical
decision making, such as Aristotelian practical wisdom or casuistical
reasoning. These modes, even more than legal interpretation, require the
deliberator to draw from a wide range of sources of normative understanding.
Thus, it is impossible to retain the ability to make ethical choices if
professional and personal roles are conceived as completely separate.
3. Antirealism, Romanticism, and Relativism
It is sometimes asserted that value incomparability is incompatible with
moral realism.380 Antirealist arguments tend to scare the daylights out of
readers, particularly when expressed in stark form, as in this passage by
Richard Rorty:
Suppose that Socrates was wrong, that we have not once seen the
Truth, and so will not, intuitively, recognize it when we see it again.
This means that when the secret police come, when the torturers
violate the innocent, there is nothing to be said to them of the form
“There is something within you which you are betraying. Though you
embody the practices of a totalitarian society which will endure
forever, there is something beyond those practices which condemns
you.”381
As others have observed, Rorty can’t possibly mean what he says here.382
He is fond of radical-sounding dicta, which shake things up a bit and help
him establish the negative case for pragmatism, but his substantive positions
380. Moral realism is the thesis that “there are mind-independent moral facts in virtue of which
each moral judgment is either true or false (and not both).” GOWANS, supra note 12, at 141; see also
AUDI, supra note 15, at 287; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas, 84 J.
PHIL. 263 (1987); Timothy Williamson, Realism and Anti-Realism, in OXFORD COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY 746 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).
381. RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM xlii (1982) (emphasis omitted).
382. See STOUT, supra note 240, at 245-65.
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are generally much more modest.383 But whether or not this passage
represents Rorty’s considered views on moral realism, it does help explain
why commentators tend to be quite wary of arguments for the
incomparability of values. Indeed, similar concerns are voiced whenever
“postmodern” philosophers start talking about deconstructing every possible
source of meaning:
[T]he belief in an exclusively linguistic universe leaves humanity
more rather than less vulnerable to the forces of political tyranny.
There is, in deconstruction, neither a safeguard against nihilistic
despair nor an antidote to passive quiescence. Rather than provide a
philosophical basis for moral judgment or existential action,
deconstruction has the effect of silencing literature and language,
leaving us an intellectual void.384
If the values at play in human life are incomparable, and liberty and
equality may be traded off against one another willy-nilly, what are we to say
when the secret police come?
Statements about the incommensurability of belief systems have become
part of the rhetorical apparatus of radically skeptical, or “postmodern,”
critics. “To the . . . universality [of reason], they oppose an irreducible
plurality of incommensurable lifeworlds and forms of life, the irremediably
‘local’ character of all truth, argument, and validity.”385 Skeptics point out
that there is no way to describe facts about the world that does not depend on
the language and values of particular cultures. The crucial premise in the
skeptical argument is the impossibility of reproducing the world-as-it-is-in-
itself in language, as though language and knowledge were nothing more
than a mirror of reality. Because reality is not represented in language, the
object of study for philosophers becomes language— what people say about
the world— not the world itself. What people say about the world has, of
course, changed over time, and continues to vary among cultures. The moral
relativist then seizes on this undeniable fact to argue for the logically remote
conclusion that these linguistic frameworks must describe self-contained
383. Compare another critic’s reaction to an overstatement by Rorty: “I can imagine someone
interjecting at this point with some impatience that whatever Rorty may have literally said in the
passage at hand, it would of course never occur to him, any more than it would to anyone else, to mean
to suggest [what he said].” MICHAEL MORTON, THE CRITICAL TURN 119 (1993) (emphasis in
original).
384. DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES: DECONSTRUCTION AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE MAN
99 (1991).
385. Thomas McCarthy, Introduction, in JURGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE
OF MODERNITY vii, ix (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1987).
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islands of normativity, which cannot be compared with each other. Thus,
says the relativist, there is no way for a member of one linguistic community
to evaluate the norms of a member of different community.
Although the fear of relativism is understandable, the appropriate
response is not to search for a means to compare human goods and values on
a common scale. As Joseph Raz shows, the existence of incomparable values
is fully compatible with moral realism and does not entail moral skepticism
or relativism. Raz is quite careful to argue that, although a plurality of
alternative ways life are possible for humans, there are numerous possible
lives that are of no moral worth whatsoever.386 Moral pluralism, defended by
Raz, is simply the claim that “there are various forms and styles of life which
exemplify different virtues and which are incompatible.”387 It is not a claim
that anything goes, or that the secret police do not violate an essential aspect
of human life by dragging dissidents away to be tortured. Although Raz
argues that there are virtues particular to the life of a nun that cannot be
realized within the life of a mother, and vice versa,388 he does not claim that
there are any virtues at all in the life of a drug addict or a neo-Nazi terrorist.
The linguistic plurality argument trotted out by some postmodern critics does
not, by itself, establish that there are no morally unworthy forms of life.
Other avowedly postmodern thinkers argue that moral pluralism is
actually “a cultural and personal resource of enormous value.”389 By playing
off opposing moral traditions against one another, individuals can create
space to live freely and to challenge conventional understandings. A similar
point can be traced back to the work of a very different philosopher, Isaiah
Berlin, who has shown that totalitarianism, not moral relativism, is the
greater danger to human societies. The necessity of guarding against
authoritarian regimes should lead us to embrace the diversity of human
values and experience, rather than to deny the incomparability of values.
Liberty and equality cannot be reduced to one another, and this essential
incomparability of the two values insures against a state regime that seeks to
realize utopian ideals at the expense of individual autonomy.
[T]he belief that some single formula can in principle be found
whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized is
demonstrably false. If, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not
all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the
386. See RAZ, supra note 12, at 133.
387. Id. at 395.
388. See id.
389. Boyle, supra note 274, at 521.
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possibility of conflict— and of tragedy— can never wholly be
eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of
choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic
of the human condition.390
A totalitarian regime is thus “a horrifying picture of a frictionless society
in which differences between human beings are, as far as possible,
eliminated, . . . pressed into a social and political straitjacket which hurts and
maims and ends by crushing men in the name of a monistic theory, a dream
of a perfect, static order.”391 The siren song of monism is moral innocence,
but, as Berlin argues, the foundation of personal autonomy is pluralism,
which ensures that individuals cannot be treated by the state as mere costs of
implementing some utopian social vision. For Berlin, treating goods as
though they are interchangeable and perfectly commensurable opens the door
to totalitarian rulers, who freely subtract from individual liberty in order to
add to collective happiness.
If monism were correct, a morally justified action would preclude regret
or guilt, because the chosen option would be justified only insofar as it
represented more of the Good than the unchosen one. A public official
should decide either to allow or not allow mining in the Glacier Peak
Wilderness and then go home and sleep well, knowing that good has been
maximized. But monism is inconsistent with our experience of making
morally troubling decisions. The existence in ordinary language of non-
action-guiding moral predicates, like guilt and shame, is often taken to reveal
the incomparability of values and to refute monism. Moral emotions, like
regret and shame, show that ethical deliberation is not only concerned with
determining the right answer to a dilemma, but also with specifying the
appropriate attitude to have toward one’s actions.392 A conscientious official,
who truly appreciates the competing values involved, may approve mining
near Glacier Peak but remain profoundly troubled by the loss of so much
natural beauty. Sartre’s tragic hero will feel regret at not having taken the
other path, even though he acted as he did for good reasons. As Berlin shows,
attitudes of hesitation in the face of profound ethical choices— shame at
having done wrong and regret at the good not done— are healthy dispositions
to cultivate in powerful officials. (This insight goes a long way toward
390. ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 54 (1958).
391. Isaiah Berlin, The Decline of Utopian Ideals in the West, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF
HUMANITY 20, 45 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990). Cf. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
113 (1980) (“Only an inhuman fanatic thinks that man is made to flourish in only one way or for only
one purpose.”).
392. See STOCKER, supra note 12, at 29-35; Postema, supra note 379, at 68.
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lessening the inevitability of moral tragedy, noticed by Weber, of one who
“lets himself in for politics.”393) The same is true for lawyers, who may be
involved in wrongdoing as an inevitable consequence of their plural
commitments. Perhaps the right thing to do in a case is to cross-examine a
truthful witness brutally, to shade the truth a bit in a negotiation, or to refuse
to disclose a client’s secret that would alleviate suffering if known. But even
if those actions are justified, we would prefer that the lawyer feel regret, so
that we know she did not make her decision lightly.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is customary to end this kind of paper with an emphatic summation of
the practical consequences of one’s preferred theory of legal ethics, and it is
certainly tempting to offer one here— Alice is a sleazeball and legal practice
will never return to its former state of grace until we figure out what to do
about mean people like her; Carlos must disclose the documents or risk
making the legal proceeding an amoral farce; Emma may have been well-
intentioned, but she went too far for her client; and so on. It would have been
possible to provide such a recapitulation if a different set of problem cases
had been chosen, one in which a hard choice really did not exist. The
problems presented in this Article, however, are designed to bring into relief
the internal contradictions underlying the practice of lawyering in the United
States, which I have represented as the tension between rebellious and
establishment lawyering, but which could also be conceptualized by other,
related paired oppositions: individualistic versus altruistic, conservative
versus progressive, liberal versus communitarian, client-centered versus
public-spirited, and so on. The contradictions are successfully managed in
most cases by intersubjective agreement, which may be embodied in
disciplinary rules, principles of professional malpractice, statutes, or
administrative regulations, but need not necessarily be captured by positive
law. It is worth re-emphasizing that, in many, and perhaps most, situations in
which an ethical conflict between values stated at a high level of abstraction
may be presented, the traditions of legal practice in a given setting394 suffice
393. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
394. It may make a great deal of difference whether the relevant community is defined
geographically, as the set of lawyers who practice in a particular country, state, or city; by subject
matter, as in practice-based groups of lawyers such as the admiralty, criminal-defense, or personal-
injury bars; or along other lines such as ethnic identity, as in the National Bar Association for black
lawyers. There is a balance to be struck here, between overly particularistic definitions of community,
which would exclude some interested participants, and communities that are defined so broadly that no
set of norms and practices can be ascertained. See generally KRAUSE, supra note 16, at 54-57; Glen O.
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to resolve the conflict definitively, as the community speaks with only one
voice. Application of moral values, like the reading of texts, is constrained by
interpretive communities. The arguments here are therefore directed at that
small but interesting subset of cases in which the community does not speak
univocally, but is internally divided.
Should we prefer the theoretical elegance of a monistic foundation for
legal ethics? Perhaps some human activities can be rationalized as having
one unified end, so that participants in the practice could be judged morally
according to whether their actions furthered or hindered the agreed-upon
goal. The social practice of lawyering, however, seems almost uniquely
unsuited to this kind of simplification, for lawyers are the agents through
whom humans construct disputes and dialogue about the basic conflicts
inherent in social life. Although I do not wish to make too much of this
observation, which has become somewhat clichéd, it nevertheless is the case
that social life exhibits a fundamental contradiction, which can be
represented as the opposition between liberty and order; individualism and
collective good; or partiality and equality. Any scheme of values, therefore,
that is to underlie and justify the practice of lawyering, is bound to partake of
the same internal incoherence as the principles of social life upon which it is
founded. As Isaiah Berlin and others have argued, this insight should be
cause for hope, not despair, but it does entail acceptance of a certain level of
messiness in moral reasoning. We make sense of this chaos by reasoning
together and forming communities that coalesce around a set of shared
values, traditions, and commitments, but these communities are always in the
process of being challenged and reshaped from within and without. This
constant dialectic is what gives rise to competing self-understandings, such
as the divergent communities of rebellious and establishment lawyers.
Because the energy created by this conflict may ultimately serve as an
impetus for controlled, manageable progress (as opposed to revolution on the
one hand and ossification on the other), it is a social benefit to have a
professional group that is able to justify its activities within society by a
plurality of ends. In other words, we need both Darrows and Davises. While
no one person can be both, neither option should be ruled out of bounds for
ethically conscientious lawyers by reasoning as though one strand of
lawyering tradition in the United States is inauthentic. As Berlin and Weber
Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269 (1997); Wendel, supra note 15. It is an important part of
any communitarian ethical argument to delineate the applicable community and defend these
boundaries.
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how, the price for accommodating both subcommunities is theoretical
complexity, the possibility of insoluble conflict, and occasional moral
tragedy. The cost of failing to recognize the pluralism of professional values,
however, is much greater.
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